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Richard Sorge. James Bond of Soviet intelligence

JAMES BOND OF  
THE SOVIET  
INTELLIGENCE

Foreword

Richard Sorge is one of the most famous intelligence officers of the World War II era. In the USSR, from the mid-60s, he even to some extent became a cult figure and remains so in today's Russia. There is one rather funny pattern. The most famous are those spies (or scouts, as you like) who failed, in connection with which information about their activities was made public. But about those intelligence officers who did not fail, reliable information is often published only many decades, or even centuries after their death.

Sorge and his comrades were unlucky in the sense that almost all of them were arrested, and some of them, including Sorge himself, paid for their work with their lives. But they were lucky in terms of posthumous fame. Since both Sorge and his associates gave very detailed testimonies, which were documented and preserved to this day, and soon after the war were reflected in fictionalized and documentary books, the whole world recognized the name of Richard Sorge.

Perhaps even the legendary Red Chapel does not have such an extensive published documentary base as the Ramsay group. Indeed, many documents relating to the Soviet intelligence network in Europe during the Second World War are still classified as "secret" in both Russian and German archives. Almost everything has been published about Sorge.

And from the materials available to us, if we approach them objectively, we see before us, if not a crystal clear image of a knight without fear and reproach, but in his own way a very attractive, lively hero. That ideal image of a scout, which Soviet propaganda diligently sculpted from Sorge after 1964, when he was officially recognized as a hero in Moscow, was hampered by Richard's immoderate addiction to alcohol, as well as his unparalleled exploits on the love front. But on the whole, we are faced with a very attractive person, with his own passions and problems, but who retained for life his faith in Marxism and devotion to both Germany and the Soviet Union, and also possessed an outstanding analytical mind and fearlessness. Contrary to popular belief, Sorge did not betray anyone and began to testify only when the investigation already had extensive testimony from his comrades. And not to admit that he worked for the Comintern and Moscow, he no longer had any opportunity.

One should not exaggerate the importance of the information coming from Sorge, as well as his influence on Japanese politics. But don't underestimate its uniqueness. Even having his own man surrounded by the head of the Japanese government, "Ramsay" could hardly influence the course

Japanese cabinet policy. However, the information received from Sorge allowed Moscow to keep abreast of Japanese policy, including in the first, most difficult months of the Great Patriotic War. And, I will add, such an extensive and effective intelligence network in Japan, which worked without failure for eight whole years, did not have any intelligence in Japan at that time in the world.

## Childhood and youth

Our hero's childhood was happy and cloudless. Richard Sorge was born in the family of a German engineer Gustav Wilhelm Richard Sorge, who was engaged in oil production at the Nobel company in the Baku fields, a rather wealthy man. This happened on October 4, 1895 in the village of Sabunchi, Baku district. It should be noted that in his autobiography, Sorge indicated that he was born in Ajikent (Elizavetpol province, now a district within the city of Ganja), but most biographers converge on Sabunchi as the birthplace of the future great intelligence officer. Richard's mother was the second wife of Gustav Sorge. Her name was Nina Stepanovna Kobeleva, and she was the daughter of a Russian railway worker. Nina was 15 years younger than her husband. Note that Richard's great-uncle, Friedrich Adolf Sorge, was one of the leaders of the First International and the secretary of Karl Marx, as well as a prominent figure in the American labor movement. In his 1927 autobiography, Richard Sorge wrote: "My father's family is a family of hereditary intellectuals and at the same time a family with old revolutionary traditions. Both my own grandfather and both of my cousins, especially Friedrich Adolf Sorge, were active revolutionaries on the eve, in time and after the revolution of 1848". However, Richard's father did not accept the family's revolutionary traditions in any way.

Gustav Wilhelm's father was a surgeon, and his more distant ancestors were pharmacists. Gustav himself became a specialist in deep drilling, studied oil production in America, and this specialty allowed him to easily earn his bread and butter. In 1877, Gustav Sorge moved from America to Baku to organize a workshop for the creation of drilling equipment at the Otto Lenz mechanical plant. At the same time, the main direction of his activity was the creation of industrial exploration equipment for deep drilling. As the author of a fictionalized biography of Richard Sorge Hans Otto Meissner wrote about his father, "he brought his wife to the south of Russia in Baku, because the Russian Tsar needed oil and he paid big money to those who found it."

In 1898 Gustav Wilhelm Richard Sorge's health deteriorated. The humid Baku climate was not for him. And Sorge Sr. decided to return with his family to Germany, since he had already earned more than enough money. In 1902, Richard was sent to an advanced real school in Berlin Lichtenfeld.

The Sorge family settled in a comfortable part of Berlin Lankwitz (Steglitz district), where representatives of the middle class lived, on Mozartstrasse 29.

Gustav Wilhelm was going to do scientific work, but when the bank "Disconto-Gesellschaft", interested in his knowledge of the state of affairs in Russia, in particular in Baku, and his linguistic knowledge (engineer

fluent in English and Russian), invited him to become a director, he agreed - this provided the family with a comfortable existence. So, in 1900, he compiled a report for the bank on the situation of the Romanian oil industry, and earlier on the Baku oil fields.

As for the beliefs of Gustav Wilhelm, Richard himself called his father a "nationalist and imperialist." The father took care of their education and outlook, while the mother tried so that the children would not forget about their second homeland - Russia.

At home they spoke two languages, Russian and German, but preferred Russian-Caucasian cuisine.

Sorge recalled in "Prison Notes": "I was acutely worried that I was born in the South Caucasus and was brought to Berlin at a very early age. And our family was in many ways different from ordinary Berlin bourgeois families. Since our family was somewhat alien to the Sorge clan, I had one strange feature in my childhood: I was different from ordinary children, like all my brothers and sisters. not to mention physical education, I was in the upper half of the class, but in other subjects below average. At the age of 15, I developed a great interest in Goethe, Schiller, Lessing, Klopstock, Dante and other works, and in addition I became addicted, without even understanding anything, to history, philosophy and Kant. From history, I especially liked the periods of the French Revolution, Napoleonic

wars and the era of Bismarck. I knew the current German problems even better than ordinary adults. For many years I have studied the political situation in detail. At school, they even called me the prime minister.

I knew that my grandfather was involved in the labor movement, but I also knew that my father's views were diametrically opposed to my grandfather's. My father was an ardent nationalist and imperialist, and all his life he could not get rid of the impressions received in his youth during the creation of the German Empire during the war of 1870-1871. He always kept in mind the capital and social position lost abroad. My older brother became a left-wing extremist. I remember that he had an extremely anarchist inclination, influenced by the writings of Nietzsche and Steiner. I have been a member of the workers' athletic association for a long time, and so I had constant contact with the workers. But as a schoolboy, I had no clear political position. I was only interested in acquiring political knowledge and did not at all think of somehow defining my personal position by this, and there were no opportunities to do so.

It is characteristic that among his literary predilections, Sorge named only the German classics. Obviously, the fact that he was born and spent the first three years of his life on the territory of the Russian Empire, as well as the presence of a Russian mother, did not mean for Richard the perception of Russia as his homeland. Although he spoke Russian more or less fluently, almost all of his written works were written in German, and Richard did not show any increased interest in Russian history and culture in childhood and adolescence. Yes, it seems, and about the revolutionary traditions of the family until the First World War

never remembered.

Although Richard Sorge joined the working athletic club, he did not have definite political views. Rather, he was characterized by spontaneous anarchism. He was a good-natured and sociable fellow and was popular with his comrades.

On December 1, 1907, my father died at the age of 55. It is said that he abused alcohol. Inflation during the First World War and after it ate all his father's fortune. Nina Sorge was forced to leave her comfortable house in Lankwitz and move to a rented apartment in a less prosperous Berlin area. Sorge's mother survived her husband by 45 years and died in 1952 in Germany.

Sorge's daughters from his first marriage, Natalie and Anna, survived the Second World War, but their further fate is unknown. The Sorge family had five children - three sons from the second marriage and two daughters from the first marriage. The eldest son Hermann was a chemical engineer, lived in Mainz and died in 1958. The middle son Wilhelm, according to Richard, "before the First World War was a revolutionary social democrat (after the war he is not)." He subsequently became rich, but went missing on the eve of World War II.

## World War I

In the summer of 1914, Sorge, together with the school company, went to Sweden. They returned to Germany at the end of July on the last ship

just before the start of the war, which no one expected. And already on the night of August 1-2, mobilization was announced in Germany. Sorge did not take the final exams and in October 1914, without graduating from a real school (the Higher District School of Berlin), he volunteered for the army. In prison, he recalled: "If we talk about the reason that prompted me to decide on such an escape, then this is an ardent desire to gain new experience and get rid of schoolwork, the desire to get rid of the thoughtless and completely meaningless life of an 18-year-old youth, as well as the general excitement generated by I did not consult with my elders, or with my mother, or with other relatives ...

Immediately after the outbreak of the war, I underwent an incomplete six-week training on a training ground near Berlin, and was immediately sent to Belgium, and took part in the battle on the Yser River. We can say that it was a period of transition "from the school audience to the battlefield", "from the school bench to the slaughterhouse."

This bloody, fierce battle for the first time aroused in the hearts - mine and my comrades-front-line soldiers - the first and therefore especially deep psychological uncertainty. Our ardent desire to fight and seek adventure was quickly satisfied. Then came several months of silent reflection and devastation.

I indulged in all sorts of reflections, pulling out of my head all my historical knowledge. I realized that I was participating in one of the countless European wars and fighting on a battlefield that had a history of several hundred or even thousands of years. I thought how

meaningless these endlessly repeated wars! How many times before me did German soldiers fight in Belgium, seeking to invade France! And vice versa, how many times did the troops of France and other countries do the same here, hoping to defeat Germany. Does any of the people know what is the point in these wars of the past?

I tried to understand the motives that underlay the new aggressive war. Who is again showing interest in these lands, mines, industries? Who seeks to capture such prey, regardless of any human sacrifice?

None of my comrades, ordinary soldiers, even thought about some kind of annexations and occupations. No one even knew what all our efforts were for. No one knew the true goals of the war, and even more so no one understood its deep meaning that follows from this. Most of the soldiers were middle-aged, workers and artisans. Almost all of them were members of trade unions, and a large number were supporters of social democracy. But only one of them was truly leftist. He was an elderly bricklayer from Hamburg, and he carefully concealed his political views, not revealing himself to anyone.

Non-commissioned officer of the German army Richard Sorge

We became friends with him. He talked about his life in Hamburg, his experiences of persecution and unemployment.

He was the first pacifist I met. He died in action at the beginning of 1915, and soon after that I was wounded for the first time. Immediately after the start of the war, I noticed that we, ordinary soldiers and officers, live a completely separate life. Outside of the service, we had very little contact with the officers. Officers communicated only with officers. I couldn't have felt any deep attachment to them at all."

The fact that the war, contrary to the original plans of the belligerents, turned out to be protracted and required the mobilization of all forces and led to unprecedented human losses, quickly cured the patriotic enthusiasm of the first months. Sorge was no exception here.

Initially, he was sent to the western front as part of a field artillery regiment. Near Diksmoide, in Flanders, he received a baptism of fire.

In the summer of 1915, in battles on the German-Belgian front, he was wounded near Ypres for the first time. During treatment in the Berlin infirmary, he passed the exam for a matriculation certificate. Sorge recalled, while awaiting the execution of a death sentence in prison: "I returned to Germany to recover from a wound. It became increasingly difficult to maintain a normal standard of living in the country. Everything was determined by two things: shortages and the black market. But if there was money, it was possible to buy anything. The poor were indignant. That enthusiasm and spirit of self-sacrifice that was at the beginning of the war no longer existed. The usual wartime speculations and underground deals began, and the frenzy of militarism gradually began to disappear. On the contrary, purely imperialist goals were fully revealed - ending the war in Europe by achieving the selfish goals of the war

and the establishment of German domination.

Using the rehabilitation period after the treatment, I prepared for the final exams, entered the medical faculty of the University of Berlin and even attended two or three lectures. But I wasn't very

having fun after returning to Germany and I didn't know what to do. I diligently studied political activity and political tendencies, but in the conditions of war all this lost all meaning. And, without waiting for the completion of the rehabilitation period, I returned to the service again.

Upon returning to the unit, I saw that my old comrades were almost gone.

Having received the rank of corporal, Sorge was sent to the east - as part of a unit to support the Austro-Hungarian troops in Galicia in battles against the Russian army, but less than three weeks later he received a new shrapnel wound. Richard recalled: "The fact that although we hit Russia in the heart, but the war still has no end in sight, was evident, and many people fear that it will last forever."

After receiving a matriculation certificate and a second wound, Sorge was promoted to non-commissioned officer of the 43rd Reserve Field Artillery Regiment and awarded the Iron Cross II degree. In 1916, after the hospital, he returned to his native regiment, which this time participated in military operations under the walls of the Verdun fortress.

In prison, Sorge recalled: "At the beginning of 1916, I was wounded for the second time. Returning to my homeland after a long difficult trip through Russian territory occupied by Germany, I saw that the situation in the country was critical.

Through the families of my fellow front-line soldiers, I knew people of various classes. Among them were families of simple workers, my relatives belonging to the middle bourgeoisie, wealthy friends, so I could observe quite well the economic situation of various social strata. The bourgeoisie gradually sank to the position of the proletariat, but tried to somehow avoid its fate by clinging to the theory of the moral superiority of Germany. I could not, without disgust, relate to what was done by the arrogant and ignorant representatives of the so-called "German spirit." But there were people among the political leaders who began to feel uneasy about the war. This was the result of the fact that domestic and foreign policy became tough and cruel. In other words, reaction and imperialism reared their heads with might and main. I am convinced that Germany cannot offer the world any new ideas or any new actions, but England, and France, and other countries of the world also do not have the opportunity to contribute to the cause of peace. No amount of discussion about spirituality and high ideals could shake my conviction. Since then, I have not taken seriously the claims about the ideas and spirit that allegedly govern the warring peoples, regardless of their race.

My dissatisfaction has grown in comparison with the period of my first rehabilitation. And I again immediately voluntarily went to the front line. I thought it was better to fight in other countries than to sink even deeper into the swamp in my own country.

The atmosphere in the unit became generally even more gloomy than before.

However, there were more people who showed interest in the problems of politics and the end of the war. Gradually, the opinion grew stronger that, except for decisive political changes, nothing could get us out of such a difficult situation. I met two soldiers who were connected to radical political organizations in Germany. One of them often talked about Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. However, neither in our conversations with them, nor in my reflections, is the problem

ending the war was not important. Much more serious was the question of how the causes of senseless self-destructive and endless wars in Europe could be eliminated. It seemed to us that this problem was much more fundamental than the end of the current war. We were not cowards who feared the continuation of the war or would not give up any means just to end it. It was clear enough to us that, if only to throw down the arms, it would untie the hands of Germany's adversaries to achieve their imperialist aspirations. More important, we considered a global solution to the problem, a solution on an international scale for a long time, but we still did not know at all how to achieve this. We were still quite far from the left movement in Germany and other countries.

Political organizations of the nationalist and imperialist persuasion carried on a frenzied propaganda and sent countless propaganda leaflets to the front. Under their influence, we had lively discussions. All of these organizations attempted to boost the morale of the soldiers by seeking to clarify Germany's vast aims in the war and to expose each of the claims Germany must make to other countries to ensure her continued superiority. But in fact, the results were completely different from those they expected. As for the radical left elements at the front and inside Germany, their efforts were like gasoline thrown into a fire. I usually silently only listened to such discussions and sometimes asked questions, I still did not have any conviction, knowledge, solutions. However, the time gradually came when it was necessary to discard the position of an outside observer, which I had adhered to for a long time, and draw a final conclusion.

Just then I was wounded for the third time. It was a very serious injury. A lot of shell fragments dug into me at the same time, and two of them crushed my bones.

Thus, in April 1917, Sorge was once again very seriously wounded on the Western Front by a shell explosion. One fragment hit the fingers of the hand, two more fragments hit the legs. For three days Richard hung on barbed wire. In the infirmary of Königsberg, he was operated on. After the operation, one leg became shorter by several centimeters.

Although he still remained a soldier and continued his treatment, Sorge resumed his studies at the University of Berlin. Later, Richard recalled in prison, awaiting execution: "For several months I had to be seriously treated in a field hospital. There I met an intelligent and intelligent nurse and her father. He was a doctor. Soon I learned that both of them are closely connected with radical social-democratic movement. From them I was able to hear for the first time in detail about the revolutionary movement in Germany, the various parties and trends, the international revolutionary movement. Here, too, for the first time I heard about Lenin and his activities in Switzerland. I felt

that if I deeply study the fundamental problems of the imperialist war, which I thought about at the front, then I will definitely be able to find answers to them. And I firmly decided to find these answers, or at least raise questions. I already had a desire to become an apostle of the revolutionary labor movement. My period of treatment in the field hospital proved beneficial in another way. I took up philosophy for the first time

I successively studied Kant and Schopenhauer, turned to history, including the history of art, and, in addition, I developed an interest in economic problems. The nurse and her father provided me with relevant literature in the various fields I wanted to study. My wound was very serious, because of which I experienced terrible pain during the treatment. However, despite this, I was happier than ever in recent years. My craving for research, which still manifests itself from time to time, was formed precisely then.

When the wound had mostly healed, I resumed my studies at the university while still a soldier, but regularly visited the field hospital for medical procedures. I gave up my medical studies and decided to specialize in political science and economics. I believed that by studying the social, economic and political changes in Germany and Europe, I could satisfy my interests.

At that time, in the summer and winter of 1917, I began to feel especially keenly that the world war was senseless and thoughtlessly condemned everything to desolation. Several million people have already died on each side. And no one can say how many more millions will share their fate. Germany's vaunted economic machine lay in ruins. I felt this first hand, feeling hunger and growing food shortages along with numerous proletarians. Capitalism has disintegrated into its constituent elements - anarchism and speculators. I saw the collapse of the German Empire, which was considered to have a solid and unshakable political foundation. The ruling class of Germany, faced with such a situation, was hopelessly confused and split both morally and politically. Culturally and ideologically, the nation has fallen into empty chatter about the past, into anti-Semitism or Romano-Catholicism. Both the military-feudal ruling class and the bourgeoisie were unable to indicate the course for the state and the way to save it from complete destruction. And in the camp of opponents of Germany it was the same. The political demands put forward by the opponents of Germany, and for the future did not leave any other way to resolve the conflict, except for the use of weapons. A fresh and effective ideology was supported by the revolutionary labor movement and fought for. This most complex, decisive and useful ideology sought to eliminate the economic and political causes of present and future wars through an internal resolution.

I studied this ideology in detail at the University of Berlin, especially its theoretical foundation. I read both Greek philosophy and Hegel's philosophy, which influenced Marxism. I read Engels and then Marx, whatever fell into my hands. I also studied the works of the opponents of Marx and Engels, that is, those who opposed them in theory, philosophy and economics, and turned to studying the history of the labor movement in Germany and other countries of the world. Within a few months, I acquired fundamental knowledge and mastered the basics of practical thinking.

The development of the revolution in Russia showed me the path along which



go to the international labor movement. I decided not only to support the movement theoretically and ideologically, but also to become a part of it in practice. And since then, no matter what conclusions are made about my personal and material problems, I have embarked on this path. And now, when the Second World War is going on for the third year and a war has been unleashed between

Germany and the Soviet Union, I am even more convinced that the decision I made 25 years ago was the right one. I can say so even after considering everything that has happened to me during the past 25 years, and especially in the last year."

Thus, in the last year of the First World War, when there was no longer any hope of a German victory, Richard Sorge came to Marxism, and then, after a very short stay at its social democratic stage, to communism. It must be said that hundreds of thousands of front-line soldiers followed his example, which led to a significant increase in the popularity of the Communist Party in post-war Germany.

In January 1918, Sorge was dismissed from military service due to disability. By his own admission, the war led to a deep spiritual turning point, as a result of which he became close in the hospital with left-wing socialists and became a Marxist. Therefore, it was natural for him to participate in the German revolution that followed the defeat of Germany in the First World War. Fortunately, in the last months of the war, the retired non-commissioned officer had more than enough free time.

#### Coming to the revolution

Sorge recalled: "After demobilization in January 1918, I entered the University of Kiel, but I never thought that a German revolution would take place here within a year. In Kiel, I joined a revolutionary organization - the Independent Social Democratic Party. I did not join the group "Spartak", but only for the reason that in Kiel he could not establish ties with this organization.

As soon as I joined the party, I was immediately entrusted with work in socialist student organizations. Together with two or three students, I created such an organization and then became its leader. In addition, within the framework of the party organization, I became the leader of a study circle in the area where I lived, and taught there the history of the labor movement, the differences between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements, and other subjects.

In 1918, Sorge received a diploma from the Friedrich Wilhelm Imperial University in Berlin. After demobilization, Richard entered the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Kiel. When the university opened in Hamburg, Sorge enrolled there as an applicant for a degree in the Faculty of State and Law, passed the exam with honors and, having defended his dissertation, in August 1919 received the degree of Doctor of State and Law.

His dissertation was entitled "Reich Tariffs of the Central Association of German Consumer Societies" and was devoted to research on the work of consumer unions - workers' organizations that were engaged in providing their members with high-quality and inexpensive

goods.

Ernst Teltan

Sorge also published in the newspaper "Hamburger Volkzeitung", thus starting his journalistic career. Here, in Hamburg, in one of the pioneer detachments, he met with the future leader of the KPD, Ernst Thälmann.

After defending his dissertation, Sorge moved to Aachen - following his supervisor, Professor Kurt Albert Gerlach, who by that time had begun teaching at the Department of Economic Sciences of the Aachen Higher Technical School. Sorge became his assistant. He still spends his evenings at the Gerlachs' house. The 30-year-old professor and his young twenty-year-old wife Christina welcomed Richard, called him by an affectionate childhood nickname - Ika.

"Both women and men were drawn to him," Christina recalled. "His deep, piercing gaze attracted others to him. It was impossible to hide from this gaze. If a woman fell into his field of vision, she was already in his captivity. In captivity light, misty, charming..."

All this time, Richard did not leave revolutionary work. In November 1918, in Kiel, where he moved from Berlin, Sorge participated in the sailors' uprising, from which the German revolution began. He was a member of the Kiel Council of Workers and Sailors, which armed the population and tried to help the revolution in Berlin. At the same time, Sorge almost died. In January 1919, the march of armed workers to Berlin was suppressed by the chairman of the government (Council of People's Delegate) Friedrich Ebert and Defense Minister Gustav Noske, just at the moment when Sorge and his comrade arrived in the capital. He was detained at the station, but, not finding weapons, sent back to Kiel.

In 1917-1919, Sorge was a member of the Independent Social Democratic Party, where he worked with youth. In 1919, he became a member of the German Communist Party, which was formed by the "Spartacus League" and the left wing of the independent social democrats.

Sorge wrote in prison: "Of course, I tried to involve

new members from my student friends and also carried out various small assignments.

I secretly lectured on socialism to groups of port workers and sailors. Thus, I contributed to the revolution in the Kiel military harbor, started by the rebellious sailors. Even now I remember one of those lectures. One early morning I was summoned and brought to a previously unfamiliar place. Arriving there, looking around, I realized that it was an underground sailor's barracks, where I was asked to secretly give a lecture behind tightly closed doors.

Immediately after the revolution, my work in the party consisted of reviewing countless applications for admission to the party, propaganda and teaching activities. Beyond that, I had to be in charge

continue to maintain contact with the student socialist organizations, which at that time gained great strength.

At the end of that year, I left for Berlin with two or three comrades on a party assignment, where I worked at the local headquarters. An irreconcilable struggle unfolded between the faction led by Noske and Scheidemann and the revolutionary movement. The army took the side of Noske and opposed the revolution. The Party needed help, but when I arrived in Berlin it was too late to do anything. After a brutal bloodshed, the uprising of "Spartacus" was crushed. We were herded into the garage and searched, but fortunately my weapon was not found. Anyone who had a weapon and refused to give it up was immediately shot. After staying with my comrades for several days in the garage building, we returned to Kiel. But it could not be called a triumphant return. At the beginning of 1919, I left for Hamburg and began to prepare for the doctor's examinations.

But, as we remember, Sorge decided that his vocation was not in medicine, but in the field of social sciences.

On the party line, he worked in the Ruhr. In industrial Wuppertal, Richard taught at one of the party schools, and in Olga he lectured at the people's university.

Sorge's rampant drinking and numerous affairs with women were not welcomed by the ascetic communist leadership, but Sorge was appreciated as a good lecturer and analyst.

On October 15, 1919, Sorge joined the KPD. In Aachen, the French occupation authorities banned both the Soviets and the Communist Party, so he legally remained a member of the USPD.

Sorge recalled: "On arrival in Hamburg, I created a student socialist organization there and became its secretary, and in addition, I did the usual party work at my place of residence. At the end of this year, I was appointed head of the training section of the party leaders of the regional organization of Hamburg. Soon after factions of our party, as well as the Spartak group and other revolutionary organizations, automatically merged into the German Communist Party. During 1920, I worked at the headquarters of the party organization in Hamburg as head of the training section. At the same time, I was a consultant in the communist newspapers of Hamburg. One day the famous socialist Scheidemann visited me and asked me if I, as a descendant of Adolf Sorge, would like to join their movement, but I, of course, resolutely refused.

Then, having a desire to move inland, I got a place

teacher at a higher school in the city of Aachen and began to prepare to leave there, but I was summoned to Berlin to the Central Committee of the Party. After reporting on the events in Hamburg, I was asked to do various practical work for the party in the Aachen region. The positions of the workers were strong there, and the Catholic workers' organizations were especially powerful. Shortly after arriving in Aachen, I was appointed a member of the city party committee, where I became responsible for party education. At the same time, I was engaged in active propaganda among the miners. Soon I established contacts with the party leaders of the Rhineland district in Cologne. They often invited me to their rallies

and asked to take part, as I did in Hamburg, in the communist publications of the area. Once, when the editor of the communist newspaper Solingen was in prison, for two months during the school holidays I even replaced him and edited the newspaper. In addition, as a representative of the Rhineland region, I several times took part in meetings of the Central Committee on the leadership of the party and the expansion of the Central Committee.

However, it was, of course, impossible for me to continue my political activity in Aachen in the interests of the party and to remain an assistant professor in a higher school. Somewhere towards the end of 1922, I left high school, because I was involved in fierce political discussions.

In agreement with the party, I began to work more actively among the miners. At the same time, working in the coal regions of Aachen, I was able to cover my living expenses. Without arousing suspicion about my membership in the party, I took a job as a laborer in a mine near Aachen. The work was hard, and because of the last wound I received at the front, it sometimes became simply unbearable. However, I did not back down from my decision. The experience of working as a miner was very valuable to me, in no way inferior to the experience I got at the front. Besides, my new job was in the interests of the Party.

My work among the miners soon began to bear some fruit. I formed a communist cell in the mine where I first worked, and after it had grown strong and developed, I moved to another mine near Aachen. And in the same way, during this year, I once again changed jobs.

I tried the same method in the coal-mining districts of Holland, but this attempt failed. I was quickly exposed, fired from the mine and sent abroad.

During this time I became well known in all the mines of Aachen, and as a result it became quite impossible to find work there. The authorities threatened to hand me over to the Allied military administration, so I had no choice but to leave Aachen and the occupied zone (then the war had just ended, and the Rhineland was under military occupation and administered by the victorious Allied countries).

I went to Berlin, and there the question of my future party activity was discussed in the Central Committee. The Central Committee offered me a paid job in the leading bodies of the party, but I refused, because I preferred to gain more practical experience and at the same time wanted to complete my education. Friends offered me an assistant position at the Faculty of Sociology at the University of Frankfurt and at the same time be a freelance lecturer there. The party leadership approved this idea and entrusted me with active work in

party organization in Frankfurt.

In Frankfurt, I became a member of the city party leadership and was responsible, as before, for educational work, and in addition, I was a consultant to the communist press. Shortly thereafter, the Communist Party in Germany was outlawed. Due to the fact that my name was not well known to the authorities in Frankfurt, I had the opportunity to work for the party with great benefit. I conducted secret office work and registration of party members, and also ensured

secret connection between the Central Committee in Berlin and the organization in Frankfurt (then, in 1924, Sorge acquired the first secret skills that were useful to him in his subsequent work as an intelligence officer. - B.S.), Party funds and propaganda materials were sent to my address. I hid large parcels in classrooms in charcoal boxes or hid them in my office and in the library of the sociological department of the university. Besides me, two or three members of the party worked there, so there was no need to be afraid of being exposed. In this way, we saved money and materials, so that if the governing bodies needed them, they could be quickly withdrawn and used. Despite the fact that the Communist Party was banned, thanks to such a system in Frankfurt, the activity of the party did not decrease at all. When a workers' republic was established in Saxony as a result of an armed uprising, I, by decision of the Party, kept secret contact with it at all times. On special assignments, I often visited Saxony and delivered important instructions and orders on political and organizational issues, which the party sent through us to Frankfurt.

When Sorge took up a teaching position in Aachen, located on the border with Belgium, the Central Committee of the party asked him to also take over the leadership of the local party organization. But when he was elected a delegate from the Rhineland to the Central Committee of the KKE, Sorge was expelled from school for political activities. It was then, on orders from Berlin, that he took up organizational work among local miners and himself temporarily retrained as a miner, having worked underground for eleven months in the mines of the Ruhr and the Dutch province of Limburg.

Due to war wounds, this work was difficult for him, but Richard never regretted this experience. The German authorities threatened to extradite him to the Belgian occupation authorities. Then Sorge was offered to work as a propagandist in the department of the Central Committee in Berlin, but he preferred to enter the University of Frankfurt am Main. With the assistance of the party, he received a position as assistant director of the department of social sciences at the University of Frankfurt, and membership in the party was to be kept secret.

From November 1920 to the beginning of 1921, Sorge edited the party newspaper in Solingen. He was also a research fellow at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, better known as the "Frankfurt School". He wrote for local communist newspapers.

Wherever fate threw Sorge, he continued to keep in touch with the Gerlachs. However, he had long been attracted to the mentor's house not only by friendship with the owner of the house. Too often they saw Christina. The young woman's husband was terminally ill, and everyone knew he was doomed.

A young woman, unable to choose, went to her stepmother in Yuzhnaya

Germany, from where she returned not to Kurt, but to Richard. They began to live together, finally giving the authorities and the burgher "public" a long-awaited reason. After Sorge brought someone else's wife into the house, a real persecution began against him. In October 1922, Richard and Christina moved to Frankfurt am Main.

In Frankfurt, Richard, together with Gerlach, with whom he managed to maintain good relations, became one of the founders of the Society

sociological research and received a teaching position at the Institute of Sociology. Professor Gerlach was supposed to be the director of the institute, but he died in 1923. Christina got a job at the same institute, and soon the Institute of Sociology was attached to the University of Frankfurt. There, Richard acquired those scientific connections that were very useful to him in Tokyo.

In the park near the rich mansion, Richard and Christina rented a stable with living quarters for grooms and converted the residential part into a pretty house. An artist from among Sorge's friends took up the design of the rooms, painting one red, the other yellow, and the third blue.

Richard Sorge with a dog

Christina recalled: "He loved cats and dogs and played with them like a boy. Not being particularly picky about food, he nevertheless cooked with pleasure. His menu was not very extensive, but definitely more than mine ... If the pancake fell apart, it became gloomy. He was not comforted even if I called the shapeless work of his culinary art a royal dish ... "

At the same time, Sorge began to write sociological articles on modern material, often foreseeing the course of events.

Sorge was in charge of the party fund of the Frankfurt organization, kept a card index of account members and was a liaison between Frankfurt and Berlin. After the defeat of the Hamburg uprising, when the leadership of the KKE gels had to go underground, Richard continued to work as a courier, providing a connection between the Central Committee and the North-West.

In May 1924, an underground congress of the KKE was held in Frankfurt, which was attended by a Soviet delegation consisting of Osin Pyatnitsky, Dmitry Manuisky, Otto Kuusinen and Solomon Lozovsky. Sorge ensured their safety and became close friends with the members of the delegation. A major exhibition was just taking place in Frankfurt, there were many visitors, so no one paid attention to the congress delegates.

In prison, Sorge recalled: "Since I was engaged in secret party relations, it was not surprising that at the communist congress held in Frankfurt am Main in 1924, I was chosen to provide protection for the delegates of the Soviet Communist Party, who represented the Comintern and arrived in the country illegally ... Of course, my relations with the delegates of the Comintern were very close, and they became more and more friendly every day. At the final meeting, they asked me to come to the headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow to work there. "

And here are his earlier memoirs relating to October 1924: "Already in mid-August, they asked me: am I ready to work in Moscow? And, although I immediately answered that I could be in Moscow in early October, since then I have not heard from Moscow. Of course, now I'm worried that maybe something is wrong, maybe there are some objections against me as a person, or the answer is just lost. In short, every day I wait for a message about this, since I will soon receive a passport, there are other reasons to worry

me. For example, regarding work, since I have not been a party worker for a year and a half ... Of course, this is not the worst thing, but still it increases the ambiguity regarding me ... Based on this, I ask you again, since no attempts to receive an answer from the German center had no effect, to make every effort so that I received an answer regarding my move to Moscow and that everything was decided for me in a good way ... "

Sorge described his teachers in the Comintern as follows: "About my meetings with such influential figures of the Comintern as Pyatnitsky, Manuisky and Kuusinen, after my transfer from the Comintern to another Moscow organization, I can give the following explanation. These people were my old colleagues and old friends. They vouched for me and were my teachers in the field of the communist movement. They also vouched for me when I was appointed to work under the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and they also vouched for me when I joined the party. These people had great international experience in areas of the revolutionary movement. Therefore, they gave me advice on various issues even after I left the Comintern (after my departure from the Comintern, I met only with these persons). In addition, they were not only well-known figures in the Comintern, but also members of the Central Committee Soviet Communist Party".

Richard asked Christina if she would go to the USSR with him, and she immediately agreed. Now I had to rent an apartment, get passports,

to pack. On October 7, a decision was made to hire Sorge to work in the information department of the Comintern as a specialist in economics and politics. Having finished the work related to the elections, on December 15, he and his wife arrived in Moscow.

#### Arrival in the USSR

Arriving in Moscow at the invitation of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, Sorge in March 1925 became a member of the CPSU (b), suspending his membership in the German Communist Party. Manuisky gave him a recommendation. Richard received the citizenship of the Soviet Union and was hired by the apparatus of the Comintern, worked as a referent for the information (intelligence) department and political and scientific secretary of the organizational department of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the BKP(b).

At the end of June 1925, Sorge asked to be transferred from the information department to the agitation and propaganda department, and in April 1926 he became deputy head of this department.

Christina, who was also, like Richard, a doctor of sociology, began working at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism on the collected works of Marx and Engels. She was assigned to translate Marx's manuscripts from English. Richard knew Russian from childhood, and Christina tried to master it, starting to study with a teacher, but did not achieve noticeable success. They lived in a small hotel room. Richard was fine with that. He was rather indifferent to the comforts of life.

Sorge worked as a journalist and sociologist, served in the apparatus

Comintern, In the press department, published in the journals "Communist International", "Red International of Trade Unions", in the theoretical journal "Bolshevik", in the journal "World Economy and World Politics". His articles were devoted to the problems of the labor and revolutionary movement in Germany and the USA. In particular, Sorge participated in the campaign launched by the communists against the Dawes plan adopted on August 16, 1924, the chairman of the allied reparations commission. Dawes proposed to provide Germany with an international loan and establish a procedure for reparation payments that would correspond to the economic possibilities of Germany.

A visit to the German club in Moscow did not disappoint the Sorge spouses. Richard immediately entered the club's management and turned

violent activity, organizing meetings, discussions, amateur performances and even a pioneer detachment for the children of German political emigrants.

Christina did not like Moscow, and she hardly knew the language. Life was much less comfortable than in Germany, and Richard was not known for marital fidelity. They had already spent the summer vacation of 1926 separately: Christina in Sochi, Richard in Baku, at home. He met his relatives, then went to the village of Sabunchi, found the house where he was born: a sanatorium has now been set up there.

At the end of 1926, Christina again received her German passport and went to Berlin. Then they met only once, in 1932, when it was necessary to formalize the divorce.

Manuilsky recommended Sorge to the department of international relations of the Comintern. Richard became an instructor - one of those who oversaw the work of the communist parties. He was assigned to the Scandinavian section.

Sorge recalled in "Prison Notes": "In the organizational department of the headquarters of the Comintern, for a long time there was a practice of sending special emissaries to all parties to assist in solving organizational problems. Then the scope of such work expanded, and their tasks also began to include intelligence activities "In accordance with this course, I was sent in 1927 to the Scandinavian countries, where I was engaged in intelligence activities of the Communist parties on the problems of the economy, politics and important military issues of these countries. I began to work in Denmark. In accordance with the instructions received, I performed the functions of an active leader along with with the leadership of the party, attended various meetings and conferences, and also visited the main party organizations in the country. When time allowed, he was engaged in intelligence work on the political and economic problems of Denmark. He discussed his observations and information with party representatives and included in his reports to Moscow and their opinions From Denmark I moved to Sweden, where I studied various problems in the same way. In 1928, he took part in the work of the political committee of the UG International Congress of the Comintern, after which he was again sent to Scandinavia. This time mainly because of the situation in the Norwegian Communist Party. And in Norway I acted by the same methods as in Sweden and Denmark. However, party problems turned out to be



far from simple there, as a result of which intelligence activities in the political and economic fields were not carried out as planned. During this period, before returning home, an order came to visit England, where they were to study the state of the labor movement, the position of the Communist Party, the political and economic situation in the country in 1929 and provide relevant information. I was instructed not to interfere in any way in the intra-Party struggle. This fully coincided with my personal intention and allowed me to pay more attention than in Scandinavia to political and economic intelligence activities.

Returning to Moscow, I, of course, gave my next message to the intelligence department. In addition, I candidly analyzed and reported everything that was not entirely successful in my intelligence-gathering trips and research in the countries I visited. In addition, I made some significant suggestions. In particular, he proposed that a fundamental and comprehensive intelligence program be separated from the internal strife in the struggle for power of local communist parties. If necessary, to solve purely internal national and private party problems, special emissaries should be sent who are capable, if not completely, then at least partially, of devoting themselves to intelligence activities in the field of economics, internal administration, foreign policy, and, if necessary, on military problems in a wide range of ways. sense. This kind of division of work, I pointed out, is also absolutely necessary to maintain the secrecy of intelligence activities. Even more clearly than before, I also proposed that persons conducting intelligence activities in other countries, for reasons of secrecy, be completely separated from the structure

Comintern. Since then, there have been some changes in my work, although it is not clear to what extent this was a consequence of the suggestions I made. Nevertheless, significant changes were clearly manifested both in the organization of my next trip, and this was a trip to China, and in the sphere of duties assigned to me. At the same time, my personal relations with persons who had previously been in close contact with me, as well as with the Comintern, underwent a complete change.

The methods of my communication with the organizational department of the Comintern during the period of my intelligence activities in the Scandinavian countries and in England were simple. I sent my correspondence to Moscow through local parties or used the services of the central Berlin post office. From time to time he sent telegrams through the same communication channels. In most cases, I traveled to Berlin myself to ensure my messages were sent. In other words, I had absolutely no means of communication of my own."

Dane Kai Moltke, later a member of the Danish Parliament, who was then a member of the leadership of the Communist Party, recalling meetings with Sorge, never ceased to admire his deep knowledge, ability to delve into any problem, as well as organizational talent. The Moscow emissary organized the printing of proclamations, constantly met with the workers, and also recommended establishing contacts with other parties in order to bring the Communist Party out of isolation.

For two years, Sorge visited Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, not yet knowing that his finest hour would come on a completely different side of the earth. At the same time, already as a scientist, he studied the relationship of the Communists with the Social Democrats and the activities

trade unions.

The transition in 1927 to the department of international relations was probably due to the fact that Richard had already become fed up with the peaceful, calm life in Moscow, which was so different from Europe. In April of this year, about Sorge, they reported from Moscow to Stockholm to the Swedish party functionary Oswald: "He can't sit down and doesn't work with us. He wants to leave as soon as possible, and we find it difficult to send him to independent work, because he has almost no practical work experience. ... Find out the following: will they mind if he goes to your disposal and works under your direction ... "

As for the lack of practical work experience, this is a clear exaggeration. Still, Sorge worked for six years as an activist of the German Communist Party and had experience in a wide variety of activities, including in the field of security.

But in Stockholm, Sorge Oswald was not found, and no one was informed about his arrival. Then he himself defined his tasks, informing Moscow: "I will work here on the following issues: the division of labor in the apparatus of the Central Committee; the work of departments: the department of trade unions, agitation and propaganda ... the question of leadership in general, districts, regions, communes, work several functionaries in Stockholm, preparations for a trade union conference at the end of January, work in the most important workshops of factories in Stockholm and the question of factory newspapers.

In the spring of 1928, during a Scandinavian trip, Sorge had a financial disagreement with the Center. And he wrote to Moscow with undisguised irritation: "After I learned that some of you are surprised that I have already spent two hundred dollars in six weeks, and some

are even more surprised that I have spent almost five hundred so far, I recommend that they all take a good look at the report. You can be sure that I have indicated there only the money spent on tickets and wages, and not for telegrams and other needs, the funds for which, according to the rules, I could indicate in the report. Further, I must say that one trip from Moscow to Oslo via Berlin, as well as a trip from Oslo to Berlin and back ... unfortunately, both trips cost over a hundred dollars. If in the end someone has something against my trip from Moscow to Oslo, then these people should have thought about it in advance ... "

In 1929, Sorge went on a business trip to England and Ireland. In England, he was detained, but the police did not reveal his connection. The alleged purpose of Sorge's arrival in England was to meet with one of the senior officers of the British intelligence organization M[b] and obtain valuable military information from him. Christina Gerlach, Sorge's first wife, many years later recalled that Richard then met with some very important agent. In 1966, while investigating Soviet infiltration of British intelligence, she was even asked to identify the man. She tried to do this, but after so many years she could only answer roughly and conjecturally.

In England, Sorge lived in a cheap furnished boarding house in Bloomsbury under his own name and used a real German passport. One day, an officer from the Special Branch of Scotland Yard came to him and said that Dr. Sorge, through a misunderstanding, forgot to indicate his address on the foreigner's registration sheet. And before

leaving, glancing at the sheet filled out by Sorge, casually remarked that "Herr Doktor" indicated his Berlin address, but didn't he live in Hamburg? The assumption about Hamburg Sorge strongly rejected, but realized that the British police were aware of his activities in Germany.

Here the intractable contradiction between intelligence and purely Comintern activity was reflected. An envoy of the Comintern and an agent of Soviet intelligence, coming into contact with representatives of the national communist parties, always took risks. After all, the local police knew almost all the prominent communists, who were constantly monitored. Therefore, in contact with members of the national Central Committee of the Communist Party, Soviet agents very often were exposed to the police and aroused suspicion.

Sorge insisted that the intelligence operations of the Comintern be carried out independently of political events, that the agents of the Comintern work without any contact with the local Communist Parties.

In England, the Communist Party suffered severely after the May 1927 police raid on the Arco\$ GL. - Soviet trading company in London. During the search, documents were found that the company's employees were engaged in espionage and subversive activities, including with the help of agents from among the local communists.

Sorge was forced to transmit information to Moscow through couriers of the Communist Parties. Therefore, he had to return to Berlin to make sure the transmission was reliable. He advocated the creation of an intelligence apparatus operating along the line of military intelligence.

In "Gurem Notes" Sorge recalled: "Formerly the leading

the section of the Comintern was independent in all respects... It also advised the leaders of the Russian Communist Party... Today the leaders of the Comintern cannot afford to act independently of the Russian Communist Party... as they once did, during the years of Zinoviev's leadership Comintern".

As can be assumed, Sorge never joined any anti-Stalinist factions in the Comintern. But his independence and independence caused discontent. In December 1928, one of the leaders of the Comintern, B. Vasilyev, indignantly wrote to the leadership of the Comintern: "Neither me nor Comrade Sirola (authorized by the Secretariat of the ECCI. - B.S.) are known, and therefore the travel plans for v. 3 are incomprehensible. At one time it was agreed that he should work in Norway, we can agree that from time to time he runs into Denmark and maybe even Sweden, but in the coming months, such trips, in my opinion, are not needed ... T. Sorge, in my opinion, must go to Norway and stay there as agreed.

As for the proposal for him to go to England, I am against it. He is too weak for England and will not be able to resist not to interfere in political affairs. For England, this is completely unacceptable."

Nevertheless, Sorge went to England, "got involved in political affairs" and even, it seems, was arrested. Then, upon returning to Moscow, Sorge

sent to work in the economic commission and Manuilsky's secretary. But he wants a living thing. Richard is already looking for a new job. And it is located. Sorge goes to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army.

In 1928, almost simultaneously in German in Berlin and Hamburg in the publishing house "Karl Hoim Nachvolger" and in Russian translation in Leningrad in the publishing house "Priboy" under the pseudonym R. Sonter, Sorge's theoretical work "The New German

imperialism." "German capital," Sorge argued, "working under conditions of a highly developed monopoly system, is burdened with such stagnation phenomena that, in connection with the situation

of the capitalist economy in general strongly hinder (as it was in pre-war times) the development of the capitalist basis, and at certain decisive points they make it directly impossible. The further development of German capitalism is temporarily possible only under one condition, namely, if the expansion of the market follows at the expense of other capitalist states. But it would be absurd to count on the stable development of a new imperialist base at the expense of other capitalist states, and to strive for this would mean nothing more than trying to provoke a new world conflict ... The very act of Germany as a NEW imperialist power raises again the question of a new redistribution of the world ". And then the conclusion followed: in Germany "they will have to proclaim a fascist dictatorship, i.e. the undisguised dictatorship of finance capital." The situation is developing "to meet the impending war... The inevitability of war is so obvious that it makes no sense to dwell on it any longer."

In this case, he, repeating traditional Marxist schemes, predicted both Hitler's rise to power and a new world war. But Hitler's dictatorship was by no means a dictatorship of finance capital.

On the contrary, finance capital soon came under the control of the Nazis.

Russian wife Sorge

We will jump ahead a little and get acquainted with the tragic story of the Russian wife of Richard Sorge. In 1927 or 1928 in Moscow, shortly after Christina's departure, Sorge met 23-year-old Ekaterina Alexandrovna Maksimova, who later became his wife.

Katya Maximova had an interesting biography. She was born in 1904 in Petrozavodsk, in the family of an official of the provincial administration Alexander Flegontovich Maksimov and a German woman Alexandra Stepanovna (nee Haupt). She was the eldest of five children and, no doubt, thanks to her mother, was fluent in German, and later learned French. From childhood, Katya studied at the theater studio, which was directed by the actor, director and playwright Yuri Nikolaevich Yuriin (Wentzel), also a German and an idol of the Petrozavodsk public. He gave her a photograph of himself with the following inscription: "You are a truly talented person, but if this gives rights, then

more responsibilities. I expect a lot from you, don't deceive me." After the studio, Katya entered the Leningrad Institute of Performing Arts, from which she graduated in 1925 in the class of Professor Vivien on the course "Drama Department". Soon she married Yuriin, who was 15 older than her years old and seriously ill with tuberculosis, and went with him to Moscow, where they performed at the Theater of the Revolution (now named after Mayakovsky), and then went abroad with him and his daughter from her first marriage, Natasha.

Katya graduated from the Leningrad Institute of Performing Arts and performed on stage. In 1926-1928, Katya lived in Switzerland, Germany and Italy, accompanying her first husband Yu.N. Yuriina for treatment. From Capri, she wrote to one of her friends, Onena Rybkina: "Rybka, dear, it's amazing here, I live wonderfully ... I'm starting to recover from all the travel impressions. Yur. bows to you very much." After his death in Italy, on Capri, in 1927, Katya returned to the USSR.

Katya left the stage and got a job as an apparatchik at the Gochpribor plant. She became a foreman, then a shop manager. She lived in a small semi-basement room in Nizhne-Kislovsky Lane, where friends came all the time.

She gave Russian lessons to foreigners. Among them were Germans, employees of the Comintern. One of them, Willy Stahl, introduced Katya to Richard Sorge in 1927 or 1928. She gave Sorge Russian language lessons and affectionately called him Ika.

In fact, Sorge knew Russian as his native language, and, most likely, Russian lessons served only as a pretext for acquaintance.

Maria Alexandrovna Maksimova, Katya's sister, already recalled the events of 1933: "One day, a very unusual little sister arrived. Actually, she was an extremely reserved person, but here she kept smiling, humming something. I met a wonderful man, he is a German, a communist." And she told about Ika. And she spoke about him in such a way that we immediately understood everything.

The wedding was very modest - she despised this "philistine" rite. Just an evening with friends after marriage is registered here in

Nizhny Kislovsky, where Ika moved his suitcases from the hotel. A bottle of light wine and talk about music, about the theater and, of course, about the "current moment" - the Nazis came to power in Germany.

Their marital happiness lasted only three months. Then Sorge left for Japan. He returned only two years later, in 1935, and only for a month. She then took a vacation at the plant.

After Sorge left for Japan, Ekaterina Alexandrovna moved from a semi-basement communal apartment to a large room (there is a version that it was in a hostel for political emigrants) on Sofiyskaya Embankment, issued to her with the assistance of the leadership of the Red Army Intelligence Directorate.

Only occasionally, with an opportunity, did he send letters to Katya, which were filmed and delivered along with the reports. Interestingly, Katya wrote letters to Richard in French, probably for conspiracy.

Sometimes Richard sent parcels to his wife. "Dear Katyusha! Finally, I had the opportunity to make myself known. I'm fine, things are moving forward. I'm sending my photo. It's very hard that I don't know how you live for a long time. I'm trying to send you some things. Seriously, I bought you ", in my opinion, very beautiful things. I will be happy if you get them, because, unfortunately, I cannot deliver any other joy, at best - care and thought. In this sense, we are "poor fellows" with you.

I don't know if Katya knew that she was the wife of an illegal intelligence officer. But in any case, I understood that he had a very responsible job. So simply people were not sent on long-term foreign business trips in the Soviet Union. And Katya wrote peppy letters to her Ika.

In the very first letter after his departure, Katya informed her husband that they would have a child. Richard was delighted and wrote: "I am very concerned about how you endure all this ... Please make sure that I immediately, without delay, receive the news. If it is a girl, she should bear your name."

He also wrote that he wanted to send a parcel for the baby through a messenger ... But this dream was not destined to come true either. There was a miscarriage.

Much belatedly, Richard learned that they would not have a child. A short letter makes its way to Moscow, across all borders: "I love you very much and think only of you, not only when it is especially hard for me, you are always with me ..." Of course, this was cunning, because Sorge has women in Japan was in abundance.

"I constantly ask myself," Richard once wrote to her, "would you not be happier without me? Do not forget that I would not reproach you ... although personally I am becoming more and more attached to you and more, than ever, I want to return home to you. But this is not what guides our lives, and personal desires fade into the background ... "

And in January 1937, Richard wrote: "Dear K. So, the New Year has come. I wish you the very best this year and hope that it will be the last year of our separation ..."

In 1938, in another letter to his wife, Sorge, he reported on his failed trip to Moscow: "Dear Katya! When I wrote your last letter at the beginning of this year, I was so sure that we would spend a vacation together in the summer that I even began to make plans where we'd better spend it, but I'm still here, I've let you down so often

my terms, that I would not be surprised if you abandoned the eternal expectation and drew the appropriate conclusions from this. There is nothing left for me but to silently hope that you have not completely forgotten me yet and that there is still a prospect of fulfilling our five-year-old dream - finally, to get the opportunity to live together at home. I still do not lose this hope even if its impracticability is entirely my fault, or rather, the fault of the circumstances in which we live and which pose certain tasks for us ... "

I note that if Sorge really returned to the USSR in the midst of the Yezhovshchina, he would have a great chance to go not with his wife on vacation to Sochi or the Crimea, but to the inner prison on Lubyanka.

The next letter from Richard came only after a long break: "Dear Katya! Finally, I am writing to you again. For too long I could not do this without receiving anything from you as well. And I needed it so much ... I don't know, I don't Have you already lost your patience, waiting for me? But, dear, otherwise it is impossible.

I think you want to see me no matter what. That the wait was too long and I was very tired. Life without you is very hard and goes too slowly. What are you doing? Where do you work now? Perhaps you are now a major director who will take me to the factory, as a last resort, as a delivery boy? Well, okay, we'll see there, Be healthy, dear Katya. Don't forget me, I'm sad enough already..."

Mikhail Ivanovich Ivanov, Major General of the GRU, and then just a captain, recalled meetings with Katya in 1940: "She was soft and shy, this Katya. In view of the exceptional merits of Sorge, in violation of all instructions and regulations, she was allowed to write to her husband letters without translation and censorship. "Without editing and with its flavor", - so said Sorge before his departure. Catherine wrote in French, and Richard could handle reading her letters himself. He wrote in German, and I was an unwitting witness to the intimate tender expressions natural in family correspondence. Both she and I were embarrassed when I sounded affectionate words in a wooden voice, sitting at a table covered with a tablecloth, on which there were cups of tea and a modest treat. Once Katya quietly asked him: "Is your Richard such a person that no one in Moscow can do without his services abroad? He hasn't been on vacation for so long..."

Mikhail Ivanovich stated: "Another time, telling that Richard recommended that she study German or another European language, she asked if she could ever become Richard's assistant in his dangerous business? Such questions were not within my competence. "I didn't feel like myself. Therefore, I pointed pointedly at the ceiling: "Everything depends on the authorities and the Lord God." She understood my gesture and did not return to this topic again."

The offer to learn German seems rather strange. Indeed, at one time Katya gave Russian lessons to the Germans, which clearly implied her knowledge of German. Perhaps it was about learning German so flawlessly that you could pass yourself off as a German woman who had lived in Germany all her life.

The last time Katya saw Mikhail Ivanov was in December 1940, on the eve of the New Year holiday. According to the general's memoirs, "the meeting was long, they talked about different things. I said that at

a certain time forced to leave Moscow. A silent question lit up in her eyes: "There?" I silently nodded. Wishing Katya happiness in the New Year and success in her work at her Tochizmeritel plant, I said goodbye. That time, down to the watchman, Ekaterina Alexandrovna did not see me off, but, standing on the steps of the upper floor, she raised her hand and signed me with a farewell gesture, like a sign of the cross, so long ago they saw me off on a long journey in Rus' ... "

But they saw each other again. A few days later, already in January, Ivanov left for Japan. At the Yaroslavl railway station, before boarding

Trans-Siberian Express, he saw a woman in a fur coat and a white sheepskin coat on the next platform. It was Katya. Seeing him, she waved her hand.

Sorge's wife was arrested by order of the Sverdlovsk Railway Transport Department of the NKVD on September 4, 1942. At that moment, the NKVD thought that Sorge had already been executed. Katya was accused of espionage with Willy Stahl, who was arrested and shot in 1938.

Katya's arrest was due to the fact that after the start of the war, a search began throughout the country for Soviet Germans and everyone who was on suspicion. There were arrests. In May, Maksimova's relative Elena Haupt, born in 1912, was arrested in Sverdlovsk. She worked in one of the railroad departments. They began to knock out testimonies against German acquaintances from her. As a result, she remembered that she was once in Moscow with her distant relative Maximova on Sofiyskaya embankment. Haupt said that Katya works at some Moscow factory, and she saw how German foreigners came to her, who are somehow connected with her husband, also a foreigner who often travels on business trips. And also that she saw Katya have several foreign outfits brought by her husband. Based on these testimonies, an inquiry was made to Moscow. Katya was brought to Sverdlovsk for a confrontation with Elena Haupt. Elena confirmed everything. A few days later, exhausted by torture, she committed suicide - on November 2, 1942, she hanged herself in a cell in a pre-trial detention center.

Here is what Haupt Elena Vladimirovna managed to show: "I wanted to hide my participation in my espionage organization and the activities of my relative Ekaterina Maximova. sq. 74. She lived there, occupying one large room, recorded in the name "Frogt", as I saw from the bill submitted to her by the commandant of the house. The apartment cost her more than 100 rubles. I asked her how much her earnings were enough for her to live, she answered that she had other sources of income, and began to show me some of her things, a watch and a few other gold things, as well as elegant dresses. I asked where she got them from, she replied that she had given all this Zisha Frogt. I asked where he works and how much he earns. She answered evasively that for work he often travels abroad on long business trips and only occasionally comes to Moscow. She said that she would help me earn money, and offered, under the guise of collect statistical data, give some information on their work. Then she gave me 500 rubles and ordered me to write a receipt as an account for receiving an advance. "It must be assumed that Tsisha Frogt was not invented by Elena herself, but by the investigators.

The decision on the extension of the investigation dated September 8, 1942 stated:

"It has been established that since 1937 Maksimova V.A. has been in contact with the German citizen Sorge Richard, who temporarily resided in the USSR, suspected of espionage activities ...

Head of the investigative department of the transport department of the NKVD of the railway them. L.M. Kaganovich, State Security Lieutenant Kuznetsov.

Katya seemed to admit: "Yes, since 1933 I was an agent of German intelligence. I was recruited for this job by Stahl."



'Either she was beaten, or just threatened with beatings.

In November 1942, the same state security lieutenant Kuznetsov wrote:

"It has been established that in 1934 Maksimova contacted Stahl on behalf of a German intelligence agent who arrived from abroad and collected provocative materials about the political moods of the working people of the USSR."

On November 17, 1942, Katya was transferred to Moscow. There she retracted her Sverdlovsk testimony. By that time, Elena Haupt, who had slandered her, was already in the other world: "All this time I gave false testimony," Katya said during interrogation. "I did not do any espionage work. I had no other choice. then, when they showed me the protocols of her interrogations, where she refers to me as a recruiter ... About Stahl, they told me that he was arrested for espionage, and my husband is also known to the NKVD as a spy. I was forced to show that Stahl told me about husband, as if Richard was conducting espionage work against the USSR ... But I don't know anything about this ... "Katya was not summoned for interrogations anymore.

She was kept at the Lubyanka for almost 9 months. Finally, by a special meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on March 13, 1943, she was sentenced to exile for five years in the Krasnoyarsk Territory for "spy communications".

When Katya arrived in Krasnoyarsk from Moscow, at the station she accidentally met her distant relative Sukhanov, an employee of the Onega plant, who was evacuated there with his family along with other production workers. He later recalled that the hungry and emaciated Katya drank 13 glasses of tea during the conversation!

On May 15, Katya arrived at the village of Bolshaya Murta, which she had designated as a place of exile. From there she wrote three letters. One to the factory, where she asked about the possibility of receiving at least some amount of money from the salary due. The second letter was to my mother, where she wrote that she was terribly thin, she was always hungry, but she was no longer in prison and therefore hoped that everything would work out now. And the third letter was to sister Maria in Petrozavodsk. Katya wrote that spring would give her strength and she would get out, the main thing was to eat a little. She wrote that she would work hard again and invite them to visit her again.

On May 23, 1943, Katya wrote to her sister. "Dear sister! Here I am again enjoying the sky, the air and complete freedom. It happened the other day - my revival. True, I am drawn to the earth from weakness, like a blade of grass. I will live and work in the region 120 km from Krasnoyarsk. From Ika I will receive, as before, everything is in order with him. Katya told her relatives in Krasnoyarsk that in Beria's office, where she obtained an appointment before her deportation, she was told that everything was in order with her husband. Although his arrest has long been known in Moscow.

She also sought to reassure her mother: "Dear mother! Lord,

how poor, naked, dirty I am now! Mom, write to me more often, for God's sake, if you don't want me to go crazy. After all, I haven't heard anything from anyone in so long. Come to me on a date, I will be very glad. I believe that I will be on horseback again, I will achieve a good life. Now would

somehow do not die and hold out. Feed a little - that's the main thing ... "

But soon Katya's mother received a mournful letter: "Hello! Greetings from Siberia. I inform you that your Katya died on July 3, 1943, while being treated at the Murta hospital. Don't worry too much, apparently, this is her fate, and now the country is losing thousands heroines and heroes. If you want to know more, then write with greetings, Elena Vasilievna Makeeva. " Then Alexandra Stepanovna received another letter. "Your daughter was admitted to our hospital on May 29 with a chemical burn. The treatment was carried out in an open way, that is, a frame was made that was covered with a sheet ... Sometimes she burst into tears with the question: why? Sometimes she said she wanted only to see my mother ... The money left after her, 450 rubles, was spent on the grave, funeral and cross. Things remained: a gray woolen skirt, a warm sleeveless jacket, old galoshes. in the same position as her, now free, I work as a nurse, although this is not my main profession. T. Zhukova.

The exile's registration card stated that she died on June 29, 1943. On the last page of the personal file, it was indicated: "Arrived in exile on May 15, 1943, entered the hospital on May 22, 1943. Died on July 3, 1947 (stroke). Rehabilitated on November 23, 1964 by the military tribunal of the Moscow Military District."

In a certificate from the FSB about the case of E.A. Maksimova was also alleged to have been admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis of cerebral hemorrhage, i.e. stroke. However, the version with a chemical burn seems more likely. It is unlikely that in letters to the mother from the hospital they would invent some kind of exotic chemical burn instead of a banal stroke.

Rather, it can be assumed that the diagnosis "stroke" was supposed to mask the real, not quite natural cause of death. A chemical burn could be the result of either an accident or suicide.

According to one version, back in Moscow, when she worked in a thermometer manufacturing workshop, her body was literally saturated with mercury. This, by the way, at one time was reflected in her pregnancy. And there, in Bolshaya Murta, the organism, poisoned and weakened by prison, could not cope with the chemical burn that Katya received in one of the workshops of a military enterprise, which, however, seemed to have never happened in Bolshaya Murta.

Lyubov Kozhemyakina, who in those years worked as a nanny in a hospital, immediately refuted the version that Katya died of burns. Lyubov Ivanovna recalled: "There were no burns. I straightened her bed, her head. I came on duty in the morning, in the first ward I noticed a new young beautiful woman. The woman did not react at all to anything. When I approached her, I quietly asked for a drink. I tried to talk to her, but she did not answer. They say she was poisoned in Murt. She lay like a wildling,

only tears flowed from her eyes, and then she began to bleed. In the evening my shift ended. And in the morning the bed was already empty. They said that the exiles had taken her from Malorosseyka and buried her there."

I think that Kozhemyakina was mistaken about the burn. She thought that it was a burn of the skin, while Katya probably had a burn of the esophagus. This rather speaks in favor of the version of suicide.

Maria Mishkina, a Komsomolskaya Pravda journalist, wrote: "Long before these events, an exiled surgeon and priest, the famous Valentin Voino-Yasenetsky, who later headed the Russian Orthodox Church, worked in our hospital (obviously, it means that Valentin Feliksovich Voino-Yasenetsky became an archbishop Luka and headed the Simferopol and Crimean diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. - B.S.), - says a person who was interested in Maximova's case, the former chief physician of the Bolshemurtinskaya hospital Vladimir Ryazantsev. - Disinfecting his hands before and after operations, he used only one antiseptic - sublimate. This a component of mercury and chlorine, an unusually volatile and poisonous compound. Voino-Yasenetsky left Bolshaya Murta long before the exiled Maksimova appeared here, but the procedures he established in the hospital took root for a long time.

Doctors who worked in the hospital in those years said that Ekaterina Maksimova, accompanied by an NKVD officer, went to Krasnoyarsk for sublimate and the drug was allegedly accidentally spilled. Then she could be poisoned. It is possible that everything was planned from the beginning. But who can prove it now, until her case is declassified?

The woman "burned out" in just a day. She was taken to the hospital in serious condition, the body did not take any food, she constantly vomited ... The exact cause of death could be established with the help of an examination if the remains were found. Only, as if on purpose, the old cemetery in Bolshaya Murta, where, most likely, Maksimova was buried (the old-timers said that they saw a cross with her name here), was demolished back in the 70s, and administration and police buildings were built in its place.

This version of the death of Ekaterina Maximova seems to me the most probable. She, in all likelihood, worked as a nurse in a local hospital and one day drank sublimate in desperation. It must be borne in mind that she was on the verge of starvation. During the war, the situation of the evacuees and exiles was especially difficult. If they did not receive a work card, then they were threatened with starvation. It is quite possible that Katya repeated the fate of Marina Tsvetaeva, who committed suicide in Yelabuga on August 31, 1941. In Katya's letters to her mother and sister, there are notes of hopelessness.

Richard Sorge and Ekaterina Maksimova were married for 11 years. Of these, they spent no more than six months together. Richard never found out that he outlived Katya by a year and four months.

In 1964, Katya was rehabilitated:

"Military Tribunal of the Moscow Military District November 26, 1964.

#### REFERENCE

The case on charges of Maksimova Ekaterina Alexandrovna, born in 1904, before the arrest on September 4, 1942, the head of the workshop of plant No. 382 of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry in Moscow, reviewed by the Military Tribunal of the Moscow Military District 23

November 1964.

The decision of March 18, 1943 in relation to Maksimova E.A. was canceled, and the case against her was dismissed due to the lack of corpus delicti. Maksimova Ekaterina Alexandrovna was rehabilitated posthumously in this case.

Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the Moscow Military District, Colonel of Justice  
N. SOKOLOV ".

Mission to China

In 1928, Richard was invited by the head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, Yan Berzin. In Prison Notes, Richard recalled: "Upon returning from England, discussing with Pyatnitsky future work in the Comintern, I told him that I had a desire to expand the scope of my activities, but in reality this is hardly possible while I remain in the Comintern. Pyatnitsky spoke about This Berzin. According to Berzin, this could be perfectly implemented through the Fourth Directorate. A few days after that, Berzin invited me, and we discussed in detail all the problems of intelligence activities in Asia. In addition, for a long time, back in Germany, I personally knew many employees "Fourth Directorate. They visited me in the Rhineland and Frankfurt. Discussing political, economic and military problems, they sought to involve me in their administration. In other words, Berzin knew about me not only through Pyatnitsky and my activities in the Comintern, but also through reports two or three of my employees during the period of my work in Germany ... "

Jan Berzin

On September 9, 1929, the resident in Germany, K. Basov (Jan Aboltyn), reported to the Center: "I telegraphed about Sorge's proposal. He really very seriously intends to go to work for us. With his current owner, he has a very uncertain position, and for almost a month as he received no instructions regarding

of your future. He also sits without money ... If his position is decided in favor of us, i.e. the current owner will not keep it, then it will be best for China. He can go there, having received assignments for scientific work from some of the local publishing houses ... "

From this letter, it rather follows that Sorge himself suggested that he go into intelligence. It can be seen that the work of a party functionary bored him pretty much.

From the Center they promptly replied: "Sorge, according to his owner, should come here in the near future. Upon arrival, let him come to us, we will personally talk with him ..."

Obviously, when testifying to the Japanese, Richard tried to convince them that not voluntarily, but on his own initiative, he became a spy, but only in

the force of the circumstances.

The documents also show that the initiative to transfer to military intelligence came from him.

Basov wrote to the Center again: "Sorge received a telegram in which he was allowed to go to Moscow for negotiations. And he must return back at his own expense. Apparently, they want to fire him. "I made inquiries - what caused such behavior in the Comintern towards him. I received some hints that he was involved in the right opposition. But all the same, comrades who know him speak very well of him. If you take him, then the most expedient would be send to China...

Rather, the point is not in ties with the right opposition, to which the former de facto leader of the Comintern Nikolai Bukharin belonged, but in the independent behavior of Sorge, in his unwillingness to obey the Comintern bosses.

In October 1929, a decision was made to transfer Sorge to the Intelligence Agency, and in January 1930 he already appeared in Shanghai. Prior to this, at the end of 1929, Sorge went to Germany to negotiate accreditation as a journalist from the German magazine "Zotsiology shop" in Shanghai.

At the institute in Frankfurt, he met the German sinologist August Wittfogel. Now, in November 1929, Richard renewed this acquaintance. Wittfogel, having learned that Sorge was going to China, brought him together with the famous sinologist, Professor Richard Wilhelm, director of the China Institute in Frankfurt. Two days later, Sorge signed a research agreement with the German-Chinese Society on the topic "the origin and development of banking law in China."

He also went to the USA, where he agreed on cooperation with two American newspapers and received the relevant documents. These documents listed the alleged pseudonym: "Alex Johnson". In China, there was a somewhat discriminatory attitude towards the Germans, as they were defeated in the First World War. They were considered second-class Europeans, and in dealing with the Chinese it was better to present themselves as an American. The entry of German subjects into China was allowed only after Germany renounced special rights for its citizens. For this, Sorge needed papers in the name of "Mr. Johnson", an American - they were extremely useful for traveling around the country.

In early December, everything was ready for departure. In January 1930, Sorge arrived in Shanghai under the guise of American journalist Alexander Johnson. He was accompanied by two GRU agents. Already three months of work

Sorge managed to create a powerful spy group, whose agents were at all key points from Canton in the south to Manchuria.

In Prison Notes, Sorge claimed that he was not a staff member of the Fourth Directorate, but was connected with the Information Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on official business, and was also registered with the party there. From the Central Committee he was supervised by a certain Smolyansky. However, in his testimony to the Japanese, Sorge tried in every possible way to obscure his connection with the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, so as not to fall into the hands of the military police. He insisted that China was his choice, since the East was more in line with his

temperament than Europe.

In China, at that time, Soviet influence was weakened after the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union in 1927. In April 1927, the Chinese police, in violation of all international norms, searched the Soviet consulate in Beijing. During the search, many documents were seized, including ciphers, lists of agents, documents on the supply of weapons to the CCP, instructions to the Chinese Communists to assist in intelligence work. Directives from Moscow were also found, which, among other things, stated that "no measures should be avoided, including robbery and massacres" in order to provoke conflicts between China and Western countries. All intelligence work in China had to be started almost anew, as the former residents and agents were failed.

Chiang Kai-shek, having quarreled with Moscow and the Chinese Communists, called on German military advisers to help him and began to actively purchase German weapons, although Germany and the USSR had good relations at that time. And functionaries of the German Communist Party were often sent as advisers to the CPC. In this context, it was logical to have a German as a resident in Shanghai.

China at that time was one of the centers of activity of all conceivable and inconceivable intelligence services that only existed on the globe. Until 1927, it could be called a "paradise for spies." The counterintelligence agencies of all authorities (and in China the Kuomintang, northern militarists and communists opposed each other) were exclusively engaged in the fight against agents of rival groups and almost did not engage in catching foreign spies. A lot of reliable information could be obtained without the help of agents, since the newspapers of the settlements and concessions printed any information that fell into their hands, including secret ones.

Corruption in the Chinese administration, police and army reached colossal proportions, and the bulk of the population lived extremely poorly and was ready for anything for very little money.

The work was made easier by the fact that foreigners in China were considered "citizens of the highest class." They lived compactly on the territory of the international settlement, French and Japanese concessions - all these settlements enjoyed the rights of extraterritoriality, Chinese laws did not apply on their territory. Formally, at the beginning of 1930, Chiang Kai-shek canceled the special status of these areas, but in fact everything remained as it was.

Sorge arrived in the country along with two employees of the Fourth Directorate. One of them was Sepp Weingarten, his first radio operator. The second is a curator from the Center with the pseudonym "Alex". According to Sorge,

"Alex's task was to provide communication with ... management and, in addition, to cover military problems ... And, although I was seconded as his political assistant, we worked independently on a mutual basis. Since he was older than me and had a direct connection with Moscow, he must be considered senior and in service. Some time after his departure from Shanghai, I took over the technical, organizational and military issues and became the leader of the group in all areas. "

As for "Alex", some confusion remains in establishing the identity of this person. This pseudonym belongs to Lev Alexandrovich Borovich (Rosenthal), an employee of the Fourth Directorate, who really worked in Shanghai and supervised the group created by Sorge. But this was much later, in 1936-1937, when Sorge himself was no longer in Shanghai.

As for the "Alex" who came with him to Shanghai in 1930, he was a completely different person. His real name is Alexander Petrovich (Israel Khaskelevich) Ulanovsky. And he became famous as a resident loser, since most of his business trips ended in failure. He was born in 1891 in Odessa and was 4 years older than Sorge. Ulanovsky started as an anarchist, but already in 1921-1924 he was on illegal intelligence work in Germany through the Cheka. In 1928, almost simultaneously with Sorge, he moved to the Intelligence Agency, and in 1930, after Shanghai, he returned to Germany as an illegal intelligence agent.

Ulanovsky's daughter Nadezhda also came to Shanghai as a radio operator. She described her first meeting with Sorge as follows: "Finally, I arrived in Shanghai, my father and Sorge met me. I saw Richard for the first time. He was tall, dark brown, looked older than his 35 years - a significant, intelligent face with wrinkles. He was He was wounded in World War I and limped. He spoke German and English to us. I did not know that he was born in Russia and spoke Russian as well as we did.

In the car, I completely fell apart. I was in such a state that Richard even looked with some disapproval, and my father felt uncomfortable for me. I say: "Thirteen days! And the Japanese and Germans are nearby!" Sorge was, of course, easier than us. He was himself, lived under his own name, with his own biography, and did not understand what it was like to play someone else's role every minute. He had to hide only the fact that he was a Soviet intelligence officer. They brought me home. Richard says: "Take a bath, put on a kimono, and fatigue will immediately pass." He prepared for me a beautiful kimono and mules with pom-poms that I had never seen before. First of all, I got rid of the cipher. Then I rested for a few days. Richard accompanied me shopping.

I got some things that I needed on the road in Moscow. Rey Bennet, an American, whom I was supposed to relieve in China, arrived and brought a leather coat and a knitted dress. She died in the Soviet Union in 1935, leaving a small child behind. Probably the Americans were looking for her. The main authority in everything related to "social life" was Sorge for us. Shanghai had colonial customs, the Europeans were masters, and our etiquette skills were very modest. Sorge, on the other hand, came from a bourgeois family, dressed and

held up as expected.

I needed a real wardrobe, it was not easy to get it - it was customary to sew to order. I managed to buy three ready-made silk dresses: blue, beige and green with flowers. In my youth, I recognized only the "English style", I did not wear bright dresses, especially green was against my rules, but Sorge highly recommended it. They also ordered linen - with the finest embroidery on silk. Sewed and embroidered

Chinese men.

To seem like real Europeans, we went to a cabaret. Sorge said that a shawl is a must for a cabaret. He and his father went to Canton on business and brought me a real Cantonese shawl from there. I still keep it, although it is the most useless thing in everyday life.

Then the weekdays began. I had to do a lot of tedious encryption. Most of my work was connected with my father's radio operator, Zeppel, a nice guy, an ex-sailor who, after being dressed up and civilized, quite passed for a German from the middle classes. Zeppel worked great, could fix any damage.

The main thing that interested us in China was the opportunity to get material about Japan: about its weapons, military plans. To work in Japan itself, our intelligence officers were not yet sufficiently qualified. I was also interested in China itself - what kind of connections does it have, with whom. Sorge was under the command of his father for only a few months, then he left for Hong Kong. He was prepared for independent work in Japan, where he later became a Soviet resident.

Father treated Sorge well, respected him, but still Richard was not "his own on the board" for him. "After all, he is a German," said the father, "one of those who sleeps with a woman, and then boasts." But Sorge did not brag about his victories at all, it was just that the German radicals were very "advanced" in matters of morality and were surprised at our "backwardness" with my father. Back in 1923 in Hamburg, the communists and anarchists assured us that bathing suits were a bourgeois prejudice. It was forbidden to swim naked on public beaches, the radicals had difficulty finding a place to swim, and we laughed: "This is all their revolutionary spirit!" The Germans were also very open about sex. Therefore, Sorge easily talked about his relationship with Agnes Smedley, because she was her man, a communist, and also unmarried. And his frankness jarred his father.

Six months later, Ulanovsky, as usual, was recalled from China under the threat of failure. He trusted his comrade in the Crimea, Fola Kurgan, and involved him in intelligence work. But he lost money at roulette, intended for one of the agents, and began to blackmail Alex with exposure. Togo, along with his daughter, had to be urgently evacuated due to the threat of arrest.

The first radio operator Sorge arrived at the same time as him. It was Sepp Weingarten, a graduate of the Moscow radio school. Education in the Moscow school was delivered in detail. Non-graduates could repair and even manufacture a transmitter on their own. And Weingarten worked in Shanghai on just such a makeshift transmitter.

Another member of the reconnaissance group sent from the Center was "John" - a Polish communist who arrived in Shanghai in 1931 and soon became Richard's deputy. He was engaged in encryption business, communication, photographing. "Roof" served him a small

photo shop.

According to some reports, the real name of "John" is Hirsch Herzberg (in the Intelligence Agency he was listed under the name "Stronsky"). Born in 1904, he became interested in Marxism from school. Started at the age of 16



carry out orders from his older brother, who was one of the first employees of Soviet intelligence in Germany. In 1920, Hirsch left for Germany, and in 1924 he ended up in Belgium, where he created a communist group. When the police became interested in him, he returned to Poland. In 1929, Hirsch was sent to study in the USSR, at the so-called Military-Political School of the Communist Party of Poland in Moscow. After school, he received an offer to work in the Fourth Directorate and, after a short preparatory business trip in March 1931, he was sent to Shanghai.

Stronsky had a very spectacular appearance, yielding in this respect only to the resident himself. As their comrade-in-arms Ursula Kuczynski recalled, "he had dark, with bald patches at the temples, curly hair, a marble-white forehead, dark eyes and high cheekbones. Introverted and serious, he gave the impression of ... a complex nature."

Radio engineering Mishin and radio operator Clausen Richard received from one of the former Shanghai residencies, the head of which was recalled to

Moscow.

In prison, Sorge recalled: "I arrived in China along with two associates - foreigners who received an order to transfer from

Fourth Directorate of the Red Army. Of the people who were in China, I counted only on Agnes Smedley, whom I heard about when I was in Europe. I asked her for help in organizing my group in Shanghai and especially in recruiting Chinese staff. He began to meet as often as possible with her acquaintances from among the Chinese. He made great efforts to make friends with this company, willing to work together and cooperate with a foreigner in the interests of the left movement. I noticed one very knowledgeable person whom I hired as an interpreter. Gradually, he became so friendly with him that it became possible to have frank conversations. After two or three months of communication, he spoke in general terms about his goals and offered to work together. I asked him to introduce me to his acquaintances and friends, if among them there are people suitable for our work. I called this Chinese man Wang, and then his wife became the second member of our group. When I was in Canton for three months, Wang told me the names of his local acquaintances. Of these, I singled out one woman who was born in Canton and was perfect for my work. She was on good terms with Smedley, gradually became close to her and was able to successfully include her among his employees. Her husband, who suffered from a severe form of tuberculosis, later joined our group as well. Of the men I met through this woman, one named Tian also became my assistant in Canton. A woman from Canton provided communication between us. Back in Shanghai, I greatly expanded my circle of employees by selecting suitable people among Wang's acquaintances and a woman from Canton, her name was Chuyi. Thus, the Chinese composition of my group in China was formed. In this group, everyone sympathized with the people's revolutionary movement, there were also those who had contacts with the CCP, but there was not a single member of this party. Following the instructions of the Center, I shied away from establishing direct links with

PDA.

As for bringing me into my reconnaissance group

foreign employees, I used similar methods. Having first of all found a person among Smedley's friends, I asked her to introduce me to him, gradually drew closer and waited for the time when it was possible to conduct direct negotiations. Thus, he recruited employees from among foreigners and brought them up to three people. These three were not in the full sense of the group, they were rather assistants and our supporters. The very first friend I made in Shanghai was Ozaki. Then, through him, he established contacts with other Japanese. I can't say for sure now, but I think I first met Ozaki on Smedley's recommendation, but I'm sure I had asked her repeatedly before to introduce me to suitable Japanese. Smedley talked to Chinese acquaintances at my request, and indeed my wishes reached the relevant Chinese and Japanese in Shanghai. This is how I apparently met Ozaki and I think I introduced Smedley to us. Then, together with Smedley, he often met with Ozaki in her house. As I said, my recollection of this rather old case is not entirely reliable, but I think that the first meeting with Ozaki happened in this way. Now I don't remember exactly whether we met for the first time with Ozaki in a restaurant or at Smedley's house. Moreover, I don't remember at all whether Kito Kito Gin'ichi asked me to meet Ozaki. Nor can I remember under what circumstances I became friends with Kito. Thanks to the meeting with Ozaki, it became possible to realize my aspirations to meet the Japanese I needed. "

Immediately upon arrival, Sorge visited the German consul, on whom his letters of recommendation made the most favorable impression. The consul, in turn, recommended the promising journalist to diplomats in Beijing, Nanjing and Canton. During the first two months of his stay in China, Richard sent five articles to the Deutsche Getreide Zeitung (German trade paper) about the trade in Chinese agricultural products, including exports of soybeans, peanuts, sesame, and grain imports.

A few weeks after arriving in China, Sorge met with the American journalist Agnes Smedley, a recognized expert on Chinese affairs and the author of many famous books about China. She had long been a communist and had worked for the Comintern in her youth. But by 1930, her Comintern connections faded to naught. Smedley was a friend of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. After her death in 1951, she bequeathed all her property to the marshal of the Chinese Communist Army, Zhu De. She was a journalist and represented the well-known German liberal newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung in China.

Agnes in America was engaged in trade union work, was a reporter for the New York socialist newspaper Call. She met the Indian Chattopadhyaya, with whom a love affair soon arose. After that, Smedley became interested in the problems of the national liberation struggle in India and China. Following her lover, Agnes moved to Berlin, visited Moscow for the congress of the Comintern, became a convinced communist, but broke up with Chattopadhyay. In 1928, the Frankfurter Zeitung newspaper invited Smedley to go to China as a special correspondent. Agnes

agreed, at the same time becoming a correspondent for several Italian newspapers, and in May 1929 she was already in Shanghai with two passports at once - American and German.

Agnes established ties with the "All-China Federation of Labor" and the "Chinese League for the Protection of Human Rights", managed to make friends with Sun Yat-sen's widow Song Qingling. The Chinese police followed her in vain. The journalist communicated with a huge number of people, and there was no physical activity to develop any suspicious among them.

possibilities.

Agnes' connections and acquaintances helped Sorge create an extensive intelligence network.

In the Gurem Notes, Sorge summarized the tasks of his group in China as follows:

"My duties, defined in Moscow, were as follows:

- 1) analysis of the activities of the gradually strengthening Nanjing government (the Kuomintang government headed by Chiang Kai-shek. - B.S.) in the socio-political field;
- 2) study of the military power of the Nanjing government;
- 3) analysis of the activities of various groups in China in the socio-political field, as well as their military power;
- 4) study of the domestic and social policy of the Nanjing government;
- 5) study of the foreign policy of the Nanking government in relation to all countries, especially Japan and the USSR;
- 6) study of the policy of America, England and Japan in relation to the Nanjing government and other groups and trends in China;
- 7) studying the armed forces of other countries in China;
- 8) study of the problems of extraterritoriality and settlements;
- 9) studying the problems of the development of agriculture and industry in China, the situation of the workers and peasants.

All these are my duties, determined by Moscow. At the same time, with the tacit consent of the Moscow authorities, I myself put forward the following problems and followed the changes in the situation in the Far East:

- 1) monitoring the new economic activity of Germany (especially in connection with the ever-growing growth of the group of German military advisers);
- 2) monitoring the strengthening of the US position in China (especially in connection with new US investments in Shanghai);
- 3) the new Japanese policy in Manchuria and its influence on the Soviet Union;
- 4) close observation of Japan's intentions during the Shanghai incident and the deployment of Japanese troops;
- 5) monitoring the deterioration of relations between the Nanjing government and Japan.

Japan's new policy towards China interested me deeply, and I became interested in Japanese problems in general. While in China, I could not deeply study the roots of these problems, but nevertheless, working on them in China was very useful later during my work in Japan. The Center in Moscow approved this area of scientific interest and expressed its satisfaction with this."

Sorge listed the following areas of activity, which

were prescribed to him by Moscow:

"A. Analysis of the activities of the Nanking government in the socio-political field.

There were many issues that we wanted to know for certain in the course of our intelligence work, including what classes firmly supported the Nanjing government, what the actual nature of the changes in the government's social base was. At that time, the attitude of the masses of the people - workers and peasants - towards the Nanking government was passive or negative. In contrast, Shanghai bankers, Zhejiang financial circles, large landowners, gangsters, drug dealers, and other big businessmen sympathized with the government. The opinions of the intelligentsia were different, and there were some of its representatives who became officials of the expanding government bureaucratic system. I had to, having taught all these problems, to inform Moscow. I collected reliable information myself, talking mainly with members of my group, maintaining relationships with a wide variety of people, or acting in other ways. At the end of 1930, and around June-July 1932, I sent detailed reports to Moscow and several additional brief communications.

B. The military forces of the Nanking government.

In carrying out this task, it was necessary to collect various information about the divisions supporting the government and the measures to reorganize the army carried out by German military advisers. In addition, we had to constantly monitor the movements of command personnel, changes in the system of fortifications, armament of troops, and methods of combat training. Gradually, we collected all the information of Chiang Kai-shek's 0b army, equipped with the most modern weapons; about the armed forces standing on the side of the Nanking government; about troops with dubious orientation. In addition, we could as a whole accurately establish the state of modern weapons and the progress of the reorganization of the main units. However, the situation changed all the time, so it was sometimes almost impossible to accurately capture the situation. I received this information mainly from the Chinese members of the group, but I myself had to collect important information both through German military advisers and through arms importers.

B. Analysis of the socio-political activities of groups that are in opposition to the Nanjing government.

The most important objects of my study were the Cantonese, Guangxi armies, the Feng Yuxiang group and others, with the first two I was able to thoroughly understand. And in this case, I focused on the social roots that formed the basis of these groupings. Although foreign banks had relations with them, the most important role was secretly played by the Chinese - Cantonese bankers and rich people from Guangxi. Of the materials received by the group on this problem, most of it was collected by me personally. And after my departure from South China, my staff sent me additional reports fairly regularly.

#### D. Domestic and social policy of the Nanjing government.

In order to deal with this problem, it was necessary to study the various laws adopted by the Nanjing government officially in the interests of the workers and peasants, both from a theoretical point of view and from the standpoint of their practical application. However, the government was not very interested in such an approach, so I had almost nothing to report. My Chinese employees collected information, but I can't remember exactly what I reported.

#### D. The foreign policy of the Nanjing government.

I was instructed to constantly collect information on the foreign policy of the Nanking government. Of greatest interest to me was the position of the Nanjing government in relation to the USSR, Japan, England and America. It is quite clear that the policy of the government was dependent on England and America, but from a practical point of view, this policy achieved its goal. The Nanjing government believed that by pursuing a policy of dependence on England and America, it would be able to strengthen its position in relation to the USSR, and later to Japan. I received materials on this issue from the Chinese members of the group, as well as from employees of the German and American consulates. During the Shanghai Incident of 1932, I observed with great interest this policy of dependence on England and America. England and America warmly supported the anti-Japanese police of the Nanjing government.

#### E. Chinese policy of England and America.

I have already touched on this issue above. In addition, my task was to follow the Anglo-American and Japanese actions against anti-Chiang Kai-shek groups. England viewed Hong Kong as a springboard for rapprochement with the Cantonese and Guangxi groupings, while Japan, using all possible means, sought to win over to its side influential forces in Northern China, but so far did not move in other directions.

#### G. Foreign military force in China.

We had to pay the closest attention to the condition of the foreign expeditionary forces and navy, and especially to their movements. As soon as the Shanghai incident broke out, all countries immediately sharply increased their armed forces here, and my work in this direction became extremely important. In this regard, I

was obliged in more detail than before to monitor the deployment of troops of all countries. I received most of the materials from German military instructors.

### 3. The problem of extraterritoriality in China.

At that time, this problem played an extremely important role in foreign policy. For the Nanjing government, this was an internal political problem that threatened the prestige of the country, which is why conferences of representatives of various powers were often held on this issue. When the so-called mission headed by Judge Fessenden (International

a mission that dealt with the problems of extraterritoriality of foreigners in Shanghai in the 1930s. - Note. ed.) in order to work out compromise proposals for foreign concessions in Shanghai, the issue became explosive. The mission had a specific plan with it, but from American and German sources I learned its contents much earlier. America was very friendly to the Nanjing government, so it made efforts to solve the problems of extraterritoriality. England, as usual, most often followed America. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, only the impact that this problem had on the relations of the countries that received the right of extraterritoriality with the Nanking government was of interest.

### I. The development of agriculture and industry in China.

The Nanjing government had many plans to overcome the agricultural crisis, and it was my job to inform them of the results. The agricultural policy of the government took into account mainly the interests of wealthy peasants and large landowners, but none of the plans for success

had.

I also reported on the state and development of industry, especially plans for the creation of a military industry. According to my information, the textile industry was successfully developing in China, two or three military arsenals were built, and the old ones were reconstructed. Having received drawings, statistical reports and other reliable documents about the arsenals in Nanjing and Hankou, I was able to reasonably estimate their production capacities. I received various materials both from the Chinese members of my group and from the Germans. I also had to get information about Chinese air routes, methods of training pilots, and so on. On these issues, he received important information by communicating with German pilots. He studied Chinese agriculture on his own initiative and subsequently studied it for a long time. I had a special interest in the problems of agriculture, so I was able to collect a lot of useful materials."

All this topic was quite traditional for intelligence. Sorge's curators could even be accused of excessive encyclopedism, if approached from a strictly formal point of view. For example, the state of China's industry and agriculture could well be judged from open sources, and Soviet officials in the embassy and trade mission could review them. But the point is

that there were no Soviet representations in China at that moment, not counting the representatives of the Comintern under the local communists. Therefore, Sorge had to collect as much information as possible on China, by no means limited to military and diplomatic secrets.

At the same time, in the "Gurem Notes" Sorge specifically highlighted the topics that he began to study in China on his own initiative:

"A. German economic activity and a group of German military advisers have gradually gained momentum.

When I began to carry out my tasks in China, I was amazed at the extremely vigorous activity of the Germans. Therefore, I decided to raise this problem and deal with it in detail. Moscow authorities

approved my investigations into German economic activity and recommended getting close to German military advisers. At that time, the Germans did not have much political power in China, but they tried to increase it by using the powerful economic base of their country and their influence on the military policy of the Nanjing government. At that time, Germany paid almost no attention to Japan. Most German diplomats believed that by pursuing a decisive policy towards China, Germany would naturally be able to maintain its position in the Far East. This opinion was also prevailing in the initial period of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The pro-Japanese policy promulgated by some of the Nazi leaders received an extremely small number of supporters. Even today, many Germans prefer China to Japan. German business circles have higher hopes for the future of China than Japan. In other words, Germany not only traditionally took a position of solidarity with China, but also counted on China to meet its economic needs. Therefore, many Germans did not give up hope for Sino-German cooperation. German economic and military activities in China at that time were conceived to create a starting point for the conclusion of a pact for such cooperation. It cannot be said that these aspirations of Germany have failed because of the current Japanese policy towards China, but it is clear that their realization is not yet possible. In addition, the purpose of the German activities was to control the organization of the Chinese army. Specifically, Germany, carrying out the supply of military equipment to the ground forces of China and in the end creating a network of military workshops, sought to infiltrate into state enterprises. At the same time, Germany intended to turn China into a testing ground for the German aviation industry. These were the common goals of the German military advisers, businessmen and diplomats who were in China. Needless to say, such a German policy towards China became a matter of serious concern for the USSR, both from an economic and political point of view. The Soviet Union knew Chiang Kai-shek thoroughly, therefore, did not consider joint actions of China and Germany against Mongolia and Turkestan possible, but nevertheless it was necessary to closely monitor the relations of these two countries. I believe that I have achieved great success in carrying out the task of observing and collecting information on this problem on my own. I could always get reliable information from the Germans. I say this because I have interacted with many Germans and maintained friendly relations with the most influential military advisers.

#### B. America's new activity in China.

American activities in China have consisted mainly of investments in Shanghai and investments in radio communications and aviation enterprises. Organizationally, it was directed by American businessmen and the trade attaché of the Shanghai consulate. In addition, America was active in the field of diplomacy in connection with the problems of extraterritoriality and the truce in Shanghai. Apparently, America sought to replace England as the dominant power in the Far East. Then such

signs, and the activities of England in the Far East began to decline rapidly. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, believed that it was necessary to establish diplomatic relations with America at all costs. I received information on this complex problem mainly from Smedley and young employees of the American consulate, information from Smedley was rare and irregular.

#### B. Japan's new policy towards Manchuria.

The position of Japan in the Far East changed after the Manchurian Incident (meaning the explosion on September 18, 1931 on the South Manchurian Railway (YüMZhd), owned by Japan, near Mukden (Shenyang), which was the reason for the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, which ended on February 18, 1932 the proclamation of the puppet state of Manchukuo. - B.S.), which broke out in the autumn of 1931. Having seized control of Manchuria, Japan began to seek to play an increasingly active role in East Asia. There was every reason to foresee that, as soon as Japan conquered Manchuria, she would strive to play this role energetically and single-handedly. The direct effect of the Manchurian Incident was that the Soviet Union was in direct contact with Japan in a vast something was not taken into account from the point of view of national security. In other words, a new, difficult situation for the USSR arose. The Manchu affairs were the task of the Harbin Group and were not part of my duties, but I personally could not help but carefully follow the new situation in East Asia with the utmost care.

D. The Shanghai Incident (meaning the beating of five Japanese Buddhist monks near a factory in Shanghai on January 18, 1932. A Chinese policeman was killed in the ensuing clashes. A campaign to boycott Japanese goods began in Shanghai. The Japanese government issued an ultimatum to the Shanghai authorities, demanding condemnation and the suppression of demonstrations, as well as compensation for damage to Japanese property. On the evening of January 28, the city authorities agreed to comply with these demands. But around midnight, aircraft from Japanese aircraft carriers began to bomb Shanghai. During the ensuing fighting, the Japanese captured Shanghai by March 3. On May 5, the Shanghai peace treaty. The city was declared a demilitarized zone. China was also forbidden to keep garrisons in neighboring Suzhou and Kunshan. Japan received the right to station a limited military contingent in Shanghai to protect Japanese subjects. - B.S.).



The outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai in 1932 indicated that a new course had begun to be pursued in Japanese foreign policy. Of course, at that time it was not entirely clear to us whether this was an accidental single clash or whether it was an expression of Japan's aspirations to conquer China following the capture of Manchuria. In addition, it was not clear whether Japan would move north into Siberia, or whether it would invade China to the south. In such a situation during the Shanghai Incident, my work became even more important. I have tried to uncover the true aims of Japan and to study in detail the fighting methods of the Japanese army during the fighting in Shanghai.

#### D. Japanese-Chinese clashes.

As a result of the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents, a new picture of the Japanese-Chinese problems was revealed. Relations between the two countries, of course, not only inevitably worsened, but their former character completely changed. China, like the Soviet Union, began to look at Japan's new actions with different eyes, inevitably experiencing new misgivings about her. Needless to say, I paid close attention to this issue.

#### E. The Japanese problem.

I have studied this problem in parts, but I have to admit that the Japanese problem must be considered as a whole. And while still in Shanghai, he began to study Japan and at the same time intended to become an expert on Japanese history and foreign policy.

It is felt that Sorge was attracted by geopolitics, which was then in vogue. He sought to analyze the clash of interests of the great powers in the East Asian region and try to predict the possible development of events.

It should be noted that for the most part, the Sorge group in China received information from open sources - from newspapers, magazines, news agency reports, etc. Sorge also drew information from his agents' observation of the movement of military units and from the rumors they collected. But the reliability of such information was sometimes very difficult to verify. Sorge did not have serious agents associated with the Nanjing government, the command of the Chinese army or working in foreign embassies and consulates.

The first and main of Sorge's Chinese assistants was Wang, whom he hired as a translator upon arrival. They soon became friends, and Sorge offered the Chinese to also work as an agent. He agreed, not too afraid of counterintelligence, and attracted his wife to the group. Subsequently, Wang's wife took a job at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nanjing, apparently on behalf of Sorge.

Julius Mader writes about another Chinese agent - Jiang. It is unlikely that they Wang are the same person, since Jiang could not be considered a "Chinese of good society" as Wang was. Jiang's father was a servant in the general's house and got some information from his master. Sorge also appreciated Jiang as an expert on local customs.

At one of the parties, Agnes Smedley introduced Sorge to Ozaki, a correspondent for Japanese newspapers in China. The communist Hotsumi Ozaki soon became one of Sorge's main informants.

In the Prison Notes, Sorge spoke of him this way: "Ozaki was my most important ally. I first met him through Smedley in Shanghai. The relationship between us, both from a business and from a human point of view, was completely impeccable. His information was extremely reliable and the best of what I received from Japanese circles. I quickly developed friendly relations with him. Therefore, as soon as I arrived in Japan, the first thing I did was to establish contact with him. He left Shanghai in 1932, and it was a serious loss for our group. He clearly had close ties to the Chinese Communist Party, but at the time I didn't know much about

this, no, actually knew nothing."

While working in China, Sorge came to the conclusion that the role of the United States in international affairs was strengthening. Sorge received extensive information about the role of the United States in the Pacific region from "a young employee of the American consulate", who was not named out of caution, and from Agnes Smedley.

In the Gurem Notes, Sorge described his work in China as follows: "In Shanghai, I was directly connected only with Wang, and only in exceptional cases dealt with other members of the group. Wang obtained information and materials from a variety of sources, which we analyzed together. In cases where there was a need to obtain particularly reliable explanations and reports, the two of Wang and I directly met and talked with the person who transmitted the information and materials. All instructions and instructions for collecting information went through Wang, and, except for exceptional cases, I directly I did not meet with individual agents to clarify my instructions. However, if an agent came to Shanghai from other places, I myself met with him in the presence of Wang. Over time, it became clear what problems each agent had a special inclination and ability, in connection with which the work in Shanghai was largely distributed so as to use the strengths of each person. Agents in Beijing, Hankou and Canton dealt with a wide variety of problems without such a distribution of functions. We met late in the evening and, weather permitting, used the crowded streets. We also met in private houses: in Wang's house, in the houses of foreigners, where I could easily go. Meeting places changed, as it is easy to catch the eye if the meetings take place in one place. Whenever possible, we avoided using my house for meetings. Working in this manner, often before starting this or that operation, I had to agree in advance and meet with Wang. However, this was not impossible, since at that time there was not much risk in such cases in Shanghai.

For meetings with the Japanese members of the group, I used restaurants, cafes, and also the Smedley house. It was dangerous for the Japanese to walk the streets of Shanghai during the first Shanghai incident, so I waited for them at the Garden Bridge on the border of the Japanese Concession and ensured their safety by picking them up in a car or personally escorting them to the meeting point. To avoid the attention of the Japanese police, I hardly showed up at the Japanese Concession. As the biggest exception, I met Ozaki once or twice in a cafe in Hankou.

However, regardless of what was said, the most convenient meeting place was the Smedley house, so I often went there with both Ozaki and Kawai. Since the meetings often took place late at night, I often used the car to pick them up and drop them off. Also, in an effort not to meet too often, I tried to meet at intervals of at least two weeks. After another Japanese took over from Ozaki, moving the meeting places to the busy streets of the foreign settlement, we met mainly in cafes on Nanjing Road or in restaurants attached to large hotels. Since the Chinese were hostile to the Japanese, we avoided visiting Chinese restaurants.

The predetermined dates of the meetings were strictly observed and therefore

dispensed with the use of telephone and mail. I strictly adhered to this course, even if an important business unexpectedly arose or I got into a difficult situation, which was more than once. When I met with the Japanese, I always came alone without accompanying foreigners. Only once did I introduce a Japanese man to Paul, as arrangements had to be made to secure communication due to my departure from Shanghai. When we met, we rarely exchanged information in writing, passing it only orally. The exception was Kawai's reports.

When I met foreign group members, I mostly went to their home, but my home was often used as well. Meetings were organized very often, usually agreed on by phone. Subsequently, the homes of familiar members of the group were also used for meetings. Sometimes they dined at a restaurant or met in bars and dance halls. Everyone preferred to meet in the French Settlement; they rarely went to the Japanese Concession. We kept the collected materials and prepared reports at home. After sending the report to Moscow, I destroyed or returned the materials, but nevertheless we always had a lot of documents in our hands.

Unlike Japan, Shanghai at that time was comparatively safe for people doing jobs like ours. We asked our friends to keep the most valuable materials, but they did not know what kind of materials they were. We only explained that these were secret documents and asked them to keep them.

I could not be satisfied with the information provided by the members of the group, and therefore I personally collected various data and materials as far as possible. Although there was no embassy in Shanghai, I immediately entered the local German colony and all sorts of information began to come to me. The center of this colony was the German Consulate General. Everyone there knew me and was often invited. I had close contact with German merchants, military instructors, students, but the most important for me was a group of German military advisers seconded to the Nanjing government. From this group, I selectively communicated with those who were aware not only of military, but also of political problems in Nanjing. One of them was a senior adviser, who later became Consul General, Colonel von Kriebel. Military advisers often invited me to Nanjing or visited me in Shanghai. In addition, I traveled with them to Tianjin and Hangzhou. From them I also received various information about the internal affairs of the Nanjing government, plans for the military, the economy and

political events. In addition, during the Shanghai Incident in 1932, they also gave me reliable information about the plans for combat operations of the Japanese army and the actual number of troops. By getting close to the German pilots from the Eurasian Airline, I could learn about the situation in the interior of China. In addition, he himself flew there several times and comprehensively studied the situation in China. Thus, constantly expanding my knowledge and reading literature about China, as a result, I became an expert on China and could, while preparing messages, quickly give conclusions on a variety of problems.

In general, in Shanghai, and indeed in China, it was relatively safe to engage in espionage. The Kuomintang counterintelligence was unable to track suspicious foreigners, and the Japanese

counterintelligence operated only within the Japanese settlement. And the main enemy for the Kuomintang was Japan, while Germany, on the contrary, was regarded as a friendly country. To some extent, this dampening effect on Sorge and members of his group. They often kept secret materials for a long time, did not mask their meetings with members of the group and agents. In China, all this went well. But when Sorge's people began to allow such violations in Japan, where counterintelligence worked much more closely, including with foreigners, this eventually led to the rapid failure of the group, although it did not, as we will see later, the direct cause of the failure.

In Shanghai, Sorge also met a good-natured German named Max Gottfried Franzern Clausen, who was already working in Shanghai as a GRU radio operator by the time Sorge arrived. In World War I, he was a radio operator in the German army, then joined the Communist Party of Germany, and in 1927 he was sent by the GRU to China.

In 1927, Clausen applied for admission to the German Communist Party. But, as he recalled, "they did not immediately rush to consider my application." For six months he was checked, and in the meantime he was engaged in agitation among the sailors, until the question of membership in the Communist Party was finally resolved.

Less than a year after that, Clausen was already in the 4th Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army in Moscow. He recalled: "General Berzin's secretary gave me 150 American dollars and a ticket from Moscow to Harbin and ordered me to establish contact with comrades in Shanghai. He showed me a photograph and said that I should meet the person depicted on it, who would come to the Shanghai Palace -Hotel every Tuesday at 5 pm I will have to hold the Shanghai Evening Post in my left hand and the pipe in my right, and when a friend says to me: "How is Erna?" "".

In April 1929, Clausen contacted Konstantin Mishin, who took him to No. 10 Rue Dou in the French concession. There was a residential building, a school and a workshop for two people. As a cover, Clausen used a job at the White Russian auto repair shop. The transmitted texts were written in German or English and encrypted before being sent.

In August 1929, Clausen was sent to Harbin, where he was met by a courier at the Modern Hotel, who introduced him to the chief of Soviet agents in

Harbin Glomberg-Ott, who a few days later, according to Clausen, "came alone and asked me to take my walkie-talkie to a private house that belonged to the American vice-consul Lillestrom - I decided that it was an American Swiss."

Back in Shanghai, Clausen moved from Mishin's house to furnished rooms with a boarding house. The 31-year-old widow Anna Wallenius also lived here. Mrs. Wallenius arrived in Shanghai with her late husband as a refugee from Soviet Russia. Although she was the daughter-in-law of General Kurt Martti Wallenius, who in 1930 was fired from the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army after the kidnapping of the first President of Finland, Karl Johaan Stolberg, in 1930, she had almost no money. After the death of her husband, she first earned a living by sewing, and then got a job as a nurse in

Shanghai Infectious Diseases Hospital. She hated communists, but she fell in love with Max. He was an excellent mechanic and made good money. And he also fell in love with Anna, although her political views contradicted his convictions. Clausen married her without succumbing to the pressure of his Moscow superiors, who demanded that he divorce Anna.

Anna Wallenius, who was often mistaken for a Finn, was actually Russian, Anna Matveevna Zhdankova, a native of Siberia, her father gave her "for education" to the family of the merchant Popov. In 1918, Anna found herself in exile in China.

In January 1930, "Jim" handed Clausen over to the recently arrived Richard Sorge. Clausen was ordered to go to the Anchor Hotel, where his acquaintance from Hamburg, Joseph Weingard, a former German communist, introduced him to Richard Sorge. Clausen Sorge remembered this: "A tall, slender brown-haired man with blue eyes. Always lively, energetic. He shone with wit and erudition. He had success with women. He loved fast motorcycle riding. He had enviable health, a unique heart ..."

Clausen, who worked as a garage mechanic under cover, built a powerful shortwave transmitter in his apartment, with which it was possible to maintain regular communication with the Soviet relay station, code-named "Wiesbaden", located in Vladivostok.

In the espionage career of Clausen, the finest hour has come. During the year, Sorge was in charge of all operations in Shanghai, and Clausen was the chief radio operator who established radio stations in different parts of China. During 1930-1932, Clausen sent only urgent intelligence reports to Center 597. But a lot of things were sent by couriers.

About Clausen's wife, Sorge subsequently testified as follows: "Anna Clausen was Clausen's wife. I met her even before her marriage - from the Shanghai period. Being Clausen's wife, she only helped him in his work and in this sense was related to my group. However, she was not a member of my group, her help to her husband was to provide their home for her husband's work. In place of her husband, she went to Shanghai to perform important tasks in the interests of the group. We counted only on her personal assistance, which she could provide to Clausen, like any a wife helps her husband. We did not expect her to become a member of our group."

Of course, we did not even dream that she would become a member of the Communist Party. She showed no interest in political affairs and was completely indifferent to them.

After Sorge partially re-created, partially reorganized the GRU agent networks in China, in the autumn of 1932 he was recalled to Moscow.

At the request of Sorge, he was sent a specialist in military affairs. In January 1931, the Estonian veterinarian Zelman Klaas arrived in Shanghai. True, the veterinarian was little interested in sick animals: at first he became a co-owner of a photographic store - the same one that belonged to Stronsky, and then opened a restaurant nearby. The real name of the restaurateur veterinarian was Carl Martin Rimm.

In 1932, when the amount of information had increased and the group needed a cryptographer, Lyubov was also sent to Shanghai.

Ivanovna Rimm, who arrived under the name of Louise Claas. Another married couple appeared in the residency. Rimm proved to be not only a specialist, but also a good scout. After the recall of Sorge, it was he who became the leader of the group.

He gave Sorge a "start in life" and another intelligence officer, who would later become known to the whole world under her writer's name Ruth Werner (Ursula Kuczynski), to whom Sorge assigned the pseudonym "Sonya".

"I became very attached to him," Ursula later recalled. - Unusually charming, highly educated, always focused. He is often portrayed as a broken fellow - not the way he really was. Sorge rarely smiled, looked rather melancholic ... Later I was asked many times if I had slept with him. I never even kissed him! Yes, and it simply could not be - I just got married, gave birth to a child ... "

She left such a portrait of Sorge: "You can't think about him without seeing him in front of you," Ursula Kuczynski said many years later. "An oblong face, thick curly hair, even then deep wrinkles on the face, bright blue eyes framed by dark eyelashes, nicely shaped mouth.

Already after the departure of Sorge, Ursula was trained at an intelligence school in Moscow, became a radio operator, then a resident of an illegal residency, having worked for twenty years without a single failure.

"He was a cheerful person who did not let difficulties get the better of him," Gerhard Eisler, then representative of the Comintern in Shanghai, recalled Sorge. "He was distinguished by a subtle sense of humor, sometimes he became somewhat ironic. In the roles that he had to play in the process task, he felt extremely confident ...

He lived among German officers and was known as a frequenter of officers' casinos. In this way he managed to prepare a good basis for his intelligence work ... "

Clausen recalled the same thing: "Richard preferred to wear comfortable

tracksuits with golf trousers. At the same time, a thick newspaper usually stuck out of the right pocket of his jacket, so much so that its name could still be partially seen, but the date of issue could not. If he was in a circle of Germans - military or civilian - it was, as a rule, the Deutsche Getreidezeitung or the Frankfurter Zeitung, in the Anglo-American company - the London Times. He seemed to be a perpetually preoccupied, frantic reporter, not particularly perceptive." And further: "For the sake of a few sketchy reports, he sometimes had to spend whole nights in such Nanjing pleasure establishments as the Clubhouse, International Club, or Rotary Club, pumping wine into his interlocutors, thus untying their tongues. (Sorge himself also pumped up fairly, but this did not surprise anyone. For a journalist and diplomat, as well as for an intelligence officer, the ability to drink a lot, if possible without getting drunk, is part of the profession. - B.S.). At the same time, he always knew more about those with whom he spoke than they did about him. Even during his stay in Germany, for example, he collected personal data, mainly of those military advisers who could be expected to have the best knowledge in the future; these data, as he repeatedly told us, gave him the opportunity, in the end, in a friendly

"Gut them like a fat Christmas goose" conversation.

Gerhard Eisler testified: "Richard Sorge found out what operations were planned to be carried out against the Soviet regions. Thanks to close contacts with Chinese comrades-in-arms in the struggle, I was able to convey this information to its intended purpose. This is how our meeting took place. Under the then conditions, it could not be long. was limited to the most necessary and essential. Despite the threat that constantly hung over him, Sorge emanated calmness and a sense of security. Without any haste, in a few minutes he managed to intelligibly explain the intentions and plans of the enemy, the most difficult situations. He had an amazing gift to state the most essential in addition to briefing me on the military plans of the Kuomintang clique, he also suggested a number of countermeasures and advised me what to do in order not to let the enemy take him by surprise. During our conversations, he did not use any notes. He kept everything in my head - both numbers, and names, and geographical names, which, for the most part, were difficult to remember.

In February 1932, the independent state of Manchukuo was proclaimed on the occupied Manchurian territory, headed by the Japanese put "emperor" Aisinzero Pu Yi, the last representative of the Chinese imperial Qin dynasty.

I must say that in China, Sorge and his comrades did not have any particularly valuable agents. They drew almost all information from open sources - from newspapers, as well as from conversations with journalists, diplomats, foreign military advisers, Chinese

officials and military.

Emperor Puyi

Kawaii Tekshii was in that category. He never graduated from university and changed one job after another. In early 1928, he left for China and got a job as a reporter at the Shanghai Weekly, where he contrived

last almost two years. Then he opened a bookstore in Chongqing, and then wanderlust took over again. In 1939, this honored Soviet agent was recruited by Japanese intelligence, who did not know about his past, and in 1940 he returned to Japan and resumed his work in the Sorge group. Kawai became a communist shortly after arriving in Shanghai in 1928. Until October 1931, he worked in a minor Soviet group, when he met Ozaki, who passed him on to Sorge and Agnes Smedley. Another member of the group, named Kawai Shine Ronin, is a Chinese adventurer who is constantly in need of money and often asks Ozaki for a cash loan.

Funakoshi Hisao arrived in Shanghai in 1927 as a reporter for the Mainichi newspaper. Shortly thereafter, he transferred to the Japanese news agency Rengo Tsushinsha, where he headed its branches in Hankou and Chongqing. Between 1935 and 1937, he represented the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper in Chongqing, and from 1938 to 1941 he was an unofficial adviser at the headquarters of the Japanese army in Hankow. He became a communist back in 1929, but only in 1932 was he recruited by Kawai, who handed him over to Sorge. After Sorge's departure from Shanghai, Funakoshi was introduced to the "Fields" group. His military connections gave him a brilliant opportunity to report on military issues that were of such interest to intelligence.

Another member of the Shanghai group who was later transferred to Tokyo was Mitsuno Shige. A young man from a good family, he became fascinated with communism when he was a student at the East Asian Screenwriting School in Shanghai at the age of 20. However, he developed such a vigorous activity in terms of propaganda of communist ideas that in 1931 he was deported from China to his homeland.

In 1937 Shige rejoined the Sorge group in Tokyo. He collected information for a yearbook produced by the Great Japan Youth Association. As a result, he prepared extensive reports for Sorge on the Great Japan Youth Party and the Black Dragon Society. He also managed to collect information about the armament of two divisions in preparation for a military campaign in South Asia.

On June 15, 1931, a certain Hilary Nulens and his wife were arrested in Shanghai. Hilary Nulens' real name was Yakov Matveyevich Rudnik. In 1917 he became an ensign of the Russian army and a member of the CPSU (b), participated in the storming of the Winter Palace, in 1918 he became a member of the collegium of the Cheka, worked in France and Austria through the Comintern, and in 1929, again through the Comintern, was sent To China. He maintained contact between the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the Far Eastern Bureau, the Communist Party of China, and the Communist Parties of other countries of the Far East. On June 1, 1931, the Comintern courier Joseph Ducroix was arrested in Singapore. A piece of paper with an address was found on him, with the help of which the Shanghai police quickly contacted Nulens, who, along with his wife, was immediately arrested.

Nulens called himself Belgian, stating that he and his wife should be placed under Belgian jurisdiction. The Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to confirm their citizenship. Then he declared himself a Swiss by the name of Bere, but the Swiss Foreign Ministry also did not recognize him as a citizen. The case was referred to a Chinese court, which was for

Nulensa-Mine is the worst option.

Already in August 1931, the French trade unions began a loud



campaign in defense of "an innocent trade union secretary". The protest campaign was expanding every day, spreading throughout the world. In the autumn of 1931, the names of the imprisoned spouses changed again: the surname Rug began to sound in letters of protest. Curiously, these letters were ahead of the change in the "legend" of the arrested person, since Nulens began calling himself a Swiss citizen Paul Ruth only in November, after he received instructions from the Comintern in prison.

Albert Einstein, Clara Zetkin, Henri Barbusse, Theodore Dreiser and Maxim Gorky took part in the campaign in defense of the Nulens-Roog-Rudnik spouses, launched around the world.

As a result, the spouses, whose identity the Chinese never established, were tried in Nanjing in the summer of 1932. The Sorge group communicated with the arrested and sent detailed reports to Moscow on the progress of the case. Shortly before the trial, Richard informed Moscow that the fate of those arrested could be influenced, but for this they needed 20 thousand dollars - for bribes. Immediately, two couriers were sent from Harbin to Shanghai, each of which carried 10 thousand US dollars. These people were Otto Braun and Herman Zibler. On August 19, 1932, Nulens was sentenced to death, but since an amnesty was declared in China in June, the death penalty was commuted to life imprisonment for both Nulens himself and his wife. Since the amnesty was apparently not taken for the sake of the Nulenses alone, there is serious doubt that the money did not actually reach the Chinese officials. And if they did, they had no effect on the verdict. It was carried out after the Mukden and Shanghai incidents, when Japan became the main enemy, and the USSR, for which the imaginary Nulenses were obviously working, was a very likely ally of Japan in this struggle. In 1937, the spouses, even whose names could not be established, were allegedly released so that they could find money to make a bail - naturally, they immediately evaporated, and in 1939 they returned safely to the USSR, where they were not even subjected to repression. Of course, the Nanjing authorities had no illusions about the fact that the imaginary Nulens would return to prison. Their release was part of an unspoken deal with the USSR and the Chinese Communists. The fact is that on July 7, 1937, Japan launched a big war against China. And the Chinese generals at the end of 1936, during the so-called. The Xian incident forced Chiang Kai-shek to create a united anti-Japanese front with the Chinese Communists, who supported the Soviet Union. After that, it was inconvenient to keep agents of the Comintern in prison. So they were given the opportunity to safely disappear.

Sorge, in prison, wrote about the Nulens case: "I first learned that Nulens was on a secret mission in Shanghai only when he was arrested. His arrest caused a great sensation among foreigners living in Shanghai. The arrest was made by the police of the Shanghai Foreign Settlement at the request of the Nanjing government and handed it over to this government. The Nanjing government arrested CCP leaders and from their testimony learned of Nulens' existence and activities, and to top it off, the places where Nulens met with party representatives. Nulens and his family were

were arrested at their home, where highly secret documents were found and confiscated as important evidence. Nulens claimed to be Swiss, but the Swiss authorities stubbornly denied this. He was sentenced to a long prison term, but soon,

due to the intervention of the Soviet Union, was sent abroad.

In November 1932, Richard left China, and left it suddenly, within one day. Ursula Kuczynski said that one day at the end of 1932, John called her and said that in the afternoon she should come to his house - Richard called her. According to the rules, one more call was to follow, and only then should one go. However, John did not call, and Ursula decided that everything was cancelled. That evening, she and her husband were visiting, and in the middle of the evening, the phone suddenly rang. She picked up the phone.

"I've been waiting for you for two hours," a familiar voice said. - Then I called, but no one was there. Did you go out?

- Yes.

- Fine. I want to say goodbye to you...

Richard treated Ursula very well, and this parting by phone could only mean one thing: he was leaving suddenly.

In 1955, the GRU reported to the KGB: "The illegal resident "Ramsay" headed the illegal intelligence network in Shanghai in 1929-1932. Due to the threat of its failure, due to gross organizational errors made by "Ramsay", he was recalled from Shanghai to the Center " .

On a telegram from Shanghai, which raised the question of Sorge's recall, Berzin left a resolution: "Let him go without waiting for a replacement, otherwise he will burn out."

Probably, Sorge appeared in some kind of scandal or an unpleasant story, the investigation of which could lead the police to the idea that he was a Soviet resident.

Rimm accepted the residency, and on November 12, 1932, Sorge went to Moscow via Vladivostok.

A case of 100 typewritten pages was found in the US archives about the work of a Soviet intelligence officer in Shanghai in the early 1930s. Chinese counterintelligence and British intelligence followed the Soviet resident from 1930 to 1933. Some of his contacts with representatives of the Comintern, suspicious trips to Mukden, Harbin, Changchun, Jilin were revealed. Only the absence of clear evidence saved Sorge from arrest. They also knew about the threatening situation in Moscow. On October 10, 1932, a cipher from Shanghai came to the Center about this. The answer was categorical and clear: without waiting for a replacement, "Ramsay" urgently leave for Moscow. At the beginning of 1933, Sorge left China, and the dossier filed on him was gathering dust in the archives of Chinese counterintelligence for a long time, until it got to the British, and after the war to the CIA. After the inspection carried out by the Intelligence Industry, it turned out that the threat of exposure was imaginary, but they did not return Sorge to Shanghai, preferring to change the country to a neighboring one.

Jobs in Japan

"Immediately upon my return from China," Sorge recalled, "I met with General Berzin, the chief of the 4th Directorate ... who met me

extremely kind. I was told that Moscow was highly satisfied with my work in China, after which Berzin asked me to listen to the details of my future activities. I was not allocated a desk in the department and was not assigned to another job. From time to time I was called in to discuss some issues, but for the most part Berzin or his deputy called me at the hotel.

Sorge asked to be given a job so that he could stay in Moscow. Berzin, however, turned down his request. According to Sorge, "my desire not to stay longer in Moscow was not taken into account ... Even when I half-jokingly asked if there was any work for me in Japan, Berzin did not answer me. However, a few weeks later he himself enthusiastically raised this topic.

In Prison Notes, Sorge spoke about his meetings with Karl Radek in 1933: "Radek, Alex (Borovich. - B.S.) and I discussed the general political and economic problems of Japan and East Asia for a long time. Radek showed deep interest in my trip. I have just returned from China, and he considered me as an expert on Chinese politics, so our meetings were useful and interesting. Neither Radek nor Alex did not impose their instructions on me, they only stated their views. I was able to meet with two employees of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs who were in Tokyo, and heard from them many details about this city. However, I do not know their names or what they do. Our conversations were limited to the exchange of the most general information. In addition, I, with permission Berzina met with his old friends Pyatnitsky, Mauilsky and Kuusinen, who learned from Berzin about the circumstances of my work in China and felt a great pride in their "pet". Our conversations with them also concerned only the general political situation, and we communicated simply as private individuals, as friends. Pyatnitsky, having heard from Berzin about my plans in Japan, was very worried that I might encounter various difficulties, but when he saw my strong-willed attitude, he was very pleased.

Karl Radek

Subsequently, a meeting with Radek could well serve as a pretext for accusing the intelligence officer of having links with the anti-Stalinist opposition.

In 1933, it was decided to send Sorge to Japan. His path to Tokyo lay through Germany, where in May 1933 Sorge went from Moscow.

On October 1, 1934, Richard became a member of the Tokyo organization of the NSDAP - without problems and unnecessary questions, despite his past membership in the GKP, which no one in Japan knew about. At that moment there was a massive influx of members into the Nazi Party, which had just come to power, and there was no serious background check of new members. Even ordinary communists were not forbidden to change their beliefs, and many of them, having become members of the National Socialist Party, remained loyal to Hitler to the very end, especially since they could not count on forgiveness from those of their comrades who remained faithful to their former ideals and found themselves among winners. But Sorge in no case should be allowed to surface his past ties with

communists, about whom the German embassy in Tokyo could then be informed. And he decided not to risk it.

With the help of Agnes Smedley, Sorge received accreditation in Tokyo as a correspondent for the major German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung. He has also received accreditation from the Technische Rundschau and the Dutch Amsterdam Handelsblad.

In Berlin, Sorge met with a resident who was going to China to replace him. It was the Soviet intelligence officer Yakov Gorev (another surname is Bronin, but the real, "girlish" one, is Liechtenstein). From 1930 Gorev worked in Germany. He recalled: "When I arrived exactly at the appointed time, Sorge was already there, he was sitting at one of the tables on the open spacious terrace of the cafe ... Richard Sorge was a slender, stately, imposing man, above average height. Somewhere I read that he had a "slightly sad" expression on his face. This is not true. Maybe this is how it turns out from the photographs, but this is clearly not true. His bright eyes, facial features, gestures, facial expressions - everything expressed strong-willed determination, intense work of thought, conviction in his judgments, a penetrating sharp mind. This interesting, significant person was very memorable ... Richard was energetic, but not fussy, he was specific and businesslike. He did not impose his opinion, but convinced by the logic and thoughtfulness of the proposed events. He was lively, interesting interlocutor, loved a joke ... "

Thus, a kind of handover took place. But not only.

"We agreed on the forms of secret communication between Tokyo and Shanghai," Gorev recalled. "From the end of 1933 until my arrest in Shanghai in May 1935, we maintained fairly regular contacts. During this time, I sent five or six times to Ramsay his people for mail, transmitted through his two radio stations separate telegrams from the Tokyo residency when they did not get on with communication ... Ramsay and I carried on secret correspondence (the Center provided us with a special cipher for this), he had a secret Shanghai address in case of urgent messages. .. Subsequently, I was pleased to learn that in a letter to the Center dated 1934, Ramsay emphasized "an exceptional comradely willingness to help,

displayed by our people in Shanghai."

From Berlin, Sorge went to France, in Paris he met with a courier from the Center and received from him passwords, appearances and meeting places in Tokyo. From Cherbourg, he sailed on a steamer to New York, and from there to Washington. Richard had a letter of recommendation from a former major general of the German army, and now a professor from Munich, Karl Haushofer, to the Japanese ambassador to the United States, Katsuya Debushi, a former deputy foreign minister, and Sorge received a letter of recommendation from him to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

Then Sorge went to Chicago for the World's Fair, where he met with another courier from the Center. And only after that he went to Canada, where in Vancouver at the end of August 1933 he boarded a steamer sailing to Yokohama.

In the United States, he met with communist agents in California and, according to some sources, married an American.

Richard Sorge arrived in Japan on September 6, 1933 and immediately left for Tokyo. There he settled in a luxurious hotel "Sanno". Soon, Sorge rented an apartment at number 30 in Tokyo's Azabuku district and began to send informational notes and essays on the situation in Japan to New York newspapers.

Harich-Schneider, a professor at the conservatory, described this house as follows: "It was hot in the apartment, like in an oven. The outlines of dusty streets blurred in the unbearable glare of sunlight; on the terrace located on the roof of his house, unbearable stuffiness reigned even at night ... The air was filled with the aroma of hot wood, the sounds of the radio and children's laughter were heard from neighboring houses ...

Sorge's house was lost among the dwellings of poor Japanese. Built in a casual European-Japanese style, it looked sloppy. Downstairs, two rooms, their squalid furnishings were limited to a few rickety tables, on one of which lay a piece of shabby red velvet... Behind the wall was the kitchen. Upstairs - his working room with a large sofa, a desk and a gramophone, a wall from floor to ceiling - bookshelves. Behind the door - a bedroom, which was almost entirely occupied by a wide double bed. A narrow corridor led to the bedroom. The doors of both rooms on the top floor opened onto a terrace.

Richard himself wrote to his wife with his usual humor: "Winter here is expressed in rain and damp cold, against which the apartments are poorly protected, because they live here almost under the open sky: if I type on my typewriter, then almost all the neighbors hear it. It happens at night, the dogs start barking and the kids start crying, so I bought myself a fogless car..."

He visited the German embassy, joined the German Club, and soon became a well-known figure in the German colony of Tokyo. Sorge's first article appeared in Berliner Börsen Kurir on October 18, the second on November 27. These were serious political reviews.

Soon the hostess appeared in the house. On October 4, 1935, Richard celebrated his birthday in the restaurant "Gold of the Rhine", where the Tokyo Germans who missed their homeland liked to gather. The German spirit was diligently maintained in the institution, even Japanese waitresses were called by European names. However, they were brought up in the best

Japanese traditions, were smart and knew how to entertain guests with sophisticated conversation. That day, the owner called one of the waitresses, named Agnes, and said: "This gentleman is forty years old today. Try to make this evening memorable for him."

However, despite all the efforts of the girl, the more the "master" drank, the more gloomy.

- People have fun on their birthday. And you, probably, are bored with us ... - she said, adding wine to the guest.

- If you happen to celebrate your fortieth birthday as far from your native places, you will understand how much fun it is, - he chuckled darkly.

A few days later they met by chance in a store.

records.

- You tried so hard to cheer me up that you deserve a reward, - the guest smiled. Today he was cheerful and charming, gave Agnes a few records. The next time they saw each other was in the spring of 1936, when the German reappeared in the restaurant, then in June... "Agnes", on whom he made an indelible impression, remembered his every visit. And soon they got to know each other better. Ishii Hanako, as the waitress was called, became the third wife of Richard Sorge.

Later, during interrogation by the police, she briefly defined his lifestyle: "In the mornings he went to the German embassy, was often drunk and sometimes wrote articles." If in the evening Richard was free, he would certainly spend time in one of the restaurants beloved by diplomats, military and journalists. There was constant tension. The sparkling humor characteristic of Sorge increasingly gave way to sarcasm, and Richard drank more and more.

Dr. Lily Abegg, a correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung in the Far East, recalled: "Actually, as a person, Sorge was very pleasant and even nice - if he wanted to ... He did not tolerate fools or people who seemed uninteresting to him. In such cases, he did not hide his contemptuous attitude, and his sarcasm could cross all boundaries.

American Major General Charles Willoughby, head of intelligence at the headquarters of the American occupying forces in Japan and the first biographer of Sorge, according to people who knew Richard, gives this portrait of him: "Physically, Sorge was a large man, tall and stocky, with brown hair. Like remarked one of his Japanese acquaintances, from the first glance at his face one could tell that he had lived a stormy and difficult life. In the expression of the eyes and the lines of the mouth, arrogance and cruelty were seen. He was proud and powerful, deeply loved and passionately admired those whose sought friendship, but was ruthless to others and frankly hated by them. Many of his Japanese press colleagues saw him as a typical thug, an arrogant Nazi and avoided him. He was a hot-tempered man who liked to drink heavily and was used to changing his mistresses often. It is known that for years of service in Tokyo, he was in intimate relationships with about 30 women (Japanese sources speak of 40 mistresses of Sorge. - B.S.) And yet, despite the passion for women, drunken drinking and a difficult character, he never betrayed himself ..."

In "Prison Notes" Sorge described the tasks assigned to him during a business trip to Japan:

"The tasks assigned to us in 1933 and more specific

in 1935.

In general, they boiled down to the following:

- 1) Closely monitor Japan's policy towards the USSR after the Manchurian Incident, carefully study the question of whether Japan is planning an attack on the USSR.

For many years these were the most important tasks assigned to me and my group. It would not be a big mistake to say that this task

in general was the purpose of my business trip to Japan. In 1935, when Clausen and I paid a farewell visit to General Uritsky from the Fourth Directorate of the Red Army, he especially noted the importance of our mission. It was believed that if it succeeded, the Soviet Union would perhaps be able to avoid war with Japan, and this was the object of increased interest of all Moscow authorities. In doing so, we had to keep in mind the feeling of mistrust in the Soviet Union towards Japan. Namely, the Soviet Union, seeing the growing role of Japanese military circles and their foreign policy after the Manchurian Incident, began to have serious fears that Japan was planning to attack the USSR. This feeling of suspicion was so strong that no matter how much I sent opposite versions, the Moscow authorities never fully shared them, especially during the battles at Khalkhin Gol and during the large-scale mobilization of the Japanese army in the summer of 1941.

In addition to the main task of clarifying Japan's intentions regarding the attack on the USSR, we were also entrusted with the duty to follow various foreign policy actions related to Japanese policy towards the USSR. At the same time, however, Moscow showed much more interest in the Manchu-Siberian and Mongolian-Manchu border problems than in issues related to fisheries or Sakhalin.

2) Carefully monitor the reorganization and build-up of Japanese ground forces and air units that may be directed against the Soviet Union.

This task was related to the first one. Since the Japanese military circles, in order to justify their demands for a swelling military budget, declared the USSR their main adversary, in order to fulfill it, it was necessary to obtain secret military information covering a very wide range of issues. In accordance with this, my intelligence activities were not limited to questions of the build-up of Japanese armed forces in Manchukuo.

Also of interest were various events pointing to plans for a war against the USSR, and especially the problems of reorganizing the ground forces. Needless to say, an important part of our work was to closely monitor the mechanization and motorization of the Japanese army. A common surprise was the implementation of the program for the significant growth of the Japanese armed forces and their extensive reorganization, and it was believed that the goal of these changes was not only China, but also the USSR. Military power tripled, the number of divisions almost equaled the number of Soviet divisions, after the events at Khalkhin Gol, mechanization began to develop rapidly. This rapid development, together with the public statements of many military leaders, suggested that the purpose of the preparations was the USSR, which was why it was of great interest to me. Of course, I could not continuously follow the military preparations in Manchuria from Japan, so my observations

were nothing more than random. But nevertheless, I paid attention to this problem, since I had no way to judge whether our secret organization was created in Manchuria and whether it was directly involved in these issues. I also had to constantly monitor the Japanese troops in China, because from its occupied areas the Japanese army was able to quickly advance to the Soviet borders.

3) Scrupulously study Japanese-German relations, which, it was believed, after Hitler came to power, would inevitably become more close.

Of course, in the middle of 1933 and in the summer of 1935 it was still too early to predict to what level the gradually improving Japanese-German ties would reach in their development. However, Moscow was sure that a rapprochement would take place between the two countries, moreover, directed mainly against the USSR. Suspicions were so strong in the Soviet Union that the foreign policy of Japan and Germany was aimed against the USSR, that it came as a complete surprise to Moscow when in 1941 Japan made a "big turn" in its public life and launched military operations against America and England.

This particular task was determined for me as one of the main ones, since in the Moscow center, based on the nature of my work in China, they believed that I would certainly be able to establish close contacts in the highest German circles in Japan. Of course, the main object through which this problem could be revealed in detail was the German embassy, and it was assumed that I would find a reliable channel for obtaining information there.

4) Continuously obtain information about Japanese policy towards China. This task can be seen as a continuation of my intelligence and analytical activities that I carried out in China. At the time when this task was assigned to me, no one could even imagine how large-scale it would become in the summer of 1937. Moscow only believed that if one knew Japanese policy towards China, then one could to a certain extent judge Japan's intentions regarding the USSR and, even more so, draw conclusions about Japan's future relations with other countries.

5) Keep a close eye on Japan's policy toward Britain and America. Moscow believed that the idea of a joint war of all the great powers against the USSR was not one of those from which

easy to refuse.

6) Constantly monitor the role of the military in determining the foreign policy of Japan, paying close attention to those trends in the army that affect domestic policy, especially the activities of a group of young officers, and finally, closely monitor the general course of domestic policy in all political areas.

Moscow set this task due to the fact that it was sufficiently aware of the decisive role played by the Japanese military in all areas of Japanese politics, and especially in foreign affairs. The Soviet authorities were well aware of how sharply the influence of the army increased after 1931. Therefore, they could not help but show interest in whether the influence of the military on Japanese political leaders would continue to grow. This question was indeed of great importance for Moscow, since in

for several decades, Japanese military leaders considered tsarist Russia, and then the USSR, their only real enemy. In 1933, no one thought that in the future the political influence of the Japanese navy would increase and that the raw materials necessary for the war economy (oil, rubber, metals) would be acquired in the south. Therefore, it was natural for Moscow



to assume that if the influence of the army, which had decisive power, continues to grow, it will be directed against the Soviet Union. Therefore, this particular task was very important.

7) Continuously obtain information about Japanese heavy industry, paying special attention to the problems of developing the war economy."

In addition, Sorge, as in China, took on a number of tasks on his own, so to speak, on his own initiative. According to him, "the most important tasks that arose in connection with various political events are listed below (I will state them in chronological order).

1. The so-called incident of February 26, which happened in 1936 (meaning an unsuccessful attempt at a military coup. - B.S.), and its impact on the domestic political situation. This case falls into the category of tasks set by Moscow and set out in paragraph (6) of the previous section. However, the significance of the "February 26 Incident" was so great that the study of both the event itself and its impact on domestic politics should be regarded as a special problem. For quite a long time, preceding February 26, tension in the internal situation grew more and more, but the "explosion" of the incident and especially its peculiar development were extremely unexpected for other states and foreigners. Be that as it may, the incident had a typical Japanese specificity, and particularly in-depth studies were needed to clarify its causes. A detailed study of the incident and the social tensions and internal crisis revealed during its course provided much more for understanding the Japanese internal structure than materials or secret documents on the armed forces. The results of large-scale studies of internal crises that arose under the Hirota, Hayashi and first Konoe cabinets also became excellent material.

With the February 26 Incident, the Sino-Japanese conflict actually began, which was completely hidden, and this fact turned out to be very useful for understanding Japanese foreign policy and internal structure. Therefore, it is natural that our reconnaissance group considered the incident of February 26 as a special task. And Moscow has shown great interest in this, not only from a purely military point of view, but also for various political and social reasons. Needless to say, that in the future we paid attention to the issues of resolving and suppressing this internal crisis.

2. Japanese-German alliance. Already at the very first meeting on the so-called Anti-Comintern Pact (meaning the agreement between Germany and Japan, signed on November 25, 1936. Italy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1937. - B.S.) it became clear that as the German ruling circles, and influential Japanese militaristic leaders want not just a political rapprochement between the two states, but, as far as possible, a close

political and military alliance. Undoubtedly, the USSR, or, more precisely, their opposition to the Soviet Union, was the main point connecting these two states. Therefore, the task assigned to me by Moscow to study Japanese-German relations appeared in a completely new light. I have long heard rumors that there were secret talks between the Ambassador

Oshima and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in Berlin, so the task of monitoring the relations of both states could not but become one of the most important in my work. All the more so since these negotiations, as is now well known, were carried out on the conclusion not only of the Anti-Comintern Pact, but also of a genuine alliance. The negotiations passed through various stages, and at the same time the international situation changed, and during the entire period of my stay in Japan, these problems constantly demanded my maximum attention. Of course, it was of considerable interest to Moscow how strong the anti-Soviet positions of Germany and Japan were in these negotiations. After the outbreak of war between Germany and the USSR in the summer of 1941, the question of greatest interest was whether Japan would take practical action in accordance with its original position at the beginning of negotiations for an alliance with Germany. Finding an answer to this question was one of the most important tasks that arose during my stay in Japan, and in solving it my reconnaissance group achieved outstanding success.

3. Japan-China conflict in 1937. The Sino-Japanese conflict was another unforeseen event that presented us with a task of particular importance. This conflict changed the fundamental basis of Sino-Japanese relations and gave Japan monopoly rights in China. What had previously been considered impossible by the great powers had come to pass. As a result of the new situation in Japanese-Chinese relations, not only Great Britain and America, but also Moscow faced completely new problems.

Events were limited to China. But as a result, during the period of the development of the conflict, the direction of the Japanese expansionist policy could not be quickly or easily turned to the north.

The Sino-Japanese conflict was also very important for us from an economic point of view, because it was at that time that the plans for the Japanese war economy and the turn towards the development of heavy industry were implemented. Overseeing Japan's transition to a war economy was one of the tasks set by Moscow, and as a result of the Sino-Japanese conflict, we have an excellent opportunity to fulfill it.

Later, the Sino-Japanese conflict provided us with an excellent opportunity to clarify in detail the methods of unleashing the war by Japan, the structure and ways of strengthening the navy. This conflict was a testing ground for the development of Japanese weapons and the reorganization of its army, in connection with which it was quite easy to follow these processes. In addition to the above, because of this conflict, Soviet policy towards China also changed radically. The situation has also changed in China itself, which had previously been the object of my work for a number of years. This is how the Sino-Japanese conflict presented us with special problems.

4. Severing long-term Japanese relations with Britain and America. It is obvious that if the Sino-Japanese conflict escalated into a full-scale war, as a result, either Great Britain and America would completely submit to Japan, or a very serious crisis would break out between Japan and these two countries. Several months after the start of the Sino-Japanese conflict, changes in the situation became clear. obscure

the only question left was whether Britain and the United States would succumb to Japanese policy, or whether there would still be a crisis between the two sides. As is well known, British policy showed a trend of support for Japan and, rather, approval of her Chinese policy. However, after the start of the war in Europe, the degree of Great Britain's dependence on the United States increased and there was nothing left for it but to reconsider its pro-Japanese policy and follow the American diplomatic course. Japan's relations with Great Britain and the United States finally deteriorated when, in addition to the conflict in China and the policy of the German-Japanese alliance, Japan set a course for expansion in a southerly direction. Great Britain, which had previously been an ally of Japan, and the United States, which supported this alliance, now became Japan's adversaries.

Since the Sino-Japanese conflict from the very beginning contained the above-mentioned possibilities for the development of the situation, all attentive diplomatic observers showed an extraordinary interest in the relations between Japan, Great Britain and the United States. The subsequent development of events confirmed that I was not in vain engaged in the study of this problem.

5. The position of Japan in relation to the Second World War and the war between Germany and the USSR. Now it is already possible to reveal the nature and significance of the problem that I received in connection with this. Of course, its importance is quite obvious when one considers the efforts made by Germany over the past two and a half years to bring Japan into the war. Immediately before the outbreak of the war, Germany sought to conclude an alliance with Japan, directed mainly against Great Britain. In 1940, Germany successfully managed to convince Japan of the need to sign a treaty against Great Britain and the United States. In 1941, she took all measures to involve Japan in the war with the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is natural that Moscow was very interested in Japan's attitude to World War II. There is also no need to say that after the start of the war with Germany, the Soviet Union showed extreme interest in Japan's position. Nothing else had such a direct connection with the fulfillment of my most important task - the problem of war or peace between Japan and the USSR - as Japan's attitude to the two world political events noted above (World War II and Germany's war with the USSR). Based on the foregoing, one can understand why my reconnaissance group had a special interest in this problem and actively sought to carry out this task. In any case, we carried out these duties until October 1941.

6. General mobilization in the summer of 1941. The tasks on this problem are partially touched upon in the previous section. But since for several months this was a problem of extreme importance for my reconnaissance group, it can be considered as an independent

task. Obtaining reliable information about the scale and direction (north or south) of mobilization made it clear whether Japan was striving for war with the USSR or not. The large-scale mobilization and the sending of some reserve units to the north at first gave us cause for concern, but it gradually became clear that these actions were not the main goal of the USSR. Therefore, we were finally able to give a clear answer to the question posed in the fifth paragraph. In short, one could conclude that this summer or autumn, Japan is not planning an attack on the USSR, or, to put it differently, there will be no attack, at least until spring.

next year.

After this conclusion, we immediately faced the problem of a major crisis in Japanese-American relations. In December, this crisis eventually turned into a war, but we were only able to study its initial stage and were, unfortunately, deprived of the opportunity to complete our mission.

#### Richard Sorge in Japan

Sorge, as in China, sought to supply Moscow not only with facts about certain events that took place both inside Japan and in its relations with other countries, but also provided analytical reports on how all these events could affect world politics and the position of the USSR. And for clarifying the position of Japan in the event of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war and for assessing the likelihood of a Japanese-American war, Sorge, it seems, undertook even before receiving specific assignments from Moscow.

In his testimony, Sorge also outlined "Moscow's directives regarding special tasks:

During my many years in Japan, in addition to the tasks listed in the first part, get! many directives from

Moscow. They were transmitted mainly by radio, but sometimes I received them by courier mail. The directives were both general and very specific. The general directives contained instructions for intensifying intelligence activities, required the selection of more reliable sources of information, and from time to time recommended that various precautions be taken. Special directives ordered to clarify certain specific issues, for example: does this or that division actually exist, where it is stationed, what new types of aircraft are adopted by the Japanese army, what new types of tanks are being produced. Sometimes directives on political matters were also sent. For example, once a request was received about the possibility of reaching an understanding between Japan and the United States in matters relating to the USSR. However, I did not receive new assignments that went beyond the scope of duties determined by Moscow or chosen by myself. At least, I don't remember messages containing such tasks. Moscow fully trusted the political intuition and political consciousness of my reconnaissance group."

As Sorge admitted, "in the period from the autumn of 1933 to the spring of 1935, there was almost no need to talk about the actual fulfillment of tasks. We spent this time in preparatory work in a very difficult situation in Japan. It was necessary to organize an intelligence group and create the basis for intelligence activity. As foreigners, we had to first of all get to know the problems that were the object of our mission. To achieve an accurate understanding of the various problems that we were obliged to deal with was immediately almost impossible. Even for Miyagi, who had lived abroad for a long time, it took some time to In order to become aware of Japanese problems, we foreigners needed a much longer time for this.

It was at the time when I returned from my short trip to Moscow in the summer - autumn of 1935, and approximately from the autumn of 1936 the group became a strong organization and was able to fulfill its functions. The previous period should be seen as a time to study the situation in Japan and prepare for real work. To criticize the initial period of my stay in Japan means the same as to criticize the results of my fruitful activity. This means that before 1936 results of the same value could not have been achieved.

Indeed, Sorge, and other members of the group from among foreigners who first appeared in Japan, do not know Japanese, which is considered one of the most difficult to learn among all the languages of the world, and have only a very superficial understanding of Japanese culture, history, economy and modern political situation in the country, they could not collect information in a qualified manner, as well as recruit informants. It took two years to acquire the minimum necessary knowledge. Indeed, in order to extract information, one must understand the problems to which it relates. This understanding came only by the summer of 1935, and Sorge hastened to share this understanding with Moscow in order to clarify his tasks.

According to Sorge, "The plan was to instruct me to deal with the situation in Japan in detail, to carefully study the possibilities of reconnaissance operations directly on the spot, then

the need to briefly return to Moscow and then finally decide the question of my future activities. The Moscow center considered the work in Japan extremely difficult, but important, and therefore considered such a preparatory stage as absolutely necessary.

It was especially difficult for foreigners to work in Japan.

An atmosphere of xenophobia and spy mania reigned in the country in the 1930s. The Europeans were followed by agents of the secret police. Sorge's colleague, the German journalist Friedrich Sieburg, recalled: "On two or three trips that I took with Sorge, we had to deal with a downright myriad of uniformed and civilian policemen who followed us on our heels, checked our documents and talking to us ... Often during the morning shave in my hotel room, a rather unclean young man with a lot of fountain pens in his breast pocket, bowing incessantly and with a respectful hiss inhaling air, he introduced himself as a police agent and expressed the hope that I felt myself in Japan is completely safe. The same thing happened to me during excursions, in public parks and even in temples.

These young people, with their literally screaming "inconspicuousness," were for the most part completely satisfied as soon as I handed them my visiting card with an inscription in Japanese. The Kempeitai agent, as a rule, studied the business card for a long time, as if it were some kind of especially important document, made another bow and asked permission to keep it.

Together with Sorge, I also visited the cities of Kyoto, Nara and Yamato, where we visited the sacred temples. On the trains we were constantly approached by some people, using a few phrases in broken English or German, and asked us for visiting cards. At the train station in

Yamada was surrounded by a whole group of uniformed policemen; bowing incessantly and breathing in with a respectful hiss, they wrote down our biographical data... Once, one of the policemen even asked permission to examine our fountain pens. Later, I learned that the Japanese have a particular fear of fountain pens, because they believe that with their HELP, spies take photographs or various kinds of measurements. There was also constant talk about infrared rays, with the help of which supposedly spies did their dark deeds ... "

Sorge's first radio operator in Japan was Bruno Windt, who worked under the pseudonym "Bernhardt". He was born in 1895 in Germany, in the family of a factory worker. After graduating from a technical school, he worked as an electrician, then, after being drafted, he served as a radio operator on a warship. In 1918, Bruno became a member of the "Spartacus Union", and then a communist. In the 1920s, he was a member of the "Combat Union of Red Front-line Soldiers" and trained radio operators for the Communist Party. Windt was recruited by the Intelligence Agency in 1932. And in 1933, after completing intelligence courses in the USSR, Bruno was sent as a radio operator to the Ramsay group.

In the Gurem Notes, Sorge described him as follows: "My first radio operator Bernhardt worked with me from 1933 to 1935. His position was the same as that of Clausen. Like Clausen, he was a member of the German Communist Party and studied at the Moscow radio school. Like Clausen, he was sent to me by the Fourth Directorate of the Red Army...

Around the end of 1933, Bernhardt and his wife arrived in Japan. Bernhardt was to work as my radio operator. He set up one radio station at his home in Yokohama and another at Vukelich's home in Tokyo. However, from a technical point of view, his work was extremely unsatisfactory, so I could only transmit very short messages and do this very rarely. And not only for this reason. Bernhardt was completely taken aback by the inability to protect both stations from direction finding. When Clausen arrived in Japan, the situation changed. His ability and enthusiasm for his work truly knew no bounds. Under Bernhardt, I had to encrypt the texts myself, which took up a fair amount of my time. But after the arrival of Clausen, with the permission of Moscow, I taught him the cipher and entrusted him with the cipher work. According to the old regulations, the duty of encryption was assigned only to the head of the group, but Clausen was such a reliable person that permission from Moscow was obtained without hindrance.

To fully guarantee constant radio communications, Clausen deployed as many radios as possible. At other times he could broadcast from four different locations. Usually, in the main, it provided communication from at least three points. These were the houses of Clausen and Vukeliy's first wife. When Stein was in Tokyo, his apartment was also used for radio communications. As far as I remember, Clausen once tried to deploy a radio station in my house, but he did not succeed, and we decided to use this option as a last resort, if we no longer have a choice."

Shortly after her legalization in Shanghai, the radio operator of the Shanghai residency, Rene Marceau (later Ellie Bronin, the wife of the resident) received an order to go to Tokyo and find out what was happening with the Ramsay transmitter. The radio was faulty, and the radio operator could not fix it in any way, although in principle he should have been able to do it. Rene

having graduated from the radio school, she could also not only repair the transmitter, but even make it. She made her way to Tokyo with considerable risk, went to the apartment, turned on the radio and found that it was in good working order. It turned out that the radio operator was simply afraid to go on the air. Then Sorge asked to replace Bernhardt with someone he knew from Shanghai, primarily Clausen.

Nevertheless, after Tokyo, Windt still managed to visit Spain, where his traces are lost. There he worked as a radio instructor of the Intelligence Agency, and the issue of his business trip was decided at the highest level. This is evidenced by Voroshilov's note to Stalin on the appointment of V.E. Gorev and "to ensure communication" of Windt, and the reference of S.P. Uritsky about Windt: "Born in 1895. Before the revolution, he was a sailor in the German navy. Since 1918, a member of the German Communist Party. He worked as a radio operator on ships of the German merchant fleet. Since 1929, on radio intelligence work in the Red Army. For two years, he carried out uninterrupted illegal communication Tokyo - Moscow. At present, a radio instructor of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. "

Shortly after Sorge's arrival in Tokyo, at the end of 1933, the radio operator Windt introduced him to the journalist Branko Vukelic, a correspondent for the Parisian magazine La Vu and the Belgrade newspaper Politika and an agent of the Comintern. After arriving in Japan

Vukelić also became a correspondent for the Havas agency.

Croatian Bruno Vukelic was born in Osijek in 1904. His father, Milivoj, was Croatian and served in the Austro-Hungarian army, and his mother, Vilma, was from a family with German or Jewish roots. In Zagreb, Branco entered a high school, but was forced to move to Paris because of his communist beliefs and participation in the Croatian independence movement. There, Vukelic graduated from the Sorbonne University with a degree in law and re-established contact with the communists. In 1932, he joined the French Communist Party, and in March of the same year, a certain "Olga" attracted him to work for Soviet military intelligence. In fact, a pseudonym is a mysterious thing, but the infamous Baroness Lydia Stal worked under the nickname "Olga" in France. Probably, for the "brilliant" manner, Branco was given the pseudonym "Gigolo".

In February 1933, Vukelich arrived in Tokyo, and at the end of the year established contact with Sorge. At first, Richard was not enthusiastic about the new employee. In a letter to the Center dated January 7, 1934, he wrote: "Gigolo, unfortunately, is a very big snag. He is very soft, weak, intelligent, without any hard core. His only meaning is that we are his apartment, which we got him, we are starting to use as a workshop, so that in the future he can be useful to us only as the owner of a reserve workshop. Vukelich became the group's photographer, reshooting documents on microfilm for further transfer to the Center. At first he communicated directly with Sorge, and then - probably, with the outbreak of World War II, when it became indecent for a German to communicate with a Frenchman, Miyagi became an intermediary between them.

The marriage between Branco and his first wife, Danish Edith Olson, a gymnastics teacher, concluded in 1930 in Paris, was annulled due to a series of scandals, after which he married his

Japanese translator Yoshiko Yamasaki. Sorge did not approve that this marriage was concluded without his knowledge, but in the end gave the Danish wife a sum of money sufficient for her to leave for Europe. He gave her \$5,000 from the band's funds and added another \$1,000 of his own. And rather, Yoshiko became his mistress. The stormy romance lasted three months. Vukelich did not suspect anything, especially since the girl spent all the nights with him. Sorge did not think about the risk that would arise if Branko found out that the boss was horning him. The Japanese authorities established that in addition to two wives in different parts of the world, he had at least forty women with whom he maintained relations only in Tokyo alone.

Edith left Japan just in time - in September 1941, just before the arrest of the Sorge group.

Branko Vukelić had two duties: he was the group's photographer and, in addition, he collected information. It was he who prepared many microfilms smuggled out of Japan. From his colleagues, he learned a lot about the situation in Indochina, as well as about the reaction of France to the Japanese occupation of its possessions. Foreign correspondents willingly shared news with Vukelić.

Sorge described the sources of Vukelich's information in the Gyurem Notes as follows: "Vukelich had two tasks. One concerned the technical side of our activities, the other was to collect

information.

The most important source of his information was the Domey news agency. For work, he was there every day and therefore could easily get a variety of information, both published and unpublished. In addition, he could find out hidden political nuances directly from the Home agency and its departments. The information received from there was purely political, and some simply reflected the political atmosphere. Therefore, in principle, important information did not come from there, but it was significant and interesting as an addition to the huge amount of information received by my group through other channels. This impression was especially strengthened after Vukelich's reports on the atmosphere and the agency in connection with the Second World War and the mood associated with the unleashing of a war between Germany and the USSR. The Home Agency was not at all pro-German, and this position reflected the feelings of most Japanese people.

Vukelich was often able to receive information that was widely known in "Home", but due to censorship usually was not published. Thanks to this, we were able to study the political situation in Japan and know the position of the government. He also communicated with the French from the department of the GAVAS agency and received various fragmentary information from them. Thanks to this, he could learn the position of his French friends after the fall of France in relation to Germany and the policy of Japan in relation to Indo-China and the southern countries. However, these were more materials reflecting the general atmosphere of events than reliable information.

A branch of the GAVAS agency had contacts with the French embassy, and Vukelić personally visited there on occasion, in connection with which we were very interested in the current information and capital information that he obtained there. Vukelić also met several times with



the military attache of the French embassy, but the information received through this channel was not particularly important.

As a correspondent for the GAVAS news agency, Vukelich, with the permission of the Japanese military authorities, was able to make a trip to Khalkhin Gol, and needless to say, thanks to this occasion, he collected information for us.

Lately he has received a lot of information from foreign, especially American, journalists, among which there were very interesting pieces of information, mostly related to diplomatic policy. For example, of the information he provided, the most important was a speech by US Ambassador Grew in 1941. Recently, he, perhaps, has become even closer to American journalists.

Between December 14 and 18, 1933, an advertisement appeared in the English-language newspaper Japanez Advertiser for the purchase of 20th-century Japanese ukue-e prints. A young Japanese artist, Miyagi Iotoku, who recently arrived in his homeland from the United States, responded to the ad. He was an agent of the Comintern and thus entered into contact with the imaginary buyer - Vukelich. When they met in the office of an advertising agency, in the best espionage tradition, they exchanged halves of the same dollar bill. A few hours later, Miyagi was already introduced to Sorge.

Born in 1903 in Okinawa, Miyagi has lived in America since 1919. He took a course in the art schools of San Francisco

and San Diego, from which he graduated in 1925, and in 1927 he married Chiyo Yamaki. Together with friends, he owned the Owl restaurant in Los Angeles. In 1929 (according to other sources - in 1931), Miyagi joined the American Communist Party. At the same time, he established contact with Soviet intelligence, and had previously been a member of Japanese communist circles.

Miyagi's paintings were popular. Proceeds from their sale went to the expenses of the Ramsay group. More importantly, Miyagi was popular with the Japanese military, who willingly commissioned their portraits from him. In conversations with customers, the artist obtained information about the state of the army and navy, in particular, about topographical work on the Sino-Mongolian border near Khalkhin Gol and about the upcoming actions of the Japanese fleet in the direction of the South Seas at the end of 1941.

From July 25 to August 16, 1935, Richard Sorge was in Moscow. This trip, as we remember, was planned in advance. He raised the question of the arrival of a highly qualified radio operator Clausen, with whom he worked in Shanghai. The GRU leadership agreed to comply with his request and summoned Max to Moscow.

Aino Kuusinen, the wife of Otto Kuusinen and a Soviet illegal immigrant in Japan along the line of the Intelligence Agency at the same time as Sorge, later recalled what Niiro Virtanen, an illegal intelligence agency like herself, told her. In 1935, Niiro met Richard in Moscow and they had dinner together. Aino wrote in her memoirs: "Virtanen spoke about his chance meeting in August in Moscow with Sorge. They spent a fun evening together in the restaurant of the Bolshaya Moskovskaya Hotel. Sorge, as usual, drank a lot and, in a drunken state, spoke directly about his difficult situation. He was tired of working for Russian intelligence, but no

opportunity to give up and start the life of a sheaf. He felt that he was in danger in the USSR, but he knew that Germany was closed to him, where he would immediately be arrested by the Gestapo. It remained to return to Japan, although he foresaw that he would not have long to work there.

Sorge certainly didn't like Stalinist-style communism, but Hitler's National Socialism seemed even worse.

Aino Kuusinen described her first meeting with Sorge in Tokyo in January 1935 as follows: "In early January 1935, at exactly the appointed time, I was sitting in the foyer of the Imperial. A man appeared at the door and barely perceptibly nodded to me. I immediately recognized Dr. Richard Sorge, whom I met ten years ago when he worked in the German sector of the Comintern. Then, shortly after his arrival from Germany, he and his wife were visiting Otto and me. That means who will be the liaison between me and General Berzin !

I sat a little longer, then went outside, where Sorge was waiting for me in a taxi. Our conversation was short. I told him I was going to move, he knew I was "Ingrid" but had no idea about my assignment. He did not have the authority to order me or give instructions, but all communication between me and the fourth department had to go through him. Sorge offered to meet in a week in one of the bars...

Aino Kuusinen in 1965

It was a low-class German pub, and I reproached Sorge for forcing a woman who had previously lived in the Imperial Hotel to go to such a disgusting place. Sorge did not pay attention to my words, said that he was going to Moscow soon, he would go there and back through the USA. He didn't know when he would return, so he gave me money for a whole year."

Here one can doubt that Aino ("Ingrid") was not subordinate to Sorge. After all, he not only received information from her, but also gave her money, and even for a whole year. In addition, there was no way for her to hide the essence of her task from the resident. After all, her messages to the Center still had to be encrypted by Sorge.

I must say that Aino, recalled from Japan at the end of 1937, was arrested, spent nine years in prisons and camps. Then - release after the war and soon - re-arrest and exile, final release in 1955 and return to Finland in 1965.

By the way, in terms of addiction to drinking and women in the Comintern, Sorge had someone to compete with. According to Aino Kuusinen, "Georgy Dimitrov, who became General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1935, worked in various departments of the Comintern, but each time he had to be dismissed: he was only interested in drinking and women. When indignation and complaints reached the limit, he was transferred somewhere. The Comintern simply refused to work with him, and he was sent to another building, to the Krestintern, to the old man Meshcheryakov. Once Meshcheryakov burst into Otto's office (I was there): "Comrade Kuusinen, we need to talk! Take Dimitrov! He does not understand anything in our work, he only knows to drink and seduce our girls. I'm not the head of the department while he's there! Please take it away from me!" Otto promised to think of something, and when Meshcheryakov left,

he told me, laughing, "No one wants to mess with Dimitrov. Where

his child? It's probably better to send it back to the Balkans. "And they sent it." Then Dimitrov, unlike Sorge, after being acquitted at the Leipzig trial (according to Aino, Otto Kuusinen wrote a brilliant speech of Dimitrov, who did not speak German well at the trial), was safely dragged to the USSR and made the nominal head of the Comintern, and at the end of the war - the head of the communist government of Bulgaria. True, Dimitrov's vodka did not bring him to good - on July 2, 1949, he died in Barvikha from cirrhosis of the liver at the age of 67.

The fate of Aino Kuusinen (Turtiainen) shows what the fate of Sorge could have been if he obeyed the order and left Japan at the end of 1937 or in 1938. He would almost certainly have been arrested and either shot or sent to a camp. In the latter case, however, he would have had a chance to survive the war and live to see liberation, rehabilitation, and perhaps even memoirs. But in this case, he would never have become the most famous intelligence officer in the world, but would have stood among dozens of Soviet illegal residents who went through the Gulag. After all, the Sorge group transmitted the most valuable information just in the late 30s and early 40s. And, of course, if Sorge had been recalled no later than the 38th, the Japanese police would not have been able to arrest him in the 41st. And then there would be no extensive testimonies and notes of Sorge, which, being published after the war by the Americans, created "Ramsay" posthumous worldwide fame.

Unexpected difficulties arose during the visit to Moscow. The Clausens, and especially Anna, did not want to leave their quiet home in Krasny Kut in the Volga German Republic. As Max, who worked as a tractor driver, recalled, "they settled down, got a household. And then a letter came from Moscow. An urgent call. Imagine my situation: a good job, a good team, and I have to give up everything. A week later, a telegram arrived: "Immediately return to Moscow," they reminded me that I was a fighter of the Red Army."

"Since childhood," Max Clausen claimed in his testimony, "I have not heard anything but bad things about Japan ... And therefore I happily agreed to go there to work for Sorge." It is felt that he liked working under the leadership of Sorge. In September 1935, Max said goodbye to Anna, whom he later met in Shanghai, and departed armed with three passports in three different names. One passport was Canadian, another Italian, and a third German.

"There are thousands of passports from different countries at the headquarters (4th Directorate)," Clausen reported, describing his trip. "And all are genuine. Only the names and photographs are fake. Before leaving, I received instructions regarding the use of passports and 1,800 dollars in US currency ... In Stockholm I purchased a sailor's certificate and went to New York aboard the Boston. Upon arrival, I had my own German passport renewed at the German consulate and checked in at the Lincoln Hotel, as I was instructed to do. There I a man who introduced himself as "Jones" called.

This is how Max Clausen traveled to Tokyo in 1935. From Leningrad, he went to Helsinki, from there - by plane to Amsterdam and, through Belgium, to Paris. There he settled in a hotel, where he lived for four days.

Having already paid, but still in the room, he burned his passport and

took another from a hiding place in a suitcase, with the name Ditelman, with whom he went to Vienna, where he met with a courier who handed him documents in his real name, with which he went to New York. There, Max received another set of documents, which he took to the German consulate, explaining to the consul that he lives in Boston, arrived there from Hamburg, and is now going to China, and he needs a new passport. And only after receiving genuine German documents, in which there were no traces of his stay in the Soviet Union, Max went to Tokyo.

Clausen was asked if he needed money. He answered in the negative. On November 28, he arrived in Yokohama aboard the steamship Tatsuta Maru. And although he immediately intended to go to Shanghai for Anna Wallenius, he did not have enough money - he overspent on the road. Only eight months later he went to Shanghai, where he remarried Anna and returned with her to Japan.

In Tokyo, Anna naturally entered the German colony, made acquaintances with women, which was also useful. Subsequently, she recalled: "Not alienating German society outwardly, we became its members. I made acquaintances with German women. They often arranged various charity events in favor of German soldiers. I was forced to take part in this, and this gave a lot to strengthen our I was mistaken for a permanent German. Once, the chairman of the German sorority, Frau Eger, asked me why I did not have children, and advised me to have them, since "our country" needs children, they will have a happy future. This confirmed once again that they considered me theirs."

It should be noted that until 1933, the needs of Soviet intelligence in documents were provided by illegal workshops of the Communist Party of Germany, the so-called "Pass Apparat", where the best masters in Europe worked for making false documents.

The illegal immigrant was supplied with a complete set of documents, where, if possible, all the life circumstances of the character he was to become were taken into account. Hans Reiners, a former expert on passports and other personal documents of the Comintern, recalled the intricacies of the craft of a fake document maker:

"Of course, we have a blank German passport and want to fill it out for Mr. Müller from Munich. But we must bear in mind that Müller may one day appear in Munich, and his documents will be carefully checked by the police. What kind of ink is used in Munich for passports? What is the name of the officer who signs the passports? We instruct our agent in Munich to find out and get the signature of Schmidt, the chief of police, from him, which is by no means an easy operation. Now we need to find out the time of signing, and this is a new puzzle, we must know that Mr. Schmidt was not on vacation or ill when he "signed" the passport. Also, in some countries, the police stamp is confirmed by a stamp on payment of the fee, which means that this stamp must also be forged. Stamps change from time to time. Therefore, it is required a huge collection of stamps from hundreds of cities and towns.

When these operations are completed, the work of making a passport

just getting started, the hardest part is yet to come. Müller cannot simply appear in society, equipped only with a passport, he

must have documents that indirectly confirm his identity: birth certificate, service records, social security book, etc. This is a whole collection of documents, and in order for it to be complete, the person issuing it must be a historian, geographer and connoisseur police habits.

If the birth certificate must confirm that Mr. Müller was born in Ulm in 1907. The "pass-apparatus" needs to find out what form was used in the atom city forty or fifty years ago, what notarial terms were used at that time, what names were popular and what were not. The name Ivar would sound strange in the city of Ulm, and the name Sepp would seem strange in Hamburg or Copenhagen. Finally, there was the issue of seals. What were they like in those places at that time? Was there a lion, a bear or an eagle on the coat of arms? Knowledge of heraldry was required, and entire volumes devoted to this subject stood on the shelves.

When the set of documents was ready, another problem arose. If Ivar Müller crosses the first border, his passport does not have to look new. If it contains many visas that indicate that the traveler has been checked and rechecked, the police will not pay attention to the fact that they are presented with a freshly minted document. That is why Pass Apparat affixed many false visas and border stamps to the passport. The route must be well thought out and correspond to the legend that was provided to the illegal.

"Pass Apparat" had six secret workshops and in 1927-1932, when its activity reached its peak, produced about 400 sets of documents annually, and its branches were scattered throughout Europe. But after Hitler came to power, Soviet intelligence and the Comintern began to have big problems with passports, since the activity of the Pass Apparatus was paralyzed and its masters were forced to leave Germany.

If Sorge left the Soviet Union in 1933 and reached Japan safely, then Max Clausen was already facing difficulties on the way. The first passport with which he was to leave the USSR was made incorrectly, and Max was "wrapped" in Odessa, so he had to go through Leningrad, and he got out of the country only on the second attempt. In New York, too, there was an overlay, this time with a different document. Therefore, he did not risk entering Japan with fake documents, but preferred to get a genuine German passport.

Aino Kuusinen recalled how she met Clausen in Japan at the end of 1935: "Until November, no one bothered me, and I managed to meet many journalists and people from high government circles. But then something strange suddenly happened. An unfamiliar blonde came to my house and said in German that "our mutual friend the doctor" ordered me to urgently go to Moscow, but before that to see him. That same evening I was supposed to meet a man who spoke German in a flower shop on Roppongi Square, and he will take me to the doctor. The woman also said that I must urgently prepare for a trip to Moscow and go by the shortest route.

It was beyond my understanding! Wasn't I told that I would be in Japan for a few years? Why all of a sudden these changes, right now, when I managed to make many valuable acquaintances? What about me

explain my sudden departure to acquaintances?

In the evening, I obediently went to the flower shop and bought two flowers. A fat German was waiting for me there. He didn't introduce himself, and I didn't ask his name. We took a taxi and arrived at Sorge's modest two-room apartment. He acknowledged the message, but did not know the reason for the call. I have to go through Siberia, in Moscow, stay at the Metropol Hotel, they will find me there. Then he asked me to send several messages in Moscow and gave money for the journey.

The fat German was Sorge's main assistant and radio operator (later I learned that his name was Max Clausen). He asked me to tell me in Moscow that he could open a shop for radio engineering and electrical goods in Yokohama - this would be an excellent front and, moreover, would give Clausen a livelihood. You need twenty thousand dollars to open a business.

Clausen's first assignment in Tokyo was to meet Sorge and secure a legal apartment for himself. The place for the meeting was agreed in advance - any Tuesday evening at the Blue Ribbon bar, but the very next day after Clausen was in Tokyo, he accidentally ran into Sorge in a German club. Both pretended they had never met before and went through all the formalities of introduction to each other again.

It turned out to be somewhat more difficult for Clausen to arrange a "roof" for himself. He was not a journalist and could not act in that capacity. He tried to go into the export-import business, but failed. And tried again. This time, M. Clausen 3BoKa1 (53BoKa! is Japanese for "company"), headquartered in KaraSumori Building, 5Yufa-Ka, Tokyo, was successful.

"Clausen ZBoKa1" produced and sold printing presses for photocopying and fluorescent plates - printing plates for electroforming. Among its customers were several major Japanese firms, as well as military factories, the Japanese army and the Japanese Navy. The machines that Clausen produced to imperial specifications also reproduced the very blueprints that Sorge's agents stole. Within five years of starting operations, Clausen 5poKa! already could be transformed into a joint-stock company with a capital of 100 thousand yen, of which 85 thousand were the personal property of Clausen. He opened a branch in Mukden with a registered capital of 20,000 yen, which gave him not only additional legitimate income, but also an excellent pretext for receiving bank transfers from New York, Shanghai or San Francisco, since Clausen did business abroad, and this served as an excellent cover for financial transfers coming from abroad to the Sorge organization.

Anna Clausen made four trips alone, shipping over thirty rolls of microfilm. Upon her return, she was given five thousand dollars, which she deposited into the account of her husband's "company". But to the annoyance and annoyance of Clausen, she returned, laden with expensive dresses and jewelry, which she had bought for herself with money.

"Clausen 5VokKa!".

In 1938, at the height of the Sino-Japanese war, Anna was carrying photocopies of about a thousand pages of documents from Tokyo to Shanghai. This was the peak of Sorge's "photographic" activity, after which, in connection with

By tightening security measures at the German embassy, he was already deprived of the opportunity to photograph documents and was forced to memorize their contents. This time, Vukelic produced thirty narrow-format photographic films, each about a meter long. Anna bandaged the tightly rolled films to her body.

She recalled how dramatic this trip turned out to be: "At that time, trips to Shanghai, during which military supply transport communications were actually used, were extremely limited. and the surrounding area was full of Japanese soldiers. Under these conditions, during the whole trip, I could not even afford to loosen the bandages on my body: it was impossible to arouse the slightest suspicion in anyone - not even the Englishwoman from my cabin. stronger over time, my hips swollen, every step I took was ready to scream in pain.

After several days of this journey, filled with anxiety and suffering, when it was already very close to Shanghai, a message suddenly boomed from the ship's loudspeakers, made alternately in several languages: "All passengers are asked to go to the green salon!" Shortly before this, the Japanese customs officers had already carefully checked our luggage right in the cabins. There was, however, no doubt that in case of suspicion, the check was carried out again in the absence of the passenger.

The tapes were still with me. I had to go with them to check. Soon about two hundred passengers gathered in the cabin, and all the doors were closed. I felt like a mouse caught in a mousetrap. The beats of the heart resounded in the temples. But right now, it was important to keep cool. One of the doors opened, revealing a passage leading to the railing. In front of her, forming a living corridor, stood twelve policemen - six men and six women. Never before have I seen such a humiliating inspection. The male police officers checked the men, the women checked the women. Everything was examined with scrupulous thoroughness: from ladies' handbags and vest pockets to shoes, which the police forced to take off. The Japanese police felt every seam on suits and skirts, tapped the soles of shoes and applied the soles to the ear, bending them to see if there would be a suspicious crackle. Women in police uniforms groped the breasts, sides and thighs of the passengers. The protests of a bejeweled Englishwoman were rudely cut short by a reference to martial law.

Control, of course, dragged on for a very long time. I felt like I was being fried on a slow fire. There was only one way out: at the moment when it was my turn, break through the police barrier with a run and throw myself over the rail into the sea! If I fall into the clutches of the police, torture cannot be avoided; then either beheaded with a samurai sword or hanged. Will Branco's work, the efforts of our entire group, be in vain? Without losing sight of the door, I pressed my back against the wall with all my strength,

in order to push off properly ... My turn was inevitably approaching, but I had no right to betray excitement in any way. I think that someone who has not experienced something like this cannot feel it all to the end!

Finally, only four passengers remained in the cabin. And suddenly the incredible happened: the Japanese suddenly stopped the inspection. They probably miscalculated the time, as the ship was already mooring. I felt as if I had been reborn, with all the speed that my shaky legs were capable of, I ran after my luggage, just in case, I took by the hand the child that belonged to an Englishwoman with heavy suitcases in her hands, and as quickly and discreetly as possible left the Japanese ship, and then the port. I handed over the materials to the contact only the next day, having previously traveled in several taxis around the city in order to break away from possible persecution and making sure that there was no "tail" behind the contact either.

Again and again I asked myself: am I just lucky? Or did my German passport "help"? Maybe they were following me? But what if the Japanese police hoped with my help to get on the trail of our contacts in Shanghai? .. But there was no time for reflection, since soon they had to go back to Tokyo and again carry with them a lot of information, written materials from the Center, as well as bundles of money needed to finance our activities: the latter, however, were beyond suspicion ... "

In 1935, when Artuzov, head of the INO NKVD, was appointed deputy head of the Fourth Directorate, a group of Chekists came to the Intelligence Agency with him. Artuzov's team also included Boris Gudz, who became the curator of the Ramsay group. Already in our time, in one of his interviews, he said:

- When I got acquainted with the legend of "Ramsay", I was simply amazed by its ill-conceivedness. In the 1920s in Germany, Sorge was an anti-fascist party functionary. He edited newspapers, wrote articles, spoke at various meetings and, of course, could not help but fall under the suspicion of the police. Then, as a correspondent for a German newspaper, he went to Shanghai, where he worked for two years ...

Artur Artuzov

Then he lived in Moscow for some time. From here he was sent

work in Tokyo as a correspondent. In our opinion, this was a gross violation of conspiracy. When we carried out such operations, we thought through the whole legend to the smallest detail ...

Karin and Artuzov also believed that "Ramsay" was hanging by a thread and its exposure was only a matter of time."

However, this assessment seems too pessimistic. Of course, it would be madness to make Sorge an illegal resident in Germany, where in some lands he was known, if not by every dog, then at least by a fairly large number of people, and moreover, he was known as a prominent communist functionary. But



in Japan, the German colony was small in number, and the likelihood that Sorge would meet someone who would remember his communist past was negligible. A stay in Shanghai as a correspondent for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung rather played into his legend. Few people knew about his intelligence activities in Shanghai. There was nothing surprising in the fact that the editors transferred a correspondent from Shanghai to Tokyo, especially considering the continued rapprochement between Germany and Japan. And in the end, Sorge failed not because of his own biography, which is quite risky for an illegal immigrant, but because of the failure of his employees, who revealed their communist past.

Aino Kuusinen recalled that in early 1936, before returning to Japan, Moscow officials did not speak very respectfully of Sorge: "Uritsky advised me to continue studying Japanese, to make new acquaintances. Sorge, with whom Uritsky was dissatisfied, I should avoid. When I said, that Sorge's assistant was asking for twenty thousand dollars to open a store, the general exclaimed angrily:

- These crooks only know that they drink and squander money! They won't get a dime!"

Soon after Sorge returned from a trip to Moscow, the apparatus picked up another member of the group for him - Gunther, who later became a naturalized British citizen, and in the past was a Moscow correspondent for Berliner Tageblatt. In addition, in Tokyo, he was the representative of the British "Financial News".

In 1942, Stein accepted an invitation from the American Institute of Pacific Relations to become its correspondent in Chongqing. This saved him from failure along with the Sorge group. He wrote many articles and books. In 1944, he was one of six correspondents admitted to the capital of red China - Yanan. After the war, Stein traveled extensively throughout the United States, promoting the idea that the Chinese Communists were genuinely anti-Stalinists in their orientation. When he was called a "Soviet agent" in a US Army intelligence report in 1949, Stein hastily left the country. On November 14, 1950, he was arrested in France on charges of espionage and expelled from the country.

According to Sorge, "Stein was closely acquainted with Ambassador Dirksen, whom he knew from Moscow. The Ambassador considered him an intelligent person and a significant person. In addition, it was valuable for our work that he, as a representative of a British newspaper, had connections with the British Ambassador ". He was intimately acquainted with the British Trade Attache and had several conversations with the Ambassador and the Naval Attache. Some sources claim that Stein was on friendly terms with the British ambassador, Sir George Sansom. Except the one Stein was

an economist, and his ability to understand the financial side of things was a great help to Sorge. In addition, information of a diplomatic nature, which was of great interest to the Russians, often fell into the hands of Stein. He also served as a courier, delivering microfilm to Shanghai.

In Prison Notes, Sorge characterized Stein as follows: "Stein was most actively associated with the work of my group. Considering his ideological attitudes and personal qualities, we can say that he was the right person for my group. I informed Moscow that

while he stayed in Japan, it would be nice to have him in my group. However, permission was not forthcoming."

Not only members of the group acted as couriers, but also people specially sent from Moscow. "We had the impression that the people with whom we met repeatedly over a long period of time were "professional" couriers," Sorge recalled. "We did not know either their names or the position they occupied in Moscow or abroad. Communication with them was carried out by prior arrangement with Moscow. The place, time and conditions of the meeting were agreed by radio. For example, a meeting in one of the restaurants in Hong Kong was arranged as follows. The courier, who arrived from Moscow, was supposed to enter the restaurant at three o'clock with minutes, get a thick long cigar out of your pocket and hold it in your hands without lighting it. Our courier (in this case, me), having seen this conventional sign, had to go to the restaurant counter, get a smoking pipe that was very conspicuous in shape from his pocket and unsuccessfully try to smoke it. After that, the courier from Moscow had to light his cigar, and I in return - my pipe. Then the Moscow courier had to leave the restaurant, and I, also leaving the restaurant, slowly follow him into one of the parks where the place of our meeting. He was supposed to start by saying, "Hi! I'm Kutcher," and say in response: "Hi! I'm Gustav." After that, everything should have gone according to plan."

The most important source of information for Sorge was Ozaki, who was directly involved in the government decision-making center and was able to at least to some extent influence the decision-making of Prince Konoe's cabinet.

In Prison Notes, Richard spoke of Ozaki as follows: "He himself was a source of information. Thanks to this, talking with him, arguing with him, you learn a lot. From time to time I reported to Moscow his forecasts for the development of the situation without any connection with current events as very important information. When it came to very complex problems, specific Japanese issues, or when I was not completely sure of my own judgments, I always followed his opinion. To make final decisions on the fundamental points of my work, it happened that I consulted with him two or three times. Therefore, Ozaki was an indispensable figure in my work and a direct source of information."

In turn, Sorge's closest assistant, Dr. Ozaki Hozumi, saw in Richard a like-minded person and friend. This determined the nature of their relationship. "I was interested in the position that Sorge occupied, and to him as a person," wrote Ozaki. "I did not exchange thoughts with him as much as listened to his

judgments about the information with which I introduced him. With no less interest, I listened to his thoughts on internal issues. He never extorted information from me on specific issues or gave me assignments."

But Sorge's opinion: "I knew that Ozaki was a case person. I knew how far I could go in conversations with him, and I couldn't ask more. And therefore, if, for example, Ozaki said that some data he received from someone close to Konoe, I took his words for granted. And so it has always been."

In a Tokyo prison, Sorge outlined the circle of Ozaki's sources: "Ozaki's most important source of information was a group of people revolving around Prince Konoe, a kind of "think tank", which included Kazami, Saionji, Goto and Ozaki himself. Perhaps there were other people but I only remember the names I sometimes heard. When Ozaki or I myself mentioned these people, we used to call them "Konoe group". In messages to Moscow, I called them "circles close to Konoe". part of Ozaki's information on matters of domestic and foreign policy, unless it came from Ozaki's personal extensive knowledge and deep insights, undoubtedly came through this group. on the formation of domestic and foreign policy, as well as various plans under preparation. Sometimes Ozaki provided economic information and, in very rare cases, general political and military information. He continued to receive information from this group even when Konoe was no longer Prime Minister, but not so often, and their content was not always reliable. I cannot say which member of this group provided the most information. It was very difficult to determine this. Perhaps it was Kazami, with whom Ozaki was most intimate, or perhaps it was Inukai. I want to emphasize that these are only my vague assumptions, since there was no special conversation with Ozaki on this topic. Either way, these were the two people Ozaki was closest to. However, sometimes it seemed that their closeness was coming to an end. Ozaki was a very independent person, and he was not always in harmony with them. For this reason, sometimes differences in views on something, sometimes a spoiled mood influenced their relationship.

Ozaki occasionally met Prince Konoe directly, but privately or not, I don't know. The information he received as a result of these meetings did not represent specific political reports, but reflected only opinions and considerations on general political issues, and sometimes even the mood of Prince Konoe. Such information, although not very specific, was extremely important, as it gave a deeper understanding of the policies of the Japanese government than whole mountains of detailed facts. I remember, in particular, a very important message from Ozaki about his meeting with Prince Konoe in 1941. She clearly showed how eager Prince Konoe was to resolve the Sino-Japanese problem and avoid clashes on the diplomatic front. This meeting, better than a string of political documents, reflected the policy of the third Konoe cabinet in relation to the USSR, Great Britain and the USA. However, such personal encounters between Ozaki and Prince Konoe were very rare.

#### South Manchurian Railway Company:

In connection with his work in this company, Ozaki was able to receive a lot of information of a political and economic nature, some of which could be used for our activities. Sometimes political and economic documents fell into the hands, and sometimes purely military materials. However, military information was scarce and, in my opinion, only a very small part of it came to me from this source.

I especially emphasize that I have never requested anything about such sources of information, except for the most general general information. In most cases, it was quite enough for me to have an opinion

Ozaki that this or that information is valuable or average, or not of interest. I think that Ozaki prepared monthly reports of an economic and political nature for this company. It seems that his reports to me on economics and politics were prepared on the basis of information he received through the company, or were part of his reports to the company.

The trips that Ozaki made in the interests of the company were very welcome. His absence gave me a lot of inconvenience, but we also got a lot from his trips. He had contacts with many necessary people and possessed remarkable powers of observation, so he always returned with very valuable information for our work. On behalf of the South Manchurian Railway, he traveled once to Manchuria and several times to China, and in each case I specifically asked him to pay attention to certain political or military problems connected with our activities.

Sources of Ozaki's military information:

I think that at most one or two of Ozaki's messages contained general military and political information received from active officers in the Japanese army. In my opinion, the officers were interested in the opinion of Ozaki as a specialist in China. Of course, Ozaki also tried to get information from them, but be that as it may, Ozaki had no permanent sources of military information.

Ozaki's newspaper connections:

As a well-known former newspaperman, Ozaki had many acquaintances among Japanese journalists. I believe that most of them were his colleagues when he worked for the Asahi Shimbun newspaper. From communication with them, he received a lot of information, mainly of a political nature. However, in two to four cases, political information related to military issues was released. It seems that he had connections with the Information Bureau of the Cabinet of Ministers, and before that - with the Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The information obtained from these sources contained mainly data on current political events, while information on fundamental policy issues was very rare.

About Ozaki himself:

Ozaki received an excellent education. Extensive knowledge and firmness of views made him one of those rare people who themselves were a source of information. The conversations and discussions with him were very informative. I often sent to Moscow as very valuable information his many judgments on various issues of the future development of the situation. In those cases when I encountered the most complex, specific, purely Japanese problems and I did not have a complete

confidence in their understanding, I relied on his judgment. On two or three occasions I consulted with him, finally making important decisions concerning the substance of my work. Thus, Ozaki was an exceptional individual and should be regarded as a direct source of information in his own right. I owe him a lot.

For the benefit of my reconnaissance team, Ozaki used two or three assistants. One of them is Mizuno, whom

I knew before in China. I met him once in a restaurant, and, as far as I remember, the topic of our conversation then was agriculture. Kawai can also be considered Ozaki's assistant, although, as I said before, it is more correct to consider him Ozaki's dependent. Finally, one "specialist" Shinohara Torao must be mentioned.

The artist Miyagi in terms of connections in the ruling circles of Japan, of course, was inferior to Ozaki. But he also made his own contribution to the affairs of the group. Sorge wrote in prison:

"Miyagi's oldest connection was his longtime friend, General Ugaki's personal secretary (meaning Ugaki Kazushige, who was Governor General of Korea from 1931-1936, and was appointed Prime Minister in 1936, but was unable to form a cabinet due to for the protests of the army, where he was unpopular due to his reduction in military spending when he was the minister of the army in the 20s. Later he was the minister of foreign affairs in the office of Prince Konoe. - B.S.) Yabe Xiu, with whom he is constantly met. Most of the information from this secretary concerned domestic politics, mainly changes in Japanese political circles. In addition, information was occasionally received about Japanese-Soviet relations and Japanese policy in China, but, of course, information about the problems of the Ugaki cabinet prevailed. As Ugaki assumed the post of Foreign Minister in Konoe's cabinet, this source was able to provide a variety of extensive information, while also reporting strong opposition to Ugaki's attempts to form his own cabinet. When Ugaki was foreign minister, he gave us detailed information about tensions between Ugaki and Konoe over Chinese policy and the creation of an "Asia Prosperity Sphere".

Miyagi also had a long relationship with a Hokkaido resident, Taguchi Uganda, who passed on detailed information about Hokkaido and sometimes about Sakhalin. The information was mainly on military issues, such as the scale of mobilization in the defensive area of Hokkaido, the situation of complete calm in this area, the transfer of individual units to Sakhalin, the construction of airfields in Hokkaido and Sakhalin, etc. Sometimes the same source reported economic information about the difficulties with the material supply of the northern territories, as well as information about the prohibition of travel there for military and political reasons.

According to Miyagi, the man was an old friend of his who had been a leftist for many years. However, as far as I heard, he has long retired from politics and now seems to be completely absorbed in business, at least that's how I understood it. It seems he was in the fishing business in Hokkaido.

In addition, Miyagi said that he also had long-term ties with several newspapermen, with one or two of whom he was particularly close. One of them was a man with an open right

extremist views, it seems, Sano Masahiko. Information about Japanese far-right organizations came to Miyagi mainly from him, as well as information about internal tensions and economic difficulties in the country. Another reporter, I think, Kikuchi Hachiro.

Among those who supplied Miyagi with purely military information, I

knew Koshiro quite well (probably referring to the artist Koshiro Onchi, who, in particular, could have obtained information during his trip to China in 1939. - B.S.). In addition, Miyagi occasionally mentioned the names of people who had just left the military or were called up for it, but I got the impression that they were not among the permanent or regular sources of information. I think they were casual acquaintances, not real friends.

In my opinion, only Koshiro was his real employee. When Koshiro returned from Manchuria, Miyagi developed a close relationship with him. Deciding that I should get to know him better, I met him once or twice in a restaurant. It seems that information about the mobilization in the Tokyo and Utsunomiya divisions came from Koshiro. Two or three reports were also received from him about the formation of mixed units based on the personnel of the Tokyo and Utsunomiya divisions. Koshiro also provided Miyagi with a variety of information about the living conditions and activities of troops on the border with Siberia. It seems that fragmentary data on new artillery systems and tanks of the Japanese army were also received from him.

Miyagi collected military information more in busy places in Tokyo, in restaurants and bars. In this regard, he was forced to visit various similar establishments frequently. He often complained that he had to drink a lot in bars in order to get even a little information.

Miyagi often traveled to Osaka, but I don't know who he was associated with there. He only said that he visited two or three acquaintances there. Sometimes he went to Kobe to find out something about the progress or cancellation of the mobilization of the divisions stationed there. Lately, Miyagi seems to have been seeing his old friend back from America, Akiyama Kouji, often.

My impression is that Miyagi used him not as a source of information, but as a translator and assistant in daily business. Miyagi spoke to me about Akiyama several times and always firmly emphasized that he was trustworthy if I showed concern for his friendship with this acquaintance who had returned from America.

In addition, Miyagi had many casual acquaintances from whom he also received information from time to time, but none of them can be considered a reliable or regular source of information. Because Miyagi translated Ozaki's information and relayed Ozaki's reports to me over and over again, I became very close to him in recent years.

I have previously noted that Miyagi maintained contacts with Ozaki's assistants - Kawai, Mizuno, the so-called "specialist". Therefore, these people sometimes need to be considered as Miyagi's sources of information. Like Ozaki, I had a close personal relationship with Miyagi."

Sorge stated: "I am convinced that none of the people who communicated with me, whose names will appear below, knew nothing about my true mission or the nature of my work. They all believed that I was only a well-known journalist."

Sorge, of course, was imbued with sympathy for Japan and the Japanese and sincerely wished that this country stayed away from the Second World War. Back in early January 1937, Sorge wrote in one of his articles: "Japan has a proud and glorious history, a huge treasury of national feeling and amazing self-sacrifice as the strongest reserves of energy. Hope is rooted in the spiritual strength of Japan, in the national connection between the imperial dynasty and the nation. that the path of Japan and the future will go up."

"We - me and the members of my group," Sorge said at the trial, "came to Japan not as enemies of this country. The meaning that is usually put into the word "spy" has nothing to do with us. Spies of countries such as England or the USA "are trying to identify weaknesses in Japan's politics, economy, and defenses and attack accordingly. On the contrary, we had no such intentions in the process of collecting information in Japan."

To the question of Investigator Kameyama whether the accused Notoku Miyagi admits that his information from May 5, 1941 and later should have caused damage to Japan's defense capability, Miyagi replied: "... We believe that the real defense of the country is the policy of avoiding war."

In 1935, Sorge traveled to the Soviet Union via America. In the bedroom of a New York hotel, an agent handed him a fake Austrian passport so that he could bypass Western Europe and arrive in Moscow without leaving marks in the passport in the name of Richard Sorge. He traveled through France, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland to the USSR, hiding the original passport in a hiding place in a suitcase.

In Prison Notes, Sorge spoke about the trip of 1935 as follows: "My trip was short, only 14 days. The red banner of the Far Eastern Army was the arrest in Copenhagen in February 1935 of four Soviet residents at once, who imprudently met in the same safe house, and even arranged a noisy feast that attracted the attention of the police. - B.S.) and Alex, who worked under him. I reported on about my experience in Japan and the prospects for future activities in this country. I expressed the desire to send with me as a radio operator, if possible, someone like Seber or Clausen, whom I knew from the Chinese period of work. I asked that I be given a complete freedom to establish any contact with the German ambassador, if necessary. I intended to make the German embassy the center of my activities. In addition, in a conversation with Uritsky, I asked the Center to recognize Ozaki as a direct member of my group. Uritsky approved these demands of mine and other important proposals that I put forward. He warned me to be extremely careful at all times and not to rush my work at all. In my impression, Uritsky, how

and Berzin, it seems, consulted with the party leadership when approving the plan for my work upon my return to Japan. At the very least, there is no doubt that I myself and the materials presented by me and my reports have been carefully studied. Sensing my difficult situation, he treated me very kindly. In the fourth office, I met only with

Jim and Clausen from the radio school, as well as representatives of the eastern and cipher departments. It was at this time that the International Congress of the Comintern began, but I was strictly forbidden to attend it, which Manuilsky firmly stated over the phone. Kuusinen only visited me once. Pyatnitsky was ill and was not in Moscow. I myself really wanted to attend the congress, but the requirements of secrecy did not allow me to do so.

I visited the Central Committee and made a report there, and in the end it turned out to be my farewell visit. The visit was short, during which my party problems were resolved and my report was approved. Smolyansky came to me in a friendly manner. He has already resigned from his former post on the Central Committee. During my stay in Moscow, my contacts were rather limited. However, I often met with Clausen and we discussed working together in Japan. I flew from Moscow by plane.

Generally speaking, in my work I kept in touch only with the fourth directorate, and through it with other organizations. After 1929 I had no relations with other organizations. Of course, there is no doubt that the Fourth Directorate discussed with the top leadership of the Red Army and members of the Politburo of the Central Committee all military and general political issues related to my work abroad. (I don't know if there was any connection with the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.) I think that the reports and materials that I sent to the head of the department from Japan were probably sent by the fourth department to other recipients. The new head of the department, like his predecessor Berzin, was in close relations with the leaders of the party. Being a veteran of the party, he was proud that Lenin, Stalin, Voroshilov were his old friends."

Probably, Sorge never found out that Yan Berzin (Peteris Kyuzis), after returning from Spain in May 1937, was newly appointed head of the Intelligence Agency and promoted to army commissars of the 2nd rank, was already arrested in August of the same year, and on July 29 1938 shot on charges of "Trotskyist anti-Soviet terrorist activities." He was rehabilitated in 1956, 8 years before the official recognition of Sorge as a hero.

This time, Sorge flew to Japan through Siberia, on one of the first German aircraft sent to the Far East. With the help of his acquaintances from the German embassy, Sorge very soon became one of the most informed and authoritative journalists, who was well versed in both the political problems of Japan and the problems of Japanese-Chinese relations.

But Sorge was engaged not only in the collection of journalistic and intelligence information, but also in the scientific study of Japan. This was necessary both for successful intelligence work and to satisfy his own passion for scientific research, which future generations might appreciate. In his suicide notes, Sorge stated: "I did not intend to act only as a mailbox for information collected by others. On the contrary, I considered it absolutely necessary to personally acquire the most

a full understanding of the problems of Japan... My research work in Japan was absolutely essential to my intelligence work. Without this work and a common cultural basis, my secret mission would not have been possible, and I would never have been able to gain a foothold in the embassy and German journalistic circles. More



Moreover, I could never be pain-free and calm in Japan for 8 years. In this sense, it was my thorough study and knowledge of Japan that mattered most, and not dexterity and not any special training in the Moscow intelligence school ...

The knowledge I acquired during my work in Japan was in no way inferior to that which I received at a German university. Having become acquainted with the issues of European economics, history and politics, I also spent three years in China, studied its past and present history, its economy and culture, and I also did extensive research in the field of its politics.

Even during my stay in China, trying to get a general idea of Japan, I wrote several works about this country ... By the time of my arrest, there were from 800 to 1000 volumes of various books in my house. Apparently they caused a lot of trouble for the police. Most of the books were from Japan. I collected all the books of Japanese authors translated into foreign languages, all the best works of foreign authors devoted to Japan, as well as all the best translations of outstanding works of Japan of various times ...

I studied the ancient history of Japan... the political, social and economic history of the ancient period... The knowledge gained helped me understand the issues of the Japanese economy and politics of the modern period. Therefore, I studied the agrarian problem in detail, then turned to the problems of small and large industry and, finally, heavy industry.

Since all this was kept under the strictest secrecy in accordance with the laws, my research did not bring the desired result, and it even became dangerous to conduct it. Of course, I also studied the situation in Japanese society of workers, peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie... In the light of knowledge of the ancient history of Japan, I was able to better understand the foreign policy of modern Japan, that is, to quickly assess the foreign policy of modern Japan.

I was also interested in the development of culture and art in Japan. He studied the Nara periods, the Kyoto era, the Tokugawa era, traces of the influence of various Chinese currents, as well as the period of development of Japan after the Meiji ... "

Sorge described the functions of individual members of the group as follows, which satisfied not only the intelligence, but also the scientific and analytical needs of their leader: "The question of the distribution of functions for collecting information and intelligence, of course, was determined by the people who made up my group. Clausen was completely occupied with the implementation of purely technical tasks and therefore had virtually no opportunity to participate in the collection of information and information. Ozaki obtained mainly political and economic information. Miyagi collected materials on economics and military problems, and, in addition, was responsible for translating all documents from Japanese. from foreign correspondents and French acquaintances, as well as taking photographs and other technical work.

information from foreigners, mainly from Germans.

In general, the members of the group knew about our work only what I myself told them, and only about those special tasks that I told them.

gave directly. At the same time, when one of my co-workers came to see me, we discussed issues together that were of interest to the net or seemed important to him. Therefore, not only Ozaki, but also Miyagi and Vukelich had to obtain all possible information on political and economic issues, and Ozaki had to do the same with respect to military information. In assigning tasks, I deliberately acted in a flexible manner, trying to obtain information from as wide a field as possible. In the case of Miyagi, for example, the most important thing for me was that he, having immersed himself in political and economic issues, did not forget about military information. In principle, each member of the group concentrated all his efforts on the assigned reconnaissance mission, but I reserved the right to make some changes to this rule if necessary. Of course, I tried as much as possible not to change the rules, but from time to time I resorted to adjustments.

In some special cases, without adhering to a personal distribution of tasks, I directed all members of the group to one or another special problem. Here are some examples.

When the famous incident of February 26, 1936, occurred, I instructed all members of the group to concentrate their efforts on collecting a variety of information, on the basis of which I worked out my own conclusions. During the Sino-Japanese conflict of 1937 (meaning the Sino-Japanese war that began on July 7, 1937 with the incident on the Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) in the southern suburbs of Beijing, which began with a skirmish between Japanese and Chinese troops provoked by the Japanese. From that day on, Japan began large-scale military operations with the aim of conquering all of China. - B.S.) I instructed my employees in the first few weeks to pay special attention to the discovery of plans for the initial mobilization of the Japanese army. When the battles at Khalkhin Gol took place, I directed everyone to find out Japan's military reinforcement plans in the areas adjacent to the state borders of Mongolia, and demanded materials that would allow us to draw a conclusion about the possible limits of the expansion of the conflict. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, the whole group was busy collecting various detailed data on the political position of Japan in relation to this war, while I carefully watched the extent and direction (north or south) of the large-scale mobilization beginning in Japan. When the confidence matured in me that there would be no war between Japan and the USSR, I instructed all members of the group to turn their attention to the Japanese-American negotiations that were taking place then in the conditions of an aggravating situation and the trend of their development in the future.

#### Marco Polo Bridge. Modern look

When information gathered by members of the intelligence team and myself led to issues that seemed to require special attention, I aimed my colleagues at them. In cases where certain problems were not important for our work, or as a result of the discussion it turned out that contradictory information was reported on some issues, I gave instructions to look for more reliable information and sought to uncover the true causes of events.

In addition, I determined what part of the information received by me personally or collected at my direction should be reported to

Moscow by radio, which one must then be sent by courier mail in a more detailed written form, and which one should not be reported at all.

I did not disclose to my employees how I used the findings and information. Only Clausen, who was in charge of encryption, knew what I was transmitting to Moscow and how I supplemented the information I received (of course, from time to time I consulted with Ozaki in order to most accurately evaluate and interpret various messages and important political events). I completely classified my written reports, regardless of the nature of the information contained in them ...

I was the only one who had direct contact with the main members of the reconnaissance group. The number of meetings was the minimum necessary, and they were conducted with extreme caution.

Meeting places were to be changed every time, if possible, and the meetings themselves looked random. The main members of the group did not meet among themselves or met only in very rare cases. This principle was proposed by me, but it was not always easy to observe it from the very beginning.

For example, I often met with Clausen, and to hide this during

for a long time was not possible. It was necessary to give the impression that these meetings were natural meetings between two people, and not to arouse suspicion of their hidden goals. The reason for averting suspicion from our frequent meetings was that we both belonged to a German club, that Clausen had previously been involved in the sale of motorcycles and cars, and also that when in 1938 I was seriously injured in a motorcycle accident He showed real concern for me. Clausen visited me often, even when my servants were at home. In addition, at the same time he happened to meet with other Germans who came to me. We called each other and on the phone, not worrying about the possibility that the phones were tapped.

My relationship with Vukelich was kept secret. Sometimes I told the German ambassador that it was expedient for me, as a German journalist, to maintain relations to a certain extent with a branch of the French news agency GAVAS, so as not to completely interrupt contacts with correspondents of enemy countries and countries of anti-German orientation. However, we kept the number of our meetings and how they were conducted a secret.

At first, I often visited Vukeliy at home and discussed with him questions related to our work. Clausen also often visited him in connection with his work. This house was also known to Miyagi, who went there several times to meet with me, to hand over materials to Vukelich for photographing, or to arrange the next meeting with him. But after Vukelich remarried, I stopped going to his house. He came to me himself, having previously arranged a meeting on a pay phone. Vukelich maintained direct contact with Clausen, visited his house several times to return the radio equipment that Clausen kept in his house. Vukeliy's first wife often visited Clausen at home for similar purposes. I also visited him for the first time, but in the last two or three years this has happened very rarely. However, gradually the relationship between

two or three foreigners in the group became inevitable. Strict adherence to the principle I wrote about earlier became not only difficult, but simply a waste of time.

Günther Stein and his girlfriend had contact only with Klausen and me during their stay in Tokyo. Clausen used Stein's house for his work. Stein had no direct contact with Vukeliy. In my absence, or when I was sick, he made contact with Miyagi or Ozaki, but they did not meet at his house, but in restaurants.

In addition to what has been said, I will note that I provided communication separately with Ozaki and Miyagi. From 1939 to 1940 my meetings with them took place mainly in restaurants. From time to time Miyagi visited Vukelich's house and met with me there. We tried to use restaurants that we had never been to before or very rarely, but after a while it became very difficult to find a new restaurant for a new meeting. I rarely went to European restaurants, and if I went there, it was only with Ozaki. I avoided the Imperial Hotel for fear of police surveillance.

From 1940 or 1941 I began to meet with Ozaki and Miyagi at my home. Since that time, foreigners who were one on one with the Japanese in Japanese restaurants began to attract attention.

Indeed, Ozaki and Miyagi began to be asked who I was or what they did, so I reasoned that it would be wiser to avoid places frequented by people. Therefore, I decided to meet with them at home in the evenings, after dark. Since that time, and Vukelich visited my house several times. Clausen often came to see me when Ozaki or Miyagi were in the house. Naturally, he saw them several times. I may be wrong, but I don't think Vukelich ever met Ozaki at my house or anywhere else.

In any case, I did not associate Miyagi and Vukelich with other people and strictly followed the line so that they only dated me. As time went on, direct communication between Ozaki and Miyagi in the course of their work became inevitable, so I, under a suitable pretext, arranged for them to meet at Ozaki's house.

With two exceptions, I had no contact with the rank and file members of the group. In the first case, it was Mizuno, whom I met with Ozaki in a restaurant, in the second, it was Koshiro, whom I saw once or twice. I couldn't control things like the ways Ozaki and Miyagi used to communicate with the rank and file members of the group. I saw no other way but to trust them to act, relying on their experience and ability. But sometimes I asked them about the methods of communication and drew their attention to the need to observe special precautions.

Of course, if the Japanese police had serious suspicions against any of the members of the group and the police began to closely check all his connections, the failure of the group became inevitable. But for the time being, the enumerated measures of conspiracy worked. Sorge and other foreigners from his group did not stand out too much from the general mass of foreign nationals, and counterintelligence had no reason to closely check them.

Also, the author of the special work "Experience in the organization and activities of the "Ramsay" residency", the former head of the 7th (Japanese intelligence) department of the 2nd department of the Intelligence Agency, Mikhail Ivanovich Sirotkin, who in 1938-1955 rested in the Gulag against his will, described in detail Sorge's research and analytical activities: "From the very first days of his stay in the country, he began to select and study the necessary literature, acquiring all foreign editions of original Japanese works, the best foreign books on Japan, the best foreign translations of Japanese works. Personal library "Ramsay" numbered up to 1000 books by 1941. In addition, he made extensive use of the library of the German embassy and the vast library of the German East Asia Society, attended academic meetings, lectures and reports of this society, carefully studied the current Japanese economic and political literature, bulletins and various publications of government organs, etc.

Starting with the study of the ancient history of Japan, the stages of the centuries-old development of its economy, politics, social relations, he successively moved on to the problems of modern Japan, paying special attention to the development of industry, the agrarian issue, domestic and foreign policy, the history of Japanese culture and art, and modern life. Not limited to "armchair" study of the country, he made numerous trips to Japan (the main

until 1938), which allowed him to become more closely and more vividly acquainted with the population, way of life and culture of the country and, in his words, "provided him with a solid intuitive basis" for studying history and economics.

In Prison Notes, Sorge specified his research on Japan in this way: "At the time of my arrest, I had from 800 to 1000 books at home, which seems to have been a source of considerable annoyance for the police. Most of these books were devoted to Japan. Creating my own library, I collected every edition of Japanese books in foreign languages that I could get my hands on, the best books written by foreigners about Japan, and the best translations of major Japanese works of fiction, for example, I had an English translation of "Nippon Shoki" (a book highly valued by collectors) English translation "Kojiki", German - "Manyoshu", English - "Hei-ki monogatari", a translation of the outstanding, world-famous work "Minamoto-shimonogatari", etc. I studied Japanese ancient history with great zeal (in which even now I have an interest), ancient political history, as well as ancient social and economic history. I have carefully studied the eras of Empress Jingu, Wako and Hideyoshi, quite a lot of what I have written is based on the history of Japanese expansion since ancient times. Numerous excellent translations of ancient Japanese economics and politics have been very helpful in my research.

Many foreigners studied ancient Japan, so they did not have to be particularly zealous when searching for the necessary materials. I think that I was able to collect much more materials than an ordinary foreigner.

Using all this as a starting point for research, it was easier for me to tackle the problems of modern Japanese economics and politics. I carefully studied the agrarian question, then small and large

production, and finally moved on to heavy industry, although the thick veil of secrecy due to the laws passed in recent years made my research insufficiently productive and even dangerous. Of course, I also studied the social situation of the Japanese peasants, workers and petty bourgeoisie, in the initial period I had the opportunity to do this as well. I have used original Japanese materials as much as I could, such as economic journals and government publications.

The countless internal political conflicts between the parliamentary faction and right-wing extremists over the lack of grain and the incident of February 26, 1936, provided excellent materials for research. The political incidents that occurred from time to time were so clear to a person who knew the old Japanese history perfectly, as they could not have imagined in the secret political police. It was easy to understand the foreign policy of modern Japan if viewed in the light of old Japanese history. Therefore, knowing ancient history, one could immediately assess the problems of Japanese foreign policy.

I was also interested in the development of Japanese culture and art, I studied the Nara, Kyoto, Tokugawa eras, the influence of various Chinese schools, as well as the modern period from the Meiji era.

In addition to my home library, I used the library

the German embassy in Tokyo, the personal library of the ambassador and the library of the East Asian Society in Tokyo, which has an extensive scientific literature. The society often held scientific meetings and lectures, where the main topic of discussion was Japanese history. And I, to one degree or another, maintained contacts and exchanged opinions with Germans who showed interest in these problems.

Shortly after my arrival in Japan, translations of various works on the history of Japan were made for me. I had a lot of these manuscripts at home. In addition, excerpts from a number of Japanese magazines were regularly prepared for me. Thanks to this method, I could study in detail the materials on the agrarian issue that appear in Japanese books and magazines (reading this section of the 'Prison Notes' allows us to understand that the corresponding section of M.I. Sirotkin's report was borrowed mainly from here. - B.S. ).

My study of Japan was based not only on materials that appeared in books and magazines. First of all, I must mention my meetings with Ozaki and Miyagi. These meetings were not only an exchange of information or a simple discussion of information. When the conversation touched on some specific problems in other countries, for example in China, I changed the topic of the conversation, extending it to the history and socio-political situation in Japan. Ozaki's knowledge of Japanese and foreign policy was extremely broad, and my meetings with him were very valuable in this respect. Thanks to these two friends and collaborators of mine, I was able to clearly understand the specific role of the Japanese army in the government of the state, as well as the status of the Genro Council of Elders as advisers to the emperor, which is difficult to explain from a legal point of view. From them I learned about the dominant role of Wako in the Middle Ages and their influences during the Hideyoshi and Tokugawa periods. However, thanks to them, I did not so much learn certain facts.

and historical analogies, as much as he was able to achieve a complete understanding of the subject of research and a comprehensive understanding of it. This was the case when I studied the incident of February 26 and the agrarian question in particular depth. On these two issues, their frequent advice and assessments were very informative. Moreover, I think that without Miyagi I would never have been able to understand Japanese art as well as now. We often met at exhibitions and museums, and it was not unusual for our discussions on intelligence or political topics to be pushed aside by conversations about Japanese and Chinese art. I have done my best to understand in depth the important issues facing Japan. Therefore, meetings with Ozaki and Miyagi were an important part of my research.

I also used frequent meetings with Ambassador Ott and two or three embassy officials for my political education. We discussed the current situation, and this was very important in considering the overall political situation and drawing appropriate conclusions and in comparison with previous events. Ambassador Ott was a shrewd, capable diplomat, and his assistant Marchthaler interpreted current events from history and literature. From conversations with them, I often received useful ideas for my research. Recently, I often met with the envoy Kort, who knew the situation in Europe well and generally had

excellent education, which gave rise to my keen interest in conversations and disputes with him. As a result, I decided to once again study the history of Europe, America and Asia.

In conclusion, I must say that my own many trips may have also been useful to some extent for the exploration of East Asia. Recently, due to police restrictions, travel has become completely impossible, but earlier, around 1938-1939, it was relatively easy to travel around Japan, so I often traveled, not for the usual sightseeing of places, but to explore important cities and areas. . However, the purpose of my trips was not intelligence activities, but the desire to know the land and its people. I also wanted to further develop the ability of direct perception as a basis for the study of history and economics. So I planned a trip to the coast of the Sea of Japan and toured the area from Niigata to the west. In addition, I often visited Nara and Kyoto, and examined the Kii Peninsula in detail. Through Kobe, Osaka, the coast of the Inland Sea of Japan, Shikoku, I made a tour along the coast of Kyushu up to Kagoshima. On Sundays, I often traveled on foot and by passing transport from Tokyo to Atami and further west. The purpose of such hiking trips was to find out the situation with the rice harvest in different places at different times of the year. The results of the survey were important for my work in the Frankfurter Zeitung newspaper and the Geopolitik magazine.

I never traveled with any of the members of my reconnaissance group, as I considered it to be very risky. The only exception was a meeting with Ozaki in Nara for a specific purpose, but it was very short-lived.

Gaining new knowledge about the places I have been has always been my need and gave me pleasure. This was especially true for Japan and China.

But I never saw these studies as a means to other ends. If I lived in a peaceful social and political environment, I would probably become a scientist, but I certainly would not become an intelligence officer. Nevertheless, my research was very important for my main work in China and Japan. As noted at the beginning of this section, it was not my intention to act as a mere mailbox for the transmission of information collected by others. On the contrary, I considered it absolutely essential to understand as fully as possible the problems of my host country, namely Japan. Conducting these studies gave me the opportunity to assess the importance of certain problems and events both from the standpoint of Soviet diplomacy and from a broader political and historical point of view. For example, there were numerous conflicts between Japan and the USSR related to border disputes, but this did not bother me, since I saw that they would not cause much harm. However, the subsequent Sino-Japanese incidents, especially the events of the summer of 1937, I regarded as a prelude to a big war that would engulf all of China. By studying Japanese history with particular emphasis on the Meiji era and beyond, I was able to avoid doubts and misconceptions.

As a result of these studies, I was able to evaluate the reliability of information and rumors. Having this ability was

extremely important in my secret activities, because in the Far East much more rumors and assumptions were mixed with secret information than in Europe. If I had not been able to separate the correct information from the erroneous, I would certainly have received a major reprimand.

In addition, when a particular new problem arose, I myself could make a general decision whether it was important or not for the Soviet Union. On this issue, I received from the Moscow center complete freedom of action. Moreover, I have never been criticized for not understanding or studying some important new problem or situation that has arisen. Since my stay in China, I have always received good reviews from Moscow.

Finally, thanks to research, I was able to develop my own judgments about the situation in the economy, politics and the military sphere, and not just get the necessary information, accurately transmit it. Many of my radiograms and written reports contained not only genuine information, but also the results of an analysis based on fragmentary information. I have always been extremely frank. When I felt that my point of view or political analysis was correct and necessary, I did not hesitate to convey it to Moscow. Moscow also encouraged this practice. I was even repeatedly given to understand that my analytical abilities were highly appreciated.

It would be wrong to think that I indiscriminately sent all the collected materials to Moscow. I personally carefully sifted them and sent only those that did not give rise to criticism. This required a lot of additional labor. The same applied to the analysis of the political and military situation. The ability to select material in this way, to give a full assessment of a particular problem, to develop a generalized picture of events is a necessary prerequisite for intelligence activity to become truly



useful. Only by doing serious and careful research can it be made so from the very beginning.

It is not necessary to think that our work ended as soon as we sent out our reports by radio. This was only one aspect of our intelligence activities, and definitely not the most important one. At irregular intervals, I sent large parcels to Moscow, which contained not only documents and other materials, but also reports written by me personally. For the most part, without any omissions, I reported on the state of domestic and international politics during the reporting period, as well as on military problems. These reports have been a review and analysis of the most important developments that have taken place since the last communication, and in them I have tried, on the basis of a variety of information and research results, to present an accurate and objective picture of new developments and changes in the general situation over the past few months. Such time-consuming reports cannot even be conceived without comprehensive study and extensive knowledge. Unlike Berlin and Washington, Moscow knew China and Japan too well to be easily fooled. In the USSR, the level of knowledge about the Far East was much higher than that of the US and German governments, and Moscow demanded from me well-founded, carefully planned and systematized

reports at intervals of several months. I think it can be said that from the very beginning I satisfactorily met the relatively high demands of the Moscow center, and this became possible precisely because of my research.

Research, as scientific work, was not a hindrance to my improvement as an intelligence specialist. When necessary, I always promptly, resolutely, courageously and inventively carried out my tasks.

But I have never been so self-confident as to think that I can answer any questions regarding Japan. I often relied on the opinions of Miyagi and especially Ozaki. The same applies even to the final formulations in terms of the terminology of the results of the analysis of important problems. In order to develop an assessment and description of certain phenomena that took place in Japan, I often talked with Ozaki or Miyagi. I asked Ozaki to correct me without hesitation when my judgments were wrong and especially when it was closely related to the policy of the USSR. For example, at first I predicted that the Japanese-Chinese conflict would drag on terribly and weaken Japan to such an extent that it would no longer be able to recover, during the events at Khalkhin Gol I was firmly convinced that Japan had no intention of starting a war with the USSR, and in the summer of 1941 put forward the version that the general mobilization in Japan was not directed primarily against the USSR. In all these cases, he carefully checked his thoughts and reported them to Moscow as responsible conclusions. At the same time, and to a certain extent, I relied on the opinion of Miyagi, according to Ozaki, it was the most valuable for me.

The study of Japan was of great practical importance for my intelligence activities, but at the same time it was absolutely necessary as a disguise for illegal work. If I had not studied Japan, I probably would never have been able to occupy the strong position that I had in the German embassy and among German journalists. My position in the embassy was determined not only by friendly relations with its employees. On the contrary, some

the staff objected to my influence in the embassy and even openly resented it. It was mainly because of my great general erudition, exhaustive knowledge of China and detailed study of Japan that I attained this position at the embassy. Without this knowledge, i.e. without my detailed research, none of the embassy staff would discuss their problems with me or ask my opinion on confidential matters. Many of them came to me precisely because they knew that this conversation would give them something useful to solve the problem. None of them possessed the knowledge of China and Japan that I have gained through my many travels and years of research. Many of them also did not have the general political training that I had received through my connections with the communist movement since 1924.

My research was also very important in order to establish myself in the position of a journalist. Without such a background, it would be very difficult for me to surpass even the not very high level of an aspiring German reporter. Thanks to this background, I was recognized in Germany as the best German correspondent accredited in Japan. The Frankfurter Zeitung newspaper for which I worked often praised me and

claimed that my articles had increased her international prestige. The Frankfurter Zeitung was the highest quality newspaper in the German journalism world and, in terms of article content, was superior to other newspapers. This is not only my opinion. The German embassy and the German Foreign Ministry, and indeed all educated Germans, thought the same way.

The reputation of the most prominent journalist of an influential German newspaper was, of course, extremely important for my intelligence activities. The general recognition of my abilities also had a favorable effect on my position in the embassy. The German Foreign Office, assessing my capabilities as a journalist, offered me a high official position at the embassy. I refused, but my prestige in the embassy was constantly growing.

Thanks to this journalistic reputation, I received countless commissions for articles from German newspapers and magazines. In addition, the Frankfurter Zeitung newspaper and the Geopolitik magazine urged me to write a book about Japan as soon as possible. I have already finished three hundred pages of the manuscript, but my literary plans with the arrest have failed. My essays published in the Geopolitik magazine were quite voluminous and covered various topics, thanks to which my reputation as a journalist and

writer.

I do not seek to praise myself. I'm just trying to show that my research work in Japan was absolutely necessary for intelligence activities in the interests of Moscow. I think that if I had not been engaged in these studies and had not had such an educational potential, I would not have been able to fulfill my secret mission and I would not have been able to take root so deeply in the German embassy and in journalistic circles. Moreover, I certainly would not have been able to successfully carry out my work in Japan for seven years. The most important role in this was played not even by my abilities and not by the fact that I successfully passed the exams at the Moscow intelligence school, but by my thorough research.

and acquired knowledge about Japan.

The analytical mind also helped Sorge realize at the end of 1937 that in no case should he return to the USSR, where he was recalled. Aino Kuusinen recalled: "During almost the entire 1937, I acted independently, but at the end of November a woman called, who had given me an order to return to Moscow two years ago. She asked me to come that evening to the Mitsubishi restaurant. This did not bode well. In the restaurant, the woman said that on Sorge's orders, I should meet his assistant again, just like two years ago in the flower shop on Roppongi Square. While we were having dinner, a full gentleman sat down with us, the woman introduced him as her husband. Then from Sorge I found out that the gentleman is a chemist, he has some connections with the USSR embassy, it seems that he spoke German with an Austrian accent.

I met with Sorge's assistant at the flower shop, he took me to Sorge. It was sad to see a man carrying out such a responsible task, dead drunk. There was an empty bottle of whiskey on the table, he obviously did not use a glass. Sorge announced to me that all of us, he too, were ordered to return to Moscow. I must

go through Vladivostok, they will meet me there. He did not know what caused the order, but he said that I had nothing to be afraid of, even though "an unhealthy situation" reigns in Moscow. He himself, of course, will also obey the order, but if I meet with the leadership of military intelligence in Moscow, I must convey that then all the ties that are hard-established will break. He won't be able to leave until April. In conclusion, Sorge said words that should have made me think, I later recalled them more than once: "You are a very smart woman, I must admit that I have never met such a sensible woman before. But my mind surpasses yours!"

Only later - too late! - I understood what he meant: he is smarter than me, because he feels better than me the danger that threatens both of us in Moscow. He did not warn me directly, he spoke in a blunt way - he was glad to get rid of the obligation to be my liaison, although I did not deliver much work for him. And he did not trust anyone, he believed that I could use a direct warning against him.

If Sorge had then obeyed the order and returned, he would undoubtedly have been destroyed. The USSR would have lost a source of information that, two years after the outbreak of World War II, turned out to be invaluable. The spy network created by Sorge also penetrated the highest government circles in Japan."

Aino's arrest, which followed her return to Moscow, and her long stay in the camps perfectly proved that this time Sorge was absolutely right. Meanwhile, in the Sorge case, there were documents allowing "Ramsay" to maintain contacts with the German special services. The residency was no longer funded, and in the second half of 1937 a decision was made to withdraw. In the autumn of 1937, "Ramsay" was ordered to leave for the USSR "for briefing" on future work. And at the same time, a note was made in his file: "Political completely unchecked. He had connections with the Trotskyists. Does not inspire political confidence."

Sorge immediately replied that he could not leave immediately, since he was temporarily acting head of the German

telegraph agency DNB, as the head of the agency is on vacation.

This was followed by confirmation of the order from Moscow to prepare for departure. Sorge replied that he would be glad to return to the Union as soon as possible, but he could not destroy everything done at the most crucial stage. And he asks to leave him in Japan until March 1938, so that he can timely and accurately determine the date for the start of Japan's war against the USSR.

Cancellation of the decision to recall eventually achieved acting. Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army S.G. Gendin, transferred to this position from the NKVD. In April 1938, Sorge announced his readiness to return, but the Center did not accept this offer. Semyon Grigoryevich Gendin was safely shot on February 23, 1939, and in 1957 he was rehabilitated.

Among the Japanese, Sorge made extensive acquaintances and used them as sources of information. Many members of his group, being journalists and officials, received information about the domestic and foreign policy of Japan and the state of the armed forces by the nature of their activities. But the main sources were Ozaki and his connections, as well as Sorge's connections in the German embassy. The latter helped to paint an almost exhaustive picture of German policy towards Japan.

Having become a scout, Sorge, as is now generally recognized, succeeded a lot in this field, demonstrating outstanding professional qualities. After analyzing the methods of his work, the American intelligence agencies prepared a training manual, which the head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, described as follows: "This will give the future officer an idea of many details that cannot be foreseen in advance ... He will be able to trace the new history of counterintelligence and secret services to the smallest detail and with the same zeal to study the causes of success and failure ... "

In the plan-order given to "Ramsay" and defining its tasks, it was personally attributed to the Uritskys: "The most effective would be the establishment of official or even semi-secret cooperation in the German embassy."

In his testimony to Japanese investigators, Sorge explained: "During my visit to Moscow in 1935, I received permission to supply the embassy with a certain amount of information in order to strengthen my position. at my discretion. But I promised Moscow that I would limit such information to a minimum."

Thus, Sorge received official permission to become a German agent in order to receive information of interest to Moscow from the German embassy. The information that Sorge transmitted to Berlin concerned only Japan.

As Sorge wrote, in his work with the German embassy, he used "discussions, consultations and study, as well as the exchange of secondary information for information of paramount importance - in other words, with the help of sprats to catch mackerel." Also, Ozaki put in the first place the good knowledge of the scout himself. "Today," he believed, "one cannot be a good intelligence officer without being at the same time a good source of information, that is, being very knowledgeable

human."

It was the ability to extract and analyze information related to Japan that helped Sorge become his man in the German embassy and gain access to confidential information and secret documents. It often happened that Sorge showed the military attache, and then Ambassador Ott, carefully checked intelligence materials collected by him through Ozaki and Miyagi, in turn, getting the opportunity to get acquainted with secret German documents. In his memoirs, Walter Schellenberg, head of the Foreign Intelligence Agency of the RSH A, claimed that he heard about Sorge from Wilhelm von Ritgen, head of the German Information Bureau. At that time, Sorge worked for the German Information Office and at the same time for the Frankfurter Zeitung. He maintained personal correspondence with von Ritgen, and Sorge's letters were actually analytical.

notes.

Eigen Ott became the main source of information for Sorge. When Sorge arrived in Tokyo, he was an intermediary officer liaising between the Japanese and German General Staffs, he soon became a military attaché and colonel, and later a major general and

ambassador.

Even before the First World War, the military adviser in Japan was Major General Karl Haushofer, one of the founders of geopolitics and

professor at the University of Munich, where Rudolf Hess once studied with him. Before leaving for Japan, Ott consulted him. In the same 1933 and almost at the same time, the journalist Richard Sorge also visited the professor, probably, but Agnes Smedley's recommendations. As early as 1926, she was published in the Haushofer magazine and collaborated with the Frankfurter Zeitung for several years. Sorge told that he was going to Japan and offered to send articles from there for Haushofer's magazine Zeitschrift für geopolitik. By that time he was a fairly well-known journalist, and Haushofer readily agreed to consider Sorge a correspondent for his magazine in Tokyo and wrote the necessary letters of recommendation. Including his old acquaintance Debuchi Katsuzo, the former vice minister of foreign affairs, who was ambassador to Washington in 1933, who, in turn, provided Sorge with recommendations for the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Sorge sent the following articles to Haushofer's journal, for example:

T

Karl Haushofer

"Transformations in Manchukuo", "Japanese armed forces, their position, their role in Japanese politics, military geographical consequences".

It can be assumed that Haushofer recommended Sorge Ott as one of the sources of information. In addition, Sorge had a letter of recommendation from Ott's old friend, his front-line comrade Dr. Zeller.

Ott later admitted: "It was difficult for me to observe and compile reports on the state and training of the Japanese army: everything that happened in it was as if fenced off by an iron curtain. I didn't have time to study Japanese, so I was especially glad to meet Sorge, whose language knowledge made it easier for him to contact the Japanese and obtain information from them."

Already during their second meeting, Ott introduced his wife Helma to Richard, and it turned out that they knew each other from Frankfurt. Helma was then married to an architect, leader of a KPD cell. Now fate brought them together in Japan, which was the reason to resume them

old romance. Helma tried to invite Richard to her house more often and did everything so that he became one of her mutual friends with her husband. Of course, Frau Ott hid her communist past from her husband and was not going to expose Dr. Sorge.

Once Lieutenant Colonel Ott was visited by his old friend, Dr. Klaus Mehnert. During breakfast, Sorge was also present. In front of a stranger, Dr. Mehnert tried to discuss confidential matters as little as possible, and Richard, sensing the awkwardness of the guest, soon left. Then Ott said to Mehnert: "Sorge is an excellent connoisseur of Japan and my close friend, who deserves absolute trust!" More Mehnert Sorge was not afraid.

Klaus Mehnert was born in Moscow in 1906, in the family of the owner of typography. Shortly before the outbreak of World War I, the family moved to Germany. In 1932, Klaus defended his dissertation "The Influence of the Russo-Japanese War on Big Politics" at the University of Berlin, receiving a Ph.D.

In 1929-1931, Mehnert was secretary of the German Academic Exchange Service, in 1931-1933 he worked as general secretary of the Society for the Study of Eastern Europe and editor of the Ostoyropa magazine.

In 1933-1936, he worked as a correspondent for a number of biscuits and Moscow "but in 1936 his works were banned in Germany, and Mehnert left for the USA, having previously visited China and Japan. Obviously, in this visit to the Land of the Rising Sun, he met Sorge: Mehnert had anti-Nazi views on Ott. After all, Ott was an aide-de-camp to General Kurt Schleicher, a former chancellor and opponent of the Nazis who was killed during the Night of the Long Knives.

In 1936-1937, Mehnert taught as a visiting professor at Berkeley, and then moved to the Hawaiian Islands, where in 1937-1941 he taught political science and modern history at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. He read the first courses on the history of Russia at the University of Hawaii and began to collect books about Russia for the university library, laying the foundation for the study of Russia at this university.

Since June 1941, Mehnert edited the Shanghai magazine "Twentieth Century", funded by the German Foreign Ministry. The magazine was published until 1945. At the same time, Mehnert taught at the German Medical Academy and St. John's University.

After the surrender of Japan, Klaus Mehnert was interned as

a German citizen, after returning to Germany in 1946, he successfully went through the process of denazification, again edited the Ostroiroia magazine, and in 1955 accompanied Chancellor Konrad Adenauer as a correspondent during his visit to the USSR. Then Mehnert was a professor of political sciences at the University of Aachen, from 1963 he led regular programs on German television about the political situation in the world, and the last years of his life - at STA universities. In America, he died on January 2, 1984 at the age of 77.

Menert was repeatedly suspected of working for the German secret services, but no evidence of this was found.

Sorge could be interested in the opinion of Mehnert as a political analyst. I will add that Kaliningrad University has

European Institute Klaus Mehnert, as a prominent Russianist.

Sorge spent a lot of time in restaurants with drinking buddies from among the members of the German colony and other "necessary people". Richard drank immoderately, sometimes it came to fights. Yes, and in terms of the female sex was the same immoderation. Then the police calculated that Sorge had intimate relationships with at least 40 women in Tokyo, not counting the geisha and ordinary prostitutes. However, the reputation of a drunkard and a womanizer at the same time served as a good disguise. It was very difficult for Japanese counterintelligence to think that such a person could be a resident of foreign intelligence. The very appearance of Sorge did not fit in with the traditional appearance of a scout. In the words of one American historian, "women have always been attracted to Sorge, like moths to a fire."

General Willoughby claimed that Sorge "had haughtiness and cruelty in the expression of the eyes and the lines of the mouth. He was proud and imperious, deeply loved and passionately admired those whose friendship he sought, but was ruthless to the rest and frankly hated by them. Many of his Japanese colleagues he was seen in the press as a typical thug, an arrogant Nazi and avoided him. He was a hot man who liked to drink heavily and was used to changing his mistresses often. During the years of his service in Tokyo, he was known to have intimate relationships with about 30 women ... And yet, despite his fascination with women, drunken drinking and heavy character, he never betrayed himself. In the GRU report prepared by M.I. Sirotkin, the words of the American general are called "a rather figurative and well-aimed characterization", and it is argued that this is "evidence that "Ramsay" managed to fully get used to the image of his "second self", reliably hiding behind the appearance of an arrogant Nazi thug ... The image "Ramsay's" life, the whole system of his relationships with acquaintances, colleagues, friends, intemperance, arrogance, etc., made it possible to unmistakably rank him among the unbridled representatives of the "superior race", for whom there are no dilapidated boundaries of morality and morality. "Ramsay" achieved great luck, securely securing an appropriate reputation, misleading both the Gestapo and Japanese counterintelligence."

I think that Sorge here did not have to get used to something alien to him. Such a way of life was already quite organic for Richard for a long time because of natural alcoholism and immoderate craving for fine iol. Of course, objectively, we repeat once again, so

his immoderate lifestyle served as a good disguise for him.

True, the leadership of the Intelligence Agency could have doubts about whether "Ramsay" went beyond the limits of what was necessary, whether he violated the permissible boundaries and norms of behavior of a Soviet communist intelligence officer, strenuously demonstrating some negative moral traits characteristic of a Nazi thug? M.I. Sinitsyn answered him this way: "We are talking, in particular, about drunkenness and promiscuity with women. In addition to Willoughby's remark, we have no other, more specific indications of Ramsay's drunkenness. However, the tendency to abuse alcohol, no doubt, was one of Ramsay's weaknesses, which manifested itself in the very first months of his work in Shanghai, where it happened that in a drunken state he got involved in fights and scandals in bars and restaurants. Here you can remember the drunken accident

on a motorcycle in 1938, when Sorge was heading to Clausen with secret documents and was closer than ever to failure. The GRU report, however, stated: "Sorge carried out his disguise as a convinced Nazi with amazing purposefulness, very thoughtfully, without overacting." This conclusion is simply parodic. Even if drinking can be attributed to the enormous nervous tension in which Sorge lived, it is very difficult to attribute Don Juan adventures to upset nerves. I note that many would not refuse to "disguise" as Sorge did (of course, without a tragic ending).

One German diplomat commented about Sorge: "A dissolute rake and an adventurer with a brilliant mind and unshakable conceit." "Ramsay" had the glory of the first Don Juan in Tokyo.

Sorge's friend, the German diplomat Prince Urach, recalled: "While drinking, he went through all the states of a drunkard: exaltation, tearful humiliation, aggressiveness, paranoia and megalomania, delirium (in Russian - delirium tremens. - B.S.), stupor and gray loneliness a hangover that could only be dispersed with more alcohol."

In a drunken state, Sorge was often aggressive, often got into fights, but even on the verge of unconsciousness, he never said too much about his intelligence work. Counterintelligence officer Ivar Lissner decided to once check Richard for knowledge of the Russian language: "Once I brought a Russian newspaper and put it on his table. I spoke Russian fluently. "Read this!" I said. . "Read this? Yes, you must be out of your mind!" - and from his laughter, as usual, the walls shook."

Sorge received from Eigen Ott information on the Japanese armed forces and Japanese-German cooperation, as well as on Germany, and he himself provided him with the information on foreign and domestic policy of Japan that he received from Ozaki and other Japanese members of his group. This information was essentially insider information, coming directly from government circles. Therefore, the predictions suggested by Sorge and given by Ott often came true, which increased his reputation in Berlin and contributed to his career.

In the spring of 1934, an employee of the Osaka branch of the Asahi biscuit, Hozumi Ozaki, received a business card from a certain Kanichi Minami (pseudonym Iotoku Miyagi). He said that a certain foreigner, whom Ozaki knew well in Shanghai, wanted to meet him. Along the way



conversation, Ozaki realized that it was about Sorge, and happily agreed. In the evening they met.

Returning from Shanghai in 1933, Ozaki lived in Osaka and worked in the foreign department of the Osaka Asahi newspaper and at the Ohara Institute of Social Affairs.

Sorge believed that the then German ambassador to Japan, Dr. Herbert von Dirksen, who later became the last ambassador of pre-war Germany in London, was very disposed to confidential conversations with him. But perhaps Richard exaggerated his influence over the ambassador. In his post-war memoirs, Dirksen did not mention a single word about Sorge.

#### Richard Sorge in the 1940s

Sorge allowed himself to independently assess the foreign policy of the USSR, far from always coinciding in it with the line that Stalin was currently pursuing. Here is what M.I. Sirotkin in the reference "Experience in the organization and activities of the "Ramsay" residency". "He (i.e. Sorge. - B.S.) argued that the "line of the Comintern", since 1929 (i.e. since the right disappeared from the leadership) is built on the passive tactics of retaining cash, and since what is available comes down mainly to the existence of the USSR, the entire policy of the Comintern is built on the task of helping to build socialism in the CECE: moreover, the activity of the Communist parties in the West is limited accordingly. He criticized the insufficient activity of our foreign policy, our entry into the League of Nations. "

It is interesting that Operation Millet, the activity of Zorge's residency in Japan, cost Soviet intelligence only \$40,000, a very insignificant amount for a group of 25 people who worked for 8 years in such an expensive city as Tokyo. All of them lived mainly on income from their legal activities. This applies primarily to Clausen and Miyagi, whose engravings were in constant demand. Vukelich earned not only as a photographer, but also as a Tokyo representative of the French telegraph agency Gavas. This opened the doors of many closed institutions for him. True, the amount of 40 thousand dollars is only the amount in cash that was transferred to Sorge through couriers, and bank transfers through American banks. But, at the same time, there could be non-cash transfers from Moscow to Clausen's export-import company, the volume of which cannot be established.

The headquarters of the main command in the Far East, in a report on the activities of the apparatus in Japan, scrupulously calculated its expenses: "The total expenses of the Sorge group were about three thousand yen per month, or less than one hundred US dollars as payment for the extraordinarily valuable work of almost twenty agents. Because, with one exception, they all worked out of love for the cause, and not for money, the pay they

received monthly, could only cover their living and travel expenses, without compensating their activities in any way. Ozaki, for example, never received a penny and even found himself at a loss by supporting some of his agents financially. Sorge, Vukelich and Clausen had, of course, regular income from their work, but they also had additional expenses.

Clausen, as treasurer of the residency, once a year submitted to Sorge a report on income and expenses, which was then microfilmed and sent to Russia. During his time as Treasurer from 1936 to October 1941, Clausen received \$24,500 and 18,300 yen through couriers plus about \$10,000 in wire transfers—about \$40,000 in total.

At the end of 1939, Richard Sorge decided that the time had come to abandon the courier connection with Shanghai. This was revealed by the fact that the coast police in Yokohama stepped up surveillance of arrivals and departures.

"I have the impression," he wrote in June 1939, referring to the recent difficulties of working in the German embassy, "that the best period of my work here has already passed, or at least stopped for a long time ... I consider it the most reliable - new beginnings with new forces. We are gradually becoming

used and unused...

Fritz (Clausen. - B.S.) has been lucky so far in his work ... However, here I can repeat my old request again: send new people, at least as assistants, who can serve as a replacement. It's not the case that practically all the work is done by me and Fritz. We should have received help many years ago..."

The center did nothing, the residency remained the same. And this is in conditions when the Second World War was approaching. However, at that moment in Moscow, European countries were considered priority in terms of intelligence.

This was probably due to the fact that intelligence activities, on the eve of World War II, were concentrated on the European direction - against Germany, England, France and Poland.

One of the heads of the Japanese department, M.I. Sirotkin, in his memorandum "The experience of organizing and operating the Ramsay residency" noted: "Unfortunately, a very significant gap remains for us in covering the plan for organizing the residency ... This gap is as follows: nowhere, in any document, is it recorded, what instructions and instructions did Ramsay receive when instructing and discussing the work plan - on the question of parrying the "Shanghai threat", what legend was developed to explain the previous activities of "Ramsay" in Shanghai - in case the Tokyo Germans receive any messages from Shanghai It is difficult to admit that this issue, which determined the main risk of using "Ramsay" in Japan, remained outside the field of view of "Ramsay" and the leadership of the Center. so that "Ramsay" himself, who repeatedly reminded the Center of the "threat from Shanghai", did not think out in advance for himself the legend and tactics of behavior in case "some splashes of mud fly from Shanghai to Tokyo".

Reserve Colonel Viktor Sergeevich Zaitsev, who worked in

pre-war years in Tokyo and who was in contact with the Ramsay residency there, in a note addressed to the first deputy head of the GRU, Colonel-General Kh.D. Mamsurov dated October 7, 1964 wrote: "In

1939 after graduating from the Military Academy. Frunze I was appointed to the 5th Directorate of the Red Army to the post of deputy. head of the 1st department of the 2nd department.

When getting acquainted with the affairs of the department, the residency of "Ramsay" stood out brightly, which had interesting information material with an assessment of "very valuable", "very valuable".

The second thing that attracted attention was the quick, accurate and tactful responses to requests from the Center, despite the fact that the latter were not always tactful, to say the least.

After getting acquainted with the affairs of the department, I shared my impressions of the residency of "Ramsay" with the head of the department, comrade. Popov P.A. and the head of the department. Kislenko A.T. The latter told me that I was a young intelligence worker and it was too early for me to draw such conclusions, since the personality of "Ramsay" has not yet been clearly studied and it is a mystery whether he is a disinformant or a double. It was with such a split opinion about Ramsay that I went to work in Japan in 1940.

The same Sirotkin, arrested in 1938, was forced to call himself a Japanese spy. After that, testimony was knocked out of him that he betrayed the Sorge group to the Japanese. True, Sirotkin retracted his testimony at the trial. However, the same Beria, and even Stalin, were well aware of the price of such confessions written by investigators, and they hardly believed that the Ramsay group had really failed.

In 1936, Alex (Borovich) reported to the Center: "In the colony, Ramsay is gaining more and more authority as a major domestic journalist. He is now a representative of not only one small newspaper with which he began, but, as you may know, a correspondent one of the largest local newspapers and the leading thick economic magazine". Sorge himself, in a report dated May 14, 1937, claimed that he had become a well-known journalist and deputy head of the German Information Bureau in Tokyo.

"Other journalists respected me not only as a well-known German journalist, but also as a sympathetic friend, ready to help if necessary," Richard proudly reported to the Center. "For example, when Weise went on vacation, I stayed for him at the German News Agency. Also, if anything happened that deserved to be telegraphed, which the others could not find out, I informed them. Not only did we meet in the office, but also dined together and visited each other at home. In turn, when they knew, I didn't want to go anywhere like the Domei or the Japanese government information office, they did it for me. much besides my journalistic work. On the whole, my relations with German journalists were close, friendly."

As the international situation "cooled", Richard gradually reduced the number of contacts with colleagues from other countries. Not that it was necessary. After all, journalists, despite the growing international tension, still continued together

drink and exchange information. However, it was not worth provoking

the German embassy to express displeasure, especially since Branko Vukelic maintained contact with colleagues from the countries of the anti-German bloc. With the Japanese, including those who were part of the residency, Sorge maintained only official relations, meeting at receptions and press conferences, and sometimes inviting some journalists to breakfast. The Japanese interacted almost exclusively with the Japanese members of the group.

In May 1938, Sorge crashed on a motorcycle. Then only a miracle saved the entire residency from disclosure. After a party at the Imperial Hotel, where all the foreigners of Tokyo hung out, Sorge, being quite drunk, saddled a tsundap motorcycle and rushed home like a whirlwind. At the turn, he lost control and crashed into the wall right next to the police booth at the entrance to the American embassy. As a result of the accident, Sorge received a severe concussion and a broken jaw. Luckily, he is quickly taken to St. Luke's Hospital. Overcoming unbearable pain, he repeated: "Call Clausen." The mere thought that someone might look into his pocket and find several sheets of classified information written in English made him not lose consciousness. Only after the arrival of Clausen, when Sorge whispered a few words in his ear, did he fall into oblivion and he was taken to the operating room. Sorge managed to give Max secret papers and dollars.

Clausen also managed to seize incriminating documents from Sorge's house before the German embassy officials sealed his papers.

"I had a very painful accident," Richard wrote to Katya in Moscow, "I was in the hospital for several months. True, now everything is in order and I am working again as before. In any case, I have not become more beautiful. the number of teeth has decreased significantly. They will be replaced by false teeth. All this is the result of a fall from a motorcycle. So when I get home, you will not get much beauty. I now look more like a skinned knight-robber.. It is good that I am again I can joke about it, a few months ago I couldn't do it: I had to endure an awful lot. And with all this, work ... "

Commenting on the appointment of Konoe as prime minister in June 1937, Sorge wrote in the Frankfurter Zeitung a review quite favorable for the prince: "Prince Konoe's government in today's circumstances is the most suitable for Japan ... He has better prospects than other governments to cope with future difficulties. It is not seen as a transitional government. It represents the most promising attempt at the moment for domestic political concentration of forces."

Konoe valued Ozaki as a China specialist and good analyst who played a prominent role in the Showa Research Association (Shōwa kenkyūkai), the brain trust of Konoe's right-wing radical restructuring of the late 1930s. Ozaki not only supplied the Center with first-class information, but he himself had the opportunity to influence the moods and opinions of the "powerful ones."

Ozaki transmitted information relating to the domestic and foreign policy of Japan, somewhat less often economic and even more rarely - military.

information. He began working in the research bureau of the joint-stock company of the South Manchurian Railway, where, naturally, he received data on strategic transportation. From August 1939, Ozaki edited the "Monthly Report" of this society, which contained all the information about the transportation.

"Never give the impression of a person who is eager to get any information, Ozaki shared his experience during the investigation. Someone who is busy with important matters will refuse to talk with you if he suspects that your motive is to collect information. And if you give the impression of a person who knows more than your supposed informant, he will give it to you with a smile. Informal parties are an excellent place to gather news. And it is very convenient to be an expert in some field. As for me, I was an expert on Chinese issues, and to me often approached by people from different circles... Relationships with influential organizations are vital... You cannot be a good intelligence officer if you yourself are not a good source of information. And this can only be achieved through continuous education and the acquisition of rich experience.

From time to time, a particularly significant and serious document fell into the hands of Ozaki, which he photographed. Often high-ranking officials gave him secret documents for consultations. "The only thing I could not get in advance was information about the exact time of a possible Japanese attack on Russia," Ozaki admitted in court. "My activity was characterized by a complete lack of special methods ... I am a sociable person by nature ... I have not only a wide circle of friends, but I maintained a fairly close relationship with most of them. These friends were my sources of information." But they still hanged Ozaki, not friends.

In October 1936, Alex-Borovich, who oversaw the work of the group from Shanghai, reported to the Center: "Ott, having received any interesting materials or is about to write, invites 'Ramsay' and acquaints him with the materials. Less important transfers to 'Ramsay' at home for acquaintances, more important, secret 'Ramsay' reads in his office. It happens that Ott, having given material, leaves the office on business or with another report to the ambassador. 'Ramsay' revealed the schedule of these reports (lasting 20-40 minutes) and, taking advantage of this, comes to Ott about 15 minutes before the report in order to linger with the materials during his absence. During this time, he has the opportunity to photograph the materials. "

En masse, Sorge began to retake documents in 1936-1938. Sometimes he sent several hundred frames with one mail. These were economic and political reviews, reports from the German consulates and embassies in China, reports from Ott and Dirksen to Berlin, and much more.

Starting from the end of 1938, Moscow began to show increased interest in the information supplied by Sorge. This was facilitated by both armed conflicts with Japan near Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol River, and the approach of World War II. The Ramsay group was the only real Soviet intelligence station in Japan.

The Second World War

By the beginning of World War II, the Sorge group approached fully armed. The head of the residency, thanks to his friendship with the German military attache, who became ambassador, had a very strong position in the German embassy, and indeed in the entire German colony in Tokyo. Thanks to this, Sorge had almost exhaustive information about German-Japanese relations. Ozaki, thanks to his closeness to Prime Minister Konoe, supplied exclusive information about the foreign and domestic policy of the Japanese government. True, his information concerning the higher spheres, unlike Sorge's, was not so regular, since the relevant documents did not fall into Ozaki's hands every day, and not even every month.

Back in the summer of 1936, while leaving on vacation in Germany, Ott suggested that Sorge include him in the staff of the embassy as a civilian employee, his assistant "in the line of industrial and economic study of the country." However, Richard refused. A full-time position at the embassy required approval in Berlin, and there they can check the candidate, and it is not known what else they will find in the police archives. But in September 1939, Ott nevertheless enlisted Sorge in the staff of the German embassy as a press attache. The check by the Gestapo, as we will see later, followed only in 1940, and did not reveal anything particularly politically criminal for Sorge.

In 1938, Ambassador Dirksen returned to Europe for health reasons. And to the surprise of many, Ott, despite his anti-Nazi past, was appointed German ambassador to Japan. This is how this appointment happened, which seriously expanded Sorge's information capabilities.

On March 17, 1938, Colonel General Wilhelm Keitel, who actually played the role of Minister of War, wrote to Ribbentrop, who had just been appointed Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs: moreover, that the High Command of the Ground Forces has repeatedly raised with me the question of using Major General Ott in a higher command position in the troops in the fatherland. Due to the fact that Major General Ott, being the closest employee of General von Schleicher, enjoyed unlimited confidence the latter, through no fault of his own, he found himself in a politically ambiguous position. In the course of my report, the Führer raised the question of the possible use of Major General Ott, given his successes, in an independent diplomatic post and asked me to contact the appropriate foreign policy authorities to discuss this issue with him personally.

If you, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, are inclined to support this initiative of the Führer to use Major General Ott in the diplomatic service, then Major General Ott should be called here so that the Führer, according to his desire, can personally talk with him.

The question of replacing the ambassador arose in connection with Dirksen's serious illness. Sixteen days later, Ott was already in Berlin, introducing himself to Hitler on the occasion of a new appointment. At the same time he was admitted to the NSDAP,

moreover, the Führer himself pinned the party badge to him.

In early April 1938, Ott was appointed ambassador, and even earlier promoted to major general. He suggested, "My appointment was intended as a precedent to do the same with Oshima." Indeed, Major General Hiroshi Oshima, an old friend of Eigen Ott, was also appointed Japanese ambassador to Berlin in mid-1938. Obviously, a certain symmetry was required.

The former head of the department of the ministry, Helmut Wohltat, wrote: "The ambassador treated Sorge as a press attaché of the embassy. He regularly exchanged the most secret information with Mr. Sorge ... As an ambassador, from the very beginning of the war, he entrusted Mr. Sorge with keeping the military diary of the embassy." It got to the point that the embassy paid for some of Richard's trips around Japan and even to the continent.

Now Sorge began to copy papers right in the embassy building. But soon the lafa ended. On the eve of the war, the staff of the embassy grew, and security measures tightened. In June 1939, Sorge wrote to the Center: "Under the current conditions of overcrowding in the embassy premises and enhanced security, the possibility of taking anything with you from the premises of the embassy apparatus or the BAT is almost completely excluded. In the current situation, even my best friend would not dare to extradite from the embassy apparatus even a simple piece of paper. There is a fear that all the new technique that I have deployed here, namely: the processing of material on the spot, is in jeopardy due to the extreme lack of space. " However, he could still get acquainted with the documents, but without photographing. And if the document was large in volume, contained a dozen or more pages, then it was hardly possible to memorize it in the limited time that Sorge got to know him. In addition, the retaken document was always valued at the Center more than the retold one, since there were no doubts about its authenticity and the distortions inevitable in the retelling were eliminated.

And starting from 1939, Sorge began, at the request of Ott, to sketch drafts of his reports to Berlin. Helping Ott, Sorge sought to influence the ambassador in a favorable spirit for Moscow, pursuing the idea of the desirability of maintaining peaceful relations between the USSR and Japan.

In "Gurem Notes" "Ramsay" stated: "I was strictly forbidden by Moscow to engage in other activities, except for intelligence, namely, propaganda and organizational work, which had a political character.

Therefore, my group and I were absolutely not allowed to take any political influence on any individuals or organizations. We unquestioningly complied with this prohibition, but allowed one exception: we actively influenced people's opinion regarding the power of the USSR. Even if this is a violation, it is completely unreasonable to observe general restrictions that do not provide for anything in relation to such extraordinary cases. If Ozaki and I, as advisers, experienced advisers-specialists in political problems, downgrading the power of the USSR, confirmed the general opinion, which then rated it low, our position would immediately become dangerous. That is why our group took a special position on the issue of assessing the power of the Soviet Union.

However, in doing so, we did not conduct propaganda in favor of the Soviet Union. Addressing Individuals and Whole Layers

society, we recommended a more prudent assessment of the power of the USSR. We urged them, without belittling the might of the Soviet Union, to try to solve the Japanese-Soviet problems peacefully.

Ozaki, Vukelich and I have held these positions for several years. However, since 1941, voices in favor of war with the USSR began to grow stronger. I sent a single request to Moscow, since Ozaki expressed confidence that he could, skillfully bypassing the above restrictions, influence people close to him and actively contribute to the establishment of Japan's peaceful course towards the USSR. He was convinced that, persistently propagating the theory against the war with the USSR in the Konoe group, it is possible to achieve a turn in the Japanese expansionist policy in a southerly direction.

My request was made in the most general form, in order to preserve opportunities for active action by Ozaki and other members of the group, but Moscow's response was negative.

True, it did not directly prohibit such actions, but it was indicated that there was simply no need for them. After the start of the war between Germany and the USSR in 1941, the situation began to become more and more tense. In this situation, I thought that even without interpreting Moscow's answer as not necessarily categorical, nothing prevents me from acting within my competence. And considering the wording "no need" in a broader sense, I thought that we are definitely not prohibited from doing the above activities.

Therefore, I did not interfere with Ozaki's active actions in Konoe's group. Moreover, I myself took up the work among the Germans resolutely, considering that my position on these issues has remained unchanged over the past few years. The actions that were planned by my group and by me personally, fit into the framework of the previously indicated restrictions established by Moscow in relation to political activity. None of us did anything that would violate these restrictions, otherwise our main mission would be endangered. I want to make a special mention of this. What we were doing was not related to propaganda work at all."

In the Prison Notes, Sorge described the arguments he resorted to in political discussions with members of the Ozaki cabinet: "The USSR has no intention of fighting Japan. Even if Japan invades Siberia, the USSR will only defend itself. If Japan attacks the Soviet Union, this would be a short-sighted and misguided act. Even if in the course of such a war, Japan seizes Eastern Siberia or its western part, it will not have any political and economic benefits. It is likely that the United States and Great Britain will welcome the fact that Japan is drawn into the maelstrom of this war, and, after she exhausts her reserves of oil and iron, they will attack her at a favorable moment. Meanwhile, if Germany defeats the USSR, Siberia will probably "fall into the pocket" of Japan, even if she does not lift a finger. to continue to expand elsewhere than China, the southern direction is advantageous for this. In the south, there are strategic resources badly needed for the Japanese war economy. Therefore, it is in the south that the real enemy is located, seeking to hinder the development of Japan.

Ozaki tried to soften the tense situation of 1941 with such arguments. I don't know if he used any other



ways other than these. I think that he, like me, at every opportunity resisted the general trend, which consisted in a superficial assessment of the power of the USSR and a dismissive attitude towards it as an enemy. Undoubtedly, in his conversations with people, he pointed to the lessons of Khalkhin Gol and Hitler's miscalculations in the war with the USSR.

Richard Sorge with a camera

Probably, Ozaki's arguments were perceived by Konoe and his entourage. But this is largely due to the fact that the prince assessed the international situation in approximately the same way and sought to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union.

In the Prison Notes, Sorge stated: "The views that I presented to my German friends basically boiled down to the following: Bismarck said that in order to implement the fundamental German policy of confronting the British-French bloc, it was necessary to pursue a policy of peace towards Russia, and strongly opposed The validity of this thought of Bismarck was most eloquently confirmed by the First World War (Bismarck, indeed, an incomparable diplomat, still revered by all Germans.) The Soviet Union, unlike Tsarist Russia, neither in terms of its state structure, it is not an aggressive state due to historical development (we will leave this phrase entirely on the conscience of the Marxist Sorge. - B.S.) And even if the USSR had such an idea in the near future, it does not have the opportunity for this. The USSR is only interested in its own defense, but it would be the greatest foolishness to think that the Soviet Union would immediately disintegrate both politically and militarily if it were attacked by Germany or Japan. The proof that the USSR does not intend to enter the war against Germany is the fulfillment of the agreement on the supply of materials to Germany,

vital to his own war economy, including materials brought in from the Far East via the Trans-Siberian Railway. I, not at all worried, expressed my point of view to the Nazis I knew. My bold expressions were well known, there was not a single person who would refute this my opinion.

The Japanese, Sorge, according to him, inspired the following:

"There is absolutely no reason for Japan to fear an attack from the Soviet Union. Soviet military preparations, even in Siberia, are purely defensive in nature. years of hostility between Japan and the USSR. The Japanese army, seizing on the statements of foreign propagandists, demands ever-increasing budget allocations every year to counter this terrible monster - the USSR. However, Japan's real goals are not in the north, but in China and the south. And although Soviet military preparations are purely defensive in nature, they should by no means be underestimated, as

showed the Khalkingol Incident".

In the Gurem Notes, Sorge emphasized that "the importance of the role that the Soviet Union as a state and world power played in international affairs has increased. With the growth of its political and economic power, the world powers could not ignore the existence of this socialist in the world political life. This became clear when the opposition to fascism and National Socialism became the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the Comintern and was put into practice in relation to France and Spain. For this reason, the revolutionary workers' movement willingly began to consider the Soviet Union as a bulwark in its struggle for self-defense and existence. At the same time, under the influence of the objective situation in the world, the leadership of the Soviet Union became more influential than the international labor movement, moved to the fore and the role played by the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party became more and more important. Russian socialism as the basis of international, military and political situation in the Soviet Union. The workers believed that Russia's successes in the fight against the forces of fascism and National Socialism would necessarily lead to an increase in the threat of an anti-Soviet offensive by these forces. Whether or not the fascists and national socialists attack the Soviet Union will depend on the extent to which the Soviet Union, as a socialist state, succeeds in creating economic power. The creation of this economic power has become a really urgent and major problem for the Soviet Union and the revolutionary working-class movement. And as never before, it was precisely the promotion of the development of the Soviet Union that became the responsible mission entrusted to the international working-class movement. Based on practical tasks, the point of view has been widely accepted that Trotskyism has been forgotten and turned into a theory divorced from life, suitable only for the amusement of intellectuals, and that it is precisely the building of a society of a socialist structure in the Soviet Union that for the first time guarantees the security of the international labor movement. At the same time, there was an understanding of the need

to protect Russia from all sorts of attacks directed against it. The idea of the possibility of the participation of the Red Army in the proletarian revolutions in other countries is nothing more than a sick imagination of people who are unfamiliar with the essence of the international labor movement. Based on the essence of the international working-class movement, the highest mission of the Soviet Communist Party is not to send the Red Army outside its country, but to repel the imperialist aggression already visible, to create a socialist economy as soon as possible, capable of protecting the Soviet Union, which is the most real capital of the workers of the whole world. ".

"In Japanese-Russian relations," Sorge wrote on September 16, 1939 in the Frankfurter Zeitung, "it seemed that a fundamental turn had begun, similar to the turn already made by Germany and the Soviet Union. It seemed that it also became clear to Japan that her main opponent in East Asia it is England, not the Soviet Union. However, the matter has so far been limited to at least a local truce... However, these circles, which are beginning to understand the correctness of Germany's new foreign policy course, are still

show a certain restraint towards the opponents of their former and current foreign policy reorientation".

On November 13, 1940, Sorge wrote in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: "Interest in the Russian" sworn enemy "has been lost; they even begin to look at the Russians in a new way, as possible friendly neighbors. But the clash with England and the United States is now becoming more acute, for they were the rulers of the "Great Asian space" and, perhaps, continue to feel themselves in this role today. It was these two powers that, mainly for decades, tried to push Japan to expand to the north of the continent in order to preserve their Pacific possessions. Today it is quite possible that Vladivostok, which until recently was called "a dagger aimed at Japan", will lose its edge. Singapore, on the contrary, is already today a symbol of Anglo-American hostility towards the Japanese policy of a large space in the Pacific Ocean.

Perhaps "Ramsay" hoped that his articles in one of the largest German newspapers would have some influence on the foreign policy of the Reich. He did not imagine that by that time the press had become only a means of propaganda, and only in this capacity was it perceived by Hitler and his ministers.

In letters and cipher telegrams, Sorge repeatedly asked him to indicate to him a fixed period of time for his stay in Japan, namely: whether he could leave as soon as the war ended, or should he count on a few more months. Such a request, for example, was contained in a letter dated July 22, 1940. After several such reports, the head of the Intelligence Agency I.I. Proskurov ordered to think about how it would be possible to compensate for Sorge's recall. It turned out that there was no way to compensate, since "Ramsay" is irreplaceable. He was sent a telegram and a letter apologizing for the delay in his replacement and outlining the reasons why he needed to work more in Tokyo. Sorge and his comrades

promised to give a one-time cash bonus.

M.I. Ivanov came to the Intelligence Agency in May 1940, after graduating from the Military Academy and was sent to the Japanese department, where he managed to learn the Japanese language. Toward the end of the year, he once had to replace the head of the department.

Mikhail Ivanovich recalled: "The working day was drawing to a close. I was sitting alone in the room and, as usual, having finished my current affairs, I studied the materials of the agent network. The telephone rang alarmingly. , as we called the Sorge file. A few minutes later I was already in the division commander's waiting room. 33-year-old Proskurov, as always, freshly shaven and cheerful, usually met guests, rising from his chair ... And then the division commander left the table and, holding out his hand, he said: "Hello, Mikhail Ivanovich. Comrade Poskrebyshev called. The "boss" is interested in "what did your German come up with in Tokyo"? Waiting for my report by night." I knew the contents of Sorge's last cipher, where he reported the first information about the practical steps to put together a pact between Rome, Berlin and Tokyo, and that after the end of the war in France, the main forces of Germany would be reoriented to the east, against the Soviet Union .

Proskurov took Sorge's personal file and, having finished reading, unexpectedly asked: "Tell me, Captain Ivanov, do you personally believe Sorge?" ... I thought about this more than once and therefore immediately answered: "Yes, I believe!" He immediately asked the next direct question: "Why?".

I had to not only give an answer, but actually vouch for a person who was not personally known to me ... "I believe Sorge because he informs us in advance about the events, and all his most significant information was subsequently confirmed by life. And this is in the activities of the intelligence officer the most important". I immediately cited his pre-emptive reports, received in the six months prior to the conclusion of the "Anti-Comintern Pact", about the beginning of the Japanese war in China in 1937, about the events in Mongolia in the summer of 1939.

Proskurov interrupted me and said: "That's right, Comrade Ivanov! That's not how they deceive in a big deal. We'll defend Richard."

At that time, Proskurov returned from the Kremlin already in the morning of the next day. Taking Sorge's personal file from the hands of the divisional commander, I looked inquiringly at him. But he only shrugged and allowed me to go to rest.

Ivanov's memoirs suggest that Proskurov believed Ramsay's reports, while Stalin doubted at least some of them. But in the end, Stalin believed Sorge, only Ivan Iosifovich Proskurov was not saved. Summed up the aviation past. In July 1940, Lieutenant-General of Aviation Proskurov was removed from his post as head of the Intelligence Agency, on June 27, 1941, while holding the post of commander of the Air Force of the 7th Army, he was arrested in the "aviators' case", and on October 28, 1941 he was shot. In 1954, Ivan Iosifovich was rehabilitated.

In the meantime, the continuous wear and tear of the main staff of the residency was making itself felt. "In 1940, I began to have severe heart attacks," Max Clausen recalled. "The attending German doctor prescribed me strict bed rest. I received injections endlessly. This went on for about three months. The doctor advised me to stop thinking about the affairs of the company. - it was still necessary

transfer. Then I asked for a kind of stand to be made in the workshop of my enterprise, on the pretext that with its help I could read in bed. On this stand, I then encrypted the radiograms. As soon as I finished this work, my wife quickly assembled the transmitter and set it up on two chairs near the bed. Lying in it, I tapped the key, which stood on one of the two chairs. These days Richard brought me only the most urgent materials.

Then I had to go to Jaon, in the mountains, for the final recovery. From there, I went to Tokyo twice a week to get in touch."

For the receiver and transmitter, he bought only the most common radio components, which were purchased by ordinary radio amateurs. His design talent made it possible to assemble very complex transmitters using improvised means. For example, he made a key from a wooden butter mold. Even an attempt to ask the store for a telegraph key would immediately attract the attention of peeps. And to make the transmitter portable, Max worked with alternating current.

After each broadcast, the transmitter was disassembled. Therefore, it would be difficult to find it in the event of an unexpected police check, but at any time it could be safely carried to a new location. Clausen kept pre-prepared chassis in various places and in various apartments, on which in a matter of minutes it was possible to mount the missing parts and start working. The receiver was so small that it was not required to disassemble it.

The wavelength to which the transmitter was tuned was constantly changing in the range of 39-41 m, which made direction finding difficult. Clausen also never went out twice in a row from the same area of Tokyo. If the encryption was long (once two thousand words had to be transmitted per night, which took two and a half hours), then the radio operator interrupted the session and moved to another place. The broadcasts took place at various times of the day.

During the Second World War, the Sorge group had to use the radio more intensively than before, especially since the possibilities of courier communications have decreased.

According to General Willoughby, in 1939 Max conducted 60 communication sessions, transmitting about 23 thousand words, in 1940 - also 60 sessions and 29 thousand words, in 1941 - 21 sessions and 13 thousand words. It turns out that in 1941 the number of communication sessions decreased, taking into account that the transmissions in the last year went only until October, by about 2.5 times, and the total number of words - by about 2 times, which indicates an increase in the duration of the sessions, which means - and an increased risk that the Japanese will be able to locate the transmitter.

However, Clausen himself claimed that in 1939-1941 he transmitted about 40 thousand words annually. Probably, the number of sessions actually reached 80-100. According to him, there were especially many messages in 1941, when there was a lot of urgent information, and courier communications almost ceased.

According to data from the archives of Soviet intelligence, only from the middle of 1939 until the day of his arrest, Clausen transmitted over 2,000 radiograms to the Center. This number seems to be significantly overestimated. Even if we accept Clausen's claim of 40,000 words transmitted annually, from mid-1939 to October 1941, he must have

transfer about 100 thousand words. In this case, the radiogram should have on average contained about 50 words, which seems to be too low. More credible are Willoughby's data, according to which, on average, there were about 450-500 words in a radiogram. Perhaps, in Moscow, each block of information during a communication session was counted as a separate radiogram. And in total, during the Tokyo period, Clausen transmitted to the Center, according to Soviet data, only more than 800 urgent reports: about the anti-Comintern pact between Japan and Germany, about the provocations of the Kwantung army against Mongolia in 1936 and 1939, about the groupings of Japanese troops in the war against China in 1937 year, about the preparation of Germany for the attack on September 1, 1939 on Poland, about the beginning of the offensive of German troops in France.

Against the formal rules of conspiracy, Sorge knew all the main members of the group. Max Clausen was also known to all Sorge's subordinates, and he knew everyone. Miyagi also knew the main members of the group. Richard and Miyagi came to Vukelic's house, especially since his first wife was

dedicated to her husband's work and sometimes helped him. In 1940, when Vukelich married a Japanese woman, these visits ceased. True, only those who kept them in touch met with ordinary informants. As for the main members of the group, in the real situation of that time it was not possible to avoid contacts between them, especially since information sometimes had to be transmitted every two or three days.

At first, Richard met the Japanese in restaurants. But from about 1940, this became difficult, because Japanese and foreigners talking to each other attracted too much attention. Then Richard began to meet with the Japanese at home. However, even without this, Ozaki and Miyagi knew Sorge well.

Foreigners in Japan were too closely monitored to actually use hiding places or other traditional spy channels of communication. The only guarantee against exposure was that Sorge and other members of the group from among public people met with a huge number of people, and counterintelligence could not check and analyze all suspicious contacts.

Here are a few conspiracy rules that operated in the Sorge group:

1. The professional activities of each member of the reconnaissance group should not have aroused any suspicion.
2. After each broadcast, the original text for encoding changed. Somewhat later, Soviet residencies generally introduced one-time cipher pads, which practically ruled out the possibility of decryption without a cipher pad.
3. Members of the group were not to maintain contact with the communists or with those who sympathized with the communists.
4. After each radio session, the radio was disassembled, its details were stored in various places.
5. Meetings with couriers from Moscow took place under conditions of strict secrecy.
- b. In the texts of the radiograms, only the pseudonyms of the group members were used, without the names of their professions.
7. All geographical names and names of information sources in radiograms were also encrypted. Vladivostok was called

"Wiesbaden", and Moscow - "Munich". "Marta" meant "German military attache in Tokyo", "Paula" - "Vice Admiral Wenneker", "white bottle" - "German Navy", "grun" - "Japan", "green box" - Japanese army, "Mac" - "Matsuoka", etc.

8. All notes and documents related to intelligence activities should be destroyed after use. However, there were deviations from this rule. So, Clausen, apparently on behalf of Sorge, kept the texts of many ciphers that the resident needed to analyze the situation.

Boris Gudzenko was indignant at Sorge's non-compliance with the traditional rules of conspiracy: "He, for example, drove around Tokyo on a motorcycle. Yes, there in the 30s the movement was the same as we have today in Moscow (here the scout allowed himself a clear poetic exaggeration. - B.S.). Can you imagine that the most serious resident with the most powerful network - and on a motorcycle! An accident occurs, Sorge is unconscious, with him - secret materials. Yes, then he almost got into the police with these documents! We, Naturally, the motorcycle was strictly banned. Or transmits such long telegrams to Moscow by radio. They are more of a journalistic nature, not intelligence. Of course, the most interesting ones - in a newspaper, even better in size in a magazine for publication. But we had all the Japanese newspapers here, here we had the Japanese experts, they analyzed them and understood everything perfectly. It was dangerous to transmit so much: Sorge knew that there were radars in Tokyo that were trying to catch all the negotiations. Fortunately, it passed here ... "

Here it should be noted that Sorge did not base his analysis on newspapers, but on fairly exclusive information. And long telegrams had to be sent by force, when, on the one hand, courier communication almost stopped, and on the other hand, documents had to be recounted in detail.

Sorge agreed to privately act as secretary to Ambassador Ott and supply the embassy staff with all the information he received. That's what it says in the treaty he and Ott signed. In addition, Sorge agrees to publish a daily bulletin intended for the two thousandth German colony in Tokyo. The new duty, although burdensome, guaranteed access to the latest radiograms from Berlin.

In January 1940, Sorge sent an alarming letter to Moscow: "... Fritz suffers from a serious heart disease ... we can no longer count on his recovery and, moreover, on the return of his former working capacity. The attending physician told me that even with full changing his lifestyle and work, he doubts that Fritz will live more than two years ... (In fact, Clausen safely survived all the members of the group and died in 1979 in East Berlin at the age of 80, having outlived his wife of the same age by a year. - B.S.) It is necessary that Fritz, at the latest at the beginning of next year, after the transfer of his legal business and aerial work, could go home for serious treatment and rest ...

... I would like, Mr. Director, that you answer me the following questions: can I expect to return to the Center immediately after the end of the war, where I could finally stay ... "

Sorge understood that the clouds above him were gradually gathering, and failure -

just a matter of time. But they answered him: the time is difficult, there is a war going on, someone will replace you. And Sorge reported: "No matter how hard we strive to go home from here, we, of course, will follow your instructions and continue to work here ..." And Katya wrote: "The main thing is to come home now, because here is dog life in the literal sense of the word. If only it were another country! And this one, damn it..."

General M.I. Ivanov recalled: "About the middle of December 1940, we received a telegram from Sorge asking him to allow him

to come to Moscow "due to physical and nervous fatigue", as well as to perform an operation and treat an old injury in a hospital. Along the way, Sorge reported that Max Clausen and Branko Vukelic also needed rest and treatment. He believed that the rest of the residency under the leadership of the illegal "Kommersant" could successfully do the job for several months.

The intelligence command was inclined to satisfy Sorge's request and give him six months' leave."

However, an unforeseen circumstance allegedly intervened. Head of the INO NKVD P.M. Fitin said: "According to our information, the German journalist Sorge Richard is a German and Japanese spy. Therefore, after crossing the state border of the USSR, the Soviet authorities will immediately be arrested ..." According to the official version, Sorge did not notify about this circumstance, they simply explained that still need to work.

The version, to be honest, does not look convincing. Could it really be that the leadership of the Intelligence Agency could not explain to the people of Beria that Sorge was his own, proletarian, crystal clear Marxist, and it was impossible to touch him. Rather, at the very top, at the level of People's Commissar for Defense Timoshenko, and possibly Stalin, it was decided that "Ramsay" could not be recalled, since there was no replacement for him in the German embassy. Namely, the news about Germany was of primary importance during the period of the impending Soviet-German WAR.

Continued economic pressure from the US, increasingly affecting the Japanese, has made it virtually impossible for the group to use US banks to receive remittances in China. Sorge telegraphed his Moscow superiors in Russia that meetings between his couriers and "people from Moscow" would be much more efficient to take place directly in Tokyo, which was more risky from the point of view of conspiracy.

Shortly thereafter, the Clausen couple had to become fans of Japanese opera. Max will find two tickets to the Japanese Imperial Theater in the mailbox. One for him, one for Anna. In a dim theater, he was handed a small package with \$5,000, and he gave 38 microfilms to a "connector" from Moscow. A few months later, Clausen again received two tickets to the opera "All the Girls" at the Takaratsuka Theater. And again he and Anna went to the performance. For 30 microfilm rolls, Clausen received \$3,000 and 25,000 yen. In both cases, the person making the exchange was the Soviet consul in Tokyo, Vutokevich. During the third meeting in the theater, the second secretary of the embassy, Viktor Zaitsev, got in touch. Under the pseudonym "Serge", he met Clausen about ten times in the office of Clausen 5pokka!. These meetings were encrypted in Clausen's diary.

as "5-g" - "Zegde 1geyep" "met with Serge".

In 1940, von Ritgen, head of the German Information Bureau (DNB) in Berlin, asked Schellenberg "to check the Sorge cases with the relevant Gestapo authorities to determine whether it was possible to find a way to protect Sorge, as a valuable and necessary informant, from the obstacles that the Tokyo organization of the Nazi Party in connection with his political past". Richard was then



deputy head of DAY in Tokyo, and Ritgen appreciated his information very highly. According to Schellenberg, "there was a suspicion of his disloyalty - the foreign organization of the NSDAP was the first to express distrust of Sorge, pointing to his political past. th and 4th departments.

Ritgen, who, apparently, did not want to refuse Sorge's cooperation with the DNB, pointed to Sorge's cooperation with Professor Haushofer in Munich as a fact that raises doubts about Sorge's political reliability (Hess had flown to England by that time and was declared insane, and geopolitics and its adherents were under suspicion.- B.S.). In the geopolitical journal of Haushofer, a long series of articles by Sorge about the "Rebellion of Young Officers" was published, according to Ritgen, the best that has ever been written about the background of the then disagreements between the army and industrial circles in Japan. Ritgen admired the magnificent liana Sorge of the country and people of Eastern Aliyah, as well as his deep understanding of political processes in general in the countries of the East. So, for example, he always knew exactly and correctly assessed, according to Ritgen, the balance of power between China, Japan and Russia, on the one hand, and America and England, on the other.

Schellenberg requested a dossier on Sorge and, according to his memoirs, he found rather strange information there: "I looked through the documents about Sorge. From them it was impossible to be convinced of the need to do anything against Sorge. True, the documents about his past made me think - Sorge maintained close contacts with many agents of the Comintern known to our intelligence. In addition, in the twenties he was on good terms with nationalist, right-wing and National Socialist circles, including Stennes, one of the former Fuhrers of the SA, who, after being expelled from the party fled to China, where he became a military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. We knew that Stennes, while in China, maintained close ties with Otto Strasser's Black Front, and Heydrich also suspected him of flirting with the Russians.

When I talked with Ritgen about Sorge's possible extraneous connections, he expressed the following opinion: even if he is actually connected with foreign intelligence services, we must still find means and ways, on the one hand, to protect ourselves, and on the other hand, to benefit from the knowledge of Sorge. In the end, I promised Ritgen to further protect Sorge from the attacks of the party leadership if he agreed, along with his journalistic activities, to carry out our tasks. He will have to report to our intelligence from time to time information about Japan, China and the Soviet Union; at the same time, I left Ritgen to think about how to organize the transfer of information.

When I reported this to Heydrich, he approved my plan, but on the condition that Sorge would be immediately placed under surveillance. Heydrich was skeptical and considered the possibility that Sorge might be supplying us with disinformation; in view of this, he proposed to send information to Sorge not through the usual channels, but to subject it to special verification. In addition, he instructed to discuss the whole matter again properly with Janke (head of a private intelligence bureau under Hess, closed after his flight to England. - B.S.).

I must admit that I negligently delayed the establishment of immediate control over Sorge, which Heydrich demanded. True, the organization of such observation was hindered by the fact that, firstly, in this case it was impossible to issue written orders, and secondly, our employees in Japan were still young and inexperienced for this. When I talked about this with Janke, he strangely evaded the issue, pretending that he did not know Sorge properly. I knew that he knew everything from Ritgen, but, nevertheless, I did not put pressure on him.

Complete, to tell the truth, nonsense turns out. From 1924 to 1928, Richard was generally in the USSR, and if he appeared in Germany, it was very rare, and in no way could he be associated with any German nationalists and national socialists, even if he wanted to contact them. And there is no information about his contacts with Stennes. It is possible that all this was invented either by Schellenberg himself or by officials of the Gestapo (TU department), based on Sorge's acquaintance with Haushofer and automatically attributing to him the entire circle of Haushofer's connections. It seems that the Gestapo did not have any reliable data on Sorge's activities after 1924, and they did not really find out his communist connections in the first half of the 20s, being too lazy to delve into the archives.

It is also unclear what information Sorge could give about the USSR, he simply did not have it. Perhaps in Berlin they wanted Sorge to analyze the likely policy of the Soviet Union towards Japan and the development of relations in the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo triangle.

As a result, the suspicion came down to the fact that Sorge also became an agent of Schellenberg, and maintained contact with him through the police attaché in Tokyo, Josef Albert Meisinger, who was exiled to Japan for excessive cruelty in occupied Warsaw, where he headed the SD and the police and shot hostages right and left even when, in the opinion of higher authorities, there was no need for this. At the same time, Meisinger was instructed to keep an eye on Sorge. But he did it badly. And it was practically impossible for the German intelligence services to organize tight surveillance abroad, especially in Japan, so that the local police would not notice it.

According to Schellenberg, Meisinger "instead of devoting himself to the performance of his real duties, indulged in secular entertainment and unexpectedly took up the role of a simpleton. True, he regularly informed me about the Post" - this is the nickname we chose for Sorge - but there was no case, so that the information he sent me did not contain a positive opinion about Sorge. Meisinger constantly emphasized the good reputation that Sorge enjoyed both in the German embassy in Tokyo and in Japanese institutions.

mention that sometimes he talked on the phone with Müller, who spoke with his countryman in the Bavarian dialect, which almost no one understood.

These messages reassured me at first, especially since the informational material Sorge received through Ritgen seemed useful and did not arouse suspicions of disinformation.

I received my first blow at the beginning of 1941. At that time in Berlin

there was a delegation of Japanese police officers.

I spoke with them on several occasions, and one day the head of that delegation unexpectedly asked me if Meisinger had been assigned to carry out secret surveillance of German citizens living in Japan. I answered in the negative. In the course of the conversation, the Japanese once again casually remarked that, in his opinion, it would be wiser if Meisinger cooperated with Japanese institutions for this, which at any time are ready to put their rich experience at his service. From these statements it became clear to me that Meisinger was carrying out his task with the utmost ineptness, arousing the suspicions of the Japanese.

By that time, Sorge had given us an assessment of the general situation, according to which he considered Japan's entry into the Tripartite Pact to be nothing more than political manipulation. having no real military significance for Germany. After the start of the war with Russia, he also pointed out that Japan would under no circumstances violate the non-aggression pact concluded with Russia; the war in China, according to him, makes enormous demands on the military potential of Japan - first of all, the navy urgently demands the establishment of control over the South Pacific Ocean. He concluded this from the nature of the supply of oil and fuel to the ground forces - in his opinion, these reserves would be enough for only half a year. The fact that the navy had significant resources at its disposal indicated, he believed, a change in the main directions of military operations.

Thus, Sorge informed both Stalin and Hitler that Japan would not oppose the USSR in 1941. As Schellenberg concluded, "Sorge was a lone intelligence officer who believed, perhaps, in the possibility of sincere reconciliation between Russia and Germany as a result of the establishment of a new (communist) social order; origin played a large role in the development of his worldview (his mother was Russian, and his father was a lot of lived in Russia for years.) He not only rejected National Socialism and fascism, but, apparently, in the depths of his soul he felt the greatest hatred for him.

To explain why Russian intelligence so generously granted him great personal freedom of action - contrary to their habit of directing the activities of their agents with strict directives - seems to me only possible if the Russians correctly understood the character of Sorge. They knew that Sorge could be useful only by living in an atmosphere of "contemptible" freedom, to which, despite his negative attitude towards the bourgeois way of life, he was accustomed from childhood, brought up in the traditions of Western individualism. And the fact that, neither in his testimony nor during his long imprisonment in Japan, he not only did not confess, but did not say a word about his collaboration with Berlin, can be equally explained by his strong personality and willfulness - he was associated with the former

submarine commander, holder of the order Ropg le veres von Ritgen, personal ties, and within the framework of the political game, such friendship remained inviolable for him. Such a conclusion, I think, allows us to draw the information that he supplied, since Sorge, for all his rejection of the National Socialist regime, never made an attempt to misinform our intelligence."

The fact that Sorge during the investigation did not admit to working for

German intelligence agencies, quite understandably. Such a confession could only worsen his situation. There was no evidence proving Sorge's involvement in such work in the hands of the Japanese. His subordinates did not know that some of Sorge's materials were being transferred to the Germans. By the way, the need to transfer materials to the German embassy can explain the fact that Clausen did not destroy the original materials even after he had transmitted them by radio in the form of cipher messages.

Throughout 1940, Sorge, both through couriers and by radio, did not stop supplying Moscow with current information about Japan's military production, its air and motorized forces. He informed the 4th Directorate of the determination of the Japanese army to reform along the German model, emphasizing the creation of highly mechanized tank formations.

But what kind of information came from "Ramsay" about a possible German attack on the USSR.

On September 21, 1940, Sorge sent a message to Moscow regarding the Tripartite Pact, perhaps one of those that Proskurov discussed with Captain Ivanov:

"From Ambassador Ott... The Japanese are ready to sign the pact and are putting pressure on Ambassador Ott to sign it as soon as possible... In this regard, Ribbentrop went to Italy to get Italy's consent... The Germans will try to involve the Soviet Union in this pact. There is not a single clause in the pact directed against the USSR, which will be published ... "

On December 28, 1940, Sorge radioed to the Center: "Every new person arriving from Germany to Japan tells that the Germans have about 80 divisions on the eastern border, including Romania, in order to influence the policy of the USSR. In case the USSR begins to develop activity against the interests of Germany, as already happened in the Baltics, the Germans will be able to occupy the territory along the line Kharkov - Moscow - Leningrad. The Germans do not want this, but they will resort to this means if they are forced to do so by the behavior of the USSR. The Germans are well aware that the USSR cannot risk it, since the leaders of the USSR, especially after the Finnish campaign, are well aware that the Red Army needs at least 20 years to become a modern army like the German one ... The new BAT in Tokyo told me that the figure of 80 divisions is apparently somewhat exaggerated." This information was brought to the attention of Stalin and Molotov.

By the way, the German military attache in Tokyo was absolutely right. By the end of 1940, the Germans were still far from having 80 divisions near the Soviet borders.

Sorge's cipher message, sent on May 2, 1941, said: "I talked with the German ambassador Ott and the naval attache about the relationship between Germany and the USSR. Ott told me that Hitler was determined to defeat the USSR and get the European part

the Soviet Union into their own hands as a grain and raw material base for German control over the whole of Europe.

Both - the ambassador and attache - agreed that after the defeat of Yugoslavia in relations between Germany and the USSR

critical dates are approaching.

The first date is the end time of sowing in the USSR. After the end of sowing, the war against the USSR can begin at any moment, since Germany only has to harvest.

The second critical point is the negotiations between Germany and Turkey. If the USSR creates any difficulties in accepting the German demands by Turkey, then war will be inevitable.

The possibility of a war breaking out at any moment is very great, because Hitler and his generals are sure that a war with the USSR will in no way interfere with waging a war against England.

The German generals rate the combat effectiveness of the Red Army so low that they believe that the Red Army will be crushed within a few months. They believe that the defense system on the German-Soviet border is extremely weak.

The decision to start a war against the USSR will be made only by Hitler either in May or after the war with England.

However, Ott, who is personally against such a war, is currently so skeptical that he has already suggested that Prince Urach leave for Germany in May. "This information was also brought to the top leadership of the Soviet Union, but without the paragraph that the German generals are very low estimate of the combat capability of the Red Army. Obviously, the new head of the Intelligence Department Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, the future marshal, did not want to upset Stalin once again with words about the low combat effectiveness of the Soviet troops. This telegram is marked by the head of the Intelligence Department Golikov: "Give to five addresses." That is, send Stalin, Molotov, Beria, People's Commissar for Defense and Chief of the General Staff.

F.I. Golikov

Strictly speaking, the conclusion that Sorge made was supposed to keep Stalin from unambiguously interpreting the information. Hitler may attack the USSR as early as May, but he may also postpone this matter until the end of the war with England. True, Sorge in this radiogram cited arguments that proved that, most likely, Hitler would not wait for a future landing on the British Isles, but would attack now. However, Golikov did not convey the most important argument about the low combat capability of the Red Army to Stalin.

On May 19, 1941, Sorge reported: "The new German representatives who arrived here from Berlin declare that the war between Germany and the USSR may begin at the end of May, since they received orders to return to Berlin by this time. But they also stated that in this year the danger may pass. They declared that Germany had 9 army corps against the USSR, consisting of 150 divisions..." Golikov imposed a resolution: "Specify - corps or armies?" The general knew that there were no corps of 16-17 divisions. Undoubtedly, Sorge also knew this, and, most likely, there was an error in transmitting the radiogram. In addition, according to the Intelligence Agency, by June 1, 120 divisions were concentrated on the Soviet borders. In fact, as it turned out

after the war, from captured German documents, then there were no more than 70 German divisions near the Soviet borders. In this case, Sorge became a victim of disinformation widely disseminated by the German command. The unwitting transmitters of this disinformation were also the German representatives with whom Sorge spoke.

Unlike the first telegram received on that day, which told about the peculiarities of Japanese-German relations and Japanese policy in the event of the start of a German-Soviet war, sent to the country's leadership, Golikov kept the second telegram. For Stalin, it was useless. He already understood that Hitler would either attack or not attack, and he himself was preparing to attack.

On May 30, 1941, Sorge specified: "Berlin informed Ott that the German offensive against the USSR would begin in the second half of June. Ott is 95% sure that the war will begin. The indirect evidence that I see to this is currently as follows: the technical department of the German air force in my city was instructed to return shortly. Ott demanded that BAT not send any important news through the USSR. The transport of rubber through the USSR has been reduced to a minimum."

In a message dated June 1, 1941, Sorge informed: "The expectation of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl (military attache in Siam. Previously, Friedrich von Scholl was a military attache in Tokyo, and Sorge knew him well. - B.S.) brought with him from Berlin, from where he left for Bangkok on May 3. In Bangkok, he will take the post of military attache.

Ott stated that he could not obtain information on this matter directly from Berlin, but only Scholl's information.

In a conversation with Scholl, I established that the Germans were attracted by the fact of a big tactical mistake, which, according to Scholl, was made by the USSR in the question of speaking out against the Red Army.

According to the German point of view, the fact that the defensive

the line of the USSR is located mainly against the German lines without large branches, constitutes the greatest mistake. He will help to defeat the Red Army in the first big battle. Scholl declared that the most powerful blow would be delivered by the left flank of the German army.

On this telegram, Golikov imposed a resolution: "NO-5. Send Ramsay a trail, a request: To No. ... Please tell me more clearly the essence of the "big tactical mistake" that you report. Your own opinion about the truthfulness of Scholl about the "left flank". Golikov 3.06". And he also notes right there: "NO-5. To the list of dubious and disinformation messages from Ramsay. Golikov."

Golikov probably decided that Scholl was reporting the main blow from the left flank, i.e. northern grouping of German troops. The fact is that the then leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense, represented by Timoshenko and Zhukov, and, in all likelihood, Stalin himself, were sure that the main grouping of the Wehrmacht against the USSR was concentrated on the right, southern flank. In fact, according to the Barbarossa plan, the main blow was delivered in the center of the Soviet-German front, so Scholl's information was in fact

misinformation, but again not directed personally at Sorge.

Max Clausen stated after the war: "After a few months before that, we reported that at least 150 German divisions were concentrated near the border of the Soviet Union and that the war would begin in mid-June.

I came to Richard. We received a strange radiogram, I no longer remember its verbatim content, which said that the possibility of war seemed incredible to the Center.

Richard was beside himself. He jumped up like he always did when he was very excited and exclaimed, "This is too much!!!" He was well aware of the enormous losses the Soviet Union would suffer if it did not prepare to repel the blow.

On June 15, 1941, Sorge sent a new message:

"The German courier told the military attache that he was convinced that the war against the USSR was delayed, probably until the end of June. The military attache does not know whether there will be a war or not."

And finally, the last pre-war cipher message dated June 20, 1941 read:

"The German ambassador Ott told me that a war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable. Invest (Ozaki. - B.S.) told me that the Japanese General Staff was already discussing the position that would be taken in the event of a WAR ..."

It should be noted that in 1941, Sorge received various information about the imminent German attack on the USSR from the German ambassador Ott, as well as from the military and naval attache and other German diplomats and journalists who arrived from Germany. After Ott turned from a military attaché into an ambassador, Sorge began to receive much more political information. But the flow of military information, especially concerning cooperation between the Wehrmacht and the Japanese armed forces, has somewhat decreased. However, this cooperation was not particularly important due to the great distance between the two countries from each other. And Sorge received military information about what was happening in Europe in almost the same volume as the military and naval attache, since without it it was difficult for him to help Ambassador Ott draw up

reports to Berlin.

But it must be borne in mind that only secondary and random information was received by the German embassy in Tokyo about the upcoming German attack on the USSR, the timing of the attack and the strategic plan for a future Soviet-German war. By position, Ott was not supposed to know anything about the Barbarossa plan and the attack on the USSR, since Japan was not supposed to participate in it. Therefore, although Sorge received practically information (6) about the future Soviet-German war, this information was by no means first-class and contained a significant part of the disinformation deliberately spread from Berlin. In addition, the original date for the attack from May 15 was moved to June 22, so reports of an attack at the end of May were later dismissed as disinformation by the Kremlin. It should also be taken into account that information about plans to attack

The USSR reached Tokyo with a delay of about two weeks, while people from Berlin got to Japan.

But the information about the plans for Japan's entry into World War II, Sorge was the most first-class. Ozaki's materials, dating back to Prince Konoe and his entourage, were of primary importance here, and the materials of Sorge himself, dating back to the German embassy, were of secondary importance. In the latter case, it was about information that the Japanese government considered necessary to communicate to the German side. Ozaki's information concerned the decision-making mechanism in the Japanese cabinet itself, and in this respect was unique. The most valuable was his story about the results of the top-secret meeting with the Emperor of Japan on September 6, 1941 and the decisions taken there, from which it followed that Japanese aggression would be directed not to the north, to Soviet Siberia and the Far East, but to the South Seas.

After the German attack on the USSR, Moscow began to especially trust Sorge. This is evidenced by the note of the Acting Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major General Panfilov, to the cipher message from Tokyo dated July 10, 1941: "Given the great potential of the source and the reliability of a significant part of his previous messages, this information is trustworthy."

Also Major General M.I. Ivanov recalled: "Stalin then, but apparently, had changed his opinion about Sorge. Already after the start of the war, according to Golikov, he asked him twice: "What does your German write from Tokyo?" In turn, the former head of the political department of the RUP The Red Army Brigadier Commissar I. I. Ilyichev later said in a confidential conversation with me: "I.V. Steel somehow in the presence of Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky said that in Japan, military intelligence has a scout whose price is equal to the corps and even the army."

For Sorge, the German attack on the USSR was a terrible shock. On June 22, 1941, he began to drink almost from the very morning. And after dinner I sat down in the bar of the Imperial Hotel and got down to business in earnest, and the more I drank, the more gloomy. At eight in the evening, a fairly drunk Sorge called the residence of the German ambassador and told Ott: "This war is lost!" Then he called several more members of the German colony. They attributed the gloomy prophecy to a state of severe intoxication. Ott, in the depths of his soul, thought about the same, but, of course, did not allow himself public doubts about victory.

Later, Sorge was very upset by the defeat of the Red Army and, as usual, drowned grief in strong drinks.

Max Clausen recalled how Richard told him: "We love our homeland badly - we didn't save it from trouble," and tears appeared in his eyes. He really wanted to prevent a war between the USSR and Germany, but could not do it.

On June 26, 1941, Sorge received a personal cipher message from the Center on the radio, which said: "Tokyo, comrade Inson ("Ramsay"). Tell me what decision the Japanese government has made in connection with the war between the USSR and Germany. In cases of troops being transferred to our borders, immediately let us know."

On June 28, Sorge replied: "The decision to move to Saigon was



adopted (firstly) under the pressure of radical elements who demanded action, but on the condition of avoiding conflict with America and, secondly, in order to buy time during the German-Soviet war.

An Invest source claims that as soon as the Red Army is defeated, Japan will move north, but indicated that Japan wants to buy Sakhalin peacefully ...

The German Ambassador Ott confirmed with regard to the first part of this, but Matsuoka, in response to Ott's question regarding the second part, said that Japan would oppose the USSR, as he had always assured him of this. Matsuoka then told Ambassador Ott that the emperor had agreed to the move to Saigon some time ago and that this could not be changed at this time. So Ott realized that Japan would not move north now."

The ciphergram was reported to Stalin and Molotov.

On July 2, 1941, the Supreme Council met in Tokyo with the participation of Emperor Hirohito. It approved the "Program of the National Policy of the Japanese Empire", which stated: "Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. However, for now we will not interfere in this conflict. We will covertly strengthen our military training against of the Soviet Union, adhering to an independent position ... If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to the empire, we, by resorting to armed force, will solve the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders.

In fact, it meant that Japan would try to occupy Northern Sakhalin and other Far Eastern territories only if the Red Army was finally defeated and practically ceased resistance. Then Japan could count on the fact that the Soviet troops in the Far East would not resist the Japanese invasion, and that it would be possible to manage with small forces there, without prejudice to military operations in China and in the South Seas zone.

On July 3, 1941, Ramsay reported:

"The German military attache ... thinks that Japan will enter the war in 5 weeks. The Invest source thinks that Japan will enter the war in 6 weeks. He also said that the Japanese government decided to remain loyal to the three-power pact, but there will be adhere to the neutrality pact with the USSR.

Thus, Sorge correctly believed that Japan would fight against England and America, but not against the USSR. He was wrong only in terms. Japan hired at Pearl Harbor not in mid-August, but on 7

December.

On July 30, 1941, Sorge informed the Center:

"... By mid-August, about 2 million people will be under arms in Japan. Starting from the second half of August, Japan can start a war, but only if the Red Army is actually defeated ..."

On August 11, 1941, "Ramsay" analyzed Japanese politics since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War:

"During the first days of the war between Germany and the USSR, the Japanese government and the General Staff decided to prepare for the war, so they carried out a large mobilization. However, after 6 weeks of the war, the leaders of Japan, who are preparing the war, see that the offensive of the German army is delayed and a significant part of the troops destroyed by the Red Army. At the General Staff we are confident that a final decision will follow soon, especially since winter is already approaching. The next two to three weeks will finally determine Japan's decision."

On August 12, 1941, Sorge reported:

"The military attache of the German embassy in Tokyo traveled to Korea and Manchuria and told me that six divisions had arrived in Korea for a possible attack on Vladivostok. 4 divisions had arrived in Manchuria. The BAT learned for sure that the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea together numbered 30 divisions. Preparations for operations would be completed between the 20th and the end of August, but the BAT personally telegraphed to Berlin that the decision had not yet been made for the Japanese to move in. If Japan moved, the first blow would be delivered to Vladivostok, where most of the Japanese forces were aimed. .."

And already on September 14, 1941, Sorge radioed quite definitely: "The Invest source went to Manchuria. He said that the Japanese government decided not to oppose the USSR this year ... Invest noted that after 15.9 the USSR could be completely free ".

Sorge's contact, V. Zaitsev, recalled one of the meetings of that time: "I met R. 3. in one of the provincial restaurants ... Sorge came a few minutes late and went to my table. Outwardly, nothing spoke of his panic. He was calm and, as always, collected, but he did not start the conversation first and looked at me attentively, as if studying my condition. recent months and petitioning the Central Executive Committee of the USSR for a high award, Sorge was a little embarrassed and said with a smile: "Dear Serge, do rewards and gratitude for a communist and intelligence officer have any serious meaning? The main thing is that you and I failed to prevent the war. Now people will pay for this with great blood."

True, the hero had to look for a high award for 23 years, already posthumously.

Hanako saw Sorge differently. After June 22, he darkened, yearned, all the time disappeared somewhere, returned late. And once he scared her with an outburst of uncontrollable rage. Crying, "Ramsay" said to his mistress: "I will die earlier. I want you to live. Please live long ... Don't worry, Sorge is strong. He will never say anything about you. But you live, get married ... ". And then he straightened himself up and hugged her: "Forgive me, please. I'm just very lonely and sad ... Let's die

together..."

On October 1, 1941, Konoe's cabinet fell. His resignation was a direct result of unsuccessful attempts to get a meeting with the President

Roosevelt. The party of war, led by General Tojo, came to power.

"When in 1941 the call for war with the Soviet Union sounded more and more insistently ... I did not limit myself to certain Ozaki maneuvers within the Konoe group, since I had no doubts about the need to work on Germany," Sorge wrote. Ozaki began working on his friends, Prince Saionji and Prime Minister Konoe. He warned them that the strength of the Soviet Union was underestimated and suggested that a war with Russia would be disadvantageous for Japan. According to Sorge, Ozaki's arguments were briefly as follows: "The Soviet Union under no circumstances intends to fight Japan, and even if Japan suddenly invaded Siberia, it would only defend itself. And it would be a short-sighted and erroneous step for Japan to attack against Russia, since she will not be able to gain anything in Eastern Siberia or make any significant profit from this war. The United States and Great Britain would welcome the open action of Japan against Russia in order to seize the moment and strike at Japan itself as soon as its oil and iron reserves. Moreover, if Germany succeeded in defeating the Soviet Union, Siberia could fall into the clutches of Japan, and the Japanese would not have to lift a finger in the process. And if Japan seeks further expansion, apart from China, then the southern regions of Asia would be much more suitable for these purposes, since there Japan would find those strategic resources that she so much needed in wartime, and would also directly face her real enemy (the United States), opposing her in the battle for a place under the sun".

Ozaki informed Sorge of Prince Konoe's efforts in his attempts to settle the Indo-Chinese incident and avoid further escalation of the conflict. At the end of July 1941, Japanese troops entered French Indochina. On the eve of July 25, Japan warned the United States that it would send troops to this French colony. In response, the next day, Washington announced a freeze on Japanese capital. Similar statements were made by England and Holland. This actually meant a complete trade embargo, including an oil embargo, against Japan, which at the expense of its own resources covered 10% of oil needs. The capture of the Soviet Far East would have added to Japan only the oil of Northern Sakhalin, which she already received, having concessions there. But this oil satisfied only a small part of Japanese needs. Japan's oil reserves only lasted 6 months. Therefore, by the end of 1941, Japan would have had to agree to the US ultimatum put forward on November 26, 1941, demanding that Japanese troops be withdrawn from China and Indochina, or that a war be launched against the US and other Western powers in the South Seas with the aim of capturing the Dutch Indies, which only one could provide Japanese needs for oil, as well as other territories with the necessary strategic raw materials. Ozaki, followed by Sorge, made it clear to Moscow that Japan was not going to capitulate to the Americans and that negotiations between Japan and the United States would certainly end in vain, and after their failure, Japan would start a war in the South Seas.

Although Ozaki often met with the Prime Minister, it is clear, however, that he could not seriously influence the course of thought of Prince Kono<sup>5</sup>. And, of course, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor not because one of the members of the Sorge group influenced the prime minister. Strictly speaking, Japan at that moment had only such a choice: either to abandon expansion, or to attack in the direction of the South Seas, which required

destroy the US Pacific Fleet. And this conclusion, as well as the conclusion that Tokyo is unlikely to abandon its imperialist policy, could have been reached in Moscow on the basis of open sources alone. After all, Japan's dependence on oil imports, as well as on other types of strategic raw materials, was well known, as well as the aggressive intentions of its government, clearly demonstrated in China. And in the USSR, no doubt, they understood that the occupation of the Soviet Far East would not give Japan the necessary oil and raw materials, so Japanese expansion could only be directed to the south. But Sorge's messages, of course, provided important additional arguments for C to write to conclude that Japan was not going to attack the Soviet Union. Therefore, you can safely remove divisions from the Far East and throw them against the Wehrmacht.

In early October, Sorge radioed another message to Moscow about the course of the "American-Japanese talks."

"According to Konoe, they will succeed if Japan reduces its military presence in China and French Indochina and suspends its plan to build eight naval and air bases in French Indochina ... But if the negotiations fail, then there will be war, and therefore, there is no doubt that Japan is doing everything possible to bring them to a successful conclusion, even at the expense of its German ally."

Then, in October, Ozaki warned that "the next two or three weeks will be decisive in the question of Japan's movement to the south" and attacks on the Western powers. Yet Ozaki was firmly convinced that such a dangerous negotiation for them would not be successful and would never reach the goal.

As the Russian historian Vasily Molodyakov writes, "Sorge's main goal was to prevent a war between the USSR and Germany, on the one hand, and the USSR and Japan, on the other. It was in this direction that all his work went - not so much an intelligence officer, but an analyst and player in Big Politics. He was an undoubted patriot of Russia, in which he was born, and the Soviet Union, with which he linked hopes for a better future for mankind. At the same time, he was a patriot of Germany and respected Japan. He saw that in the Soviet in the German, as well as in the Soviet-Japanese, conflict, the "third laughing" is interested, striving to destroy or at least weaken opponents. A staunch communist, an enemy of Nazism as an ideology and political system, Sorge did not want to weaken the military and economic potential of Germany, necessary for its future development along the path of socialism, that is, he was not a defeatist.

As an informant-journalist and informant-intelligence officer, Sorge sought to give "customers" in Moscow and Berlin accurate and objective information about the situation in the Far East in order to help develop a balanced political course that ruled out a military clash between the USSR and Germany and Japan, together or by

separately. As a person who had connections in the political world of Japan, he promoted the idea of mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR and Germany, following Haushofer in this. As an analyst, he inspired all sides with the idea of the perniciousness of the intra-Eurasian conflict. Highly appreciating the military potential of the Japanese and German armies in his writings - as well as the Soviet one in conversations with influential people in Japan - he

made it clear that it is better to have such a country among allies than opponents. In the Gurem Notes, Sorge spoke in detail about this, however, without naming names.

Hans Otto Meisner, third secretary of the German embassy in Tokyo, assessed the work of the Soviet residency in this way: "The Sorge group achieved unprecedented success. Details of the Anti-Comintern Pact reached the Kremlin 48 hours after signing (1) and almost 30 hours before it became known to the Japanese Cabinet and the German High Command."

The contribution of the Sorge group to solving the problem of the time and nature of Japan's entry into World War II was also invaluable. Now Richard considered his mission accomplished and was thinking about returning to the USSR, although, perhaps, he did not really want to live in this country. However, he had few chances to leave Japan during the war. The German journalist and member of the NSDAP, of course, could not go directly to the USSR, Sorge could really only try to go to China, but it is not a fact that the Japanese would allow such a trip. And from China it was very difficult to get to the USSR or neutral countries.

## Arrest and trial

The Japanese intercepted a number of Clausen's messages and found that the text was encrypted with five-digit groups of numbers, as well as that the transmissions were going in the direction of Vladivostok. Japanese counterintelligence had no doubt that a Soviet intelligence group was operating in the country, although they could not decipher the radio messages.

Max Clausen told Julius Mader about how he encrypted radio messages: "I would like to explain our coding system in more detail using the example of one of the last messages transmitted to me by Richard. The text of this so important radio message read: "The Soviet Far East can not be afraid of an attack by Japan." It had to be encoded in such a way that no one else could decipher it. So I used a system that served us reliably for several years. First, it was necessary to replace the letters with numbers. We used the English alphabet. The most commonly used letters were replaced by single digits, other letters corresponded to two-digit numbers from 80 to 99. This one-time coding did not seem reliable enough to us: the enemy radio interception service could still decipher such a text.

For secondary coding we used the "Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich". Then, in 1941, I used the 1935 issue. The statistical yearbook consisted of hundreds of tables containing a great many figures. The first part contained statistical data about Germany, printed on white paper. I used this part as a basis for coding. In

The second part of the handbook, on sheets of green paper, contained international statistical surveys: it was used by the Center to encrypt radiograms destined for our reconnaissance group. We chose a completely "apolitical" statistical yearbook not only because it could be used to make hundreds of thousands of digital combinations, but also because the presence of such

The publications of the journalist Sorge and I, who was reputed to be a respectable entrepreneur, aroused absolutely no suspicion.

Each radiogram began with our "return address": AT, that is, 83 5 93. These were the initial letters of the Russian geographical name Far East. At the end of each radiogram, I tapped out the code name of Richard Sorge - VAMZ \$ AU, respectively, in the numbers 4 5 96 0 5 97. The ciphers were transmitted exclusively in groups of five numbers.

Now I would like to try to explain the principle of secondary coding as clearly as possible. The numbers, which were the encrypted full text of the radiogram, were written as groups of five numbers. At the same time, under each line, I left enough space to write down the figures from the "Statistical Yearbook" under it, as well as the result of summing both lines. Where did the second and third row numbers come from? I took the figures for the second row from page 193 of the Statistical Yearbook of the German Reich for 1935. I took the numbers for the second row from this page of the reference book, and starting from the seventh line of the fifth column. For even greater reliability, we never took the first digit, but always started with the last digit of the corresponding column. After the numbers from the reference book were written under the numbers resulting from the primary coding, the latter were added to the former, while tens were discarded. I wrote down only the remaining units of the sums - this is how the third line turned out.

Now it was necessary to inform the Center from which place in the statistical yearbook one should start taking figures for deciphering. This necessity arose because every time I used a new page, and the counting of numbers started from a different line or from a different column. This message was encoded separately. Under the digits of the fourth "five" of the double-encoded text, I wrote down the page number and the numbers denoting the row and column. Under them, I, in addition, wrote down the third "five" from the end. It all came together..."

In an hour, Max could encrypt up to 500 fives.

The Japanese turned to the Germans with a request to attach modern direction finders to them. Ott reported this request to Sorge. He replied that the Japanese seemed to be suffering from spy mania, and he himself demanded that Clausen change transmission locations more often.

How did the Sorge group fail? Contrary to popular belief, reflected in the famous film "Who are you, Dr. Sorge?", the failure was not due to the fact that Clausen's walkie-talkie was located. The Japanese direction finders never managed to figure out any of the places where the elusive radio operator went on the air.

Willoughby voiced the version of the "communist trace": thanks to betrayal, the police found the artist Miyagi Yotoku from the Sorge group, who, while living in America, joined the US Communist Party and was recruited by Soviet intelligence, and after returning home, began working with "Ramsay". The most controversial was the name of the probable

traitor. It turned out to be Ito Ritsu, one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Japan both in the pre-war and post-war years, a man of dizzying and tragic fate.

In 1955, Ritsu Ito, who was in China, was declared a traitor and expelled from the Japanese Communist Party. Previously, he, obeying directives from Moscow, tried to learn from the Chinese experience in order to start a guerrilla war in Japan. The leadership of the CPJ stated that, according to their investigation, after his arrest on June 27, 1940, Ito "split" and became a police informer, after which he was not only released (as if for lack of evidence), but also given the opportunity to return to work in the research department of the South Manchurian Railway Company. Among others, Ito betrayed his communist acquaintance Kitabayashi Tomo, a member of the "outer circle" of the Sorge group, which was associated with Miyagi. She was arrested and, in turn, betrayed Miyagi. From him, the thread stretched to Ozaki and Soga. By the way, Ito himself was familiar with Ozaki, but only as a "junior" with a "senior" - both in age and position. Ozaki was also convinced in prison that the thread that led counterintelligence to him began with Ito's betrayal.

Ito returned to Japan only on September 3, 1980, having spent, as it turned out, 27 years in prison in the PRC. In 1998, Zhao Anbo, an 84-year-old veteran of the Chinese Communist Party, who once oversaw the "Japanese direction" of Beijing's politics, told the Japanese news agency Kyodo Tsushin that in the mid-fifties, Nosaka and another prominent communist, Hakamada Satomi, directly asked the Chinese to "eliminate" Ito as traitor. 12 years after the return of Ito, the 100-year-old Nosaka himself was accused of involvement in Stalin's repressions against Japanese communists, removed from the post of honorary chairman of the party, and then completely expelled from its ranks. Until his death in 1989, Ito tried to justify himself, stating that he was not a traitor.

In one of the documents of the Japanese secret police, published after the war, it was said that "the testimony of Ito Ritsu should be considered the beginning of the arrests in this case (Sorge. - B.S.)". This was confirmed to the Americans by the surviving Japanese counterintelligence officers. However, in the final report of the GRU commission "Experience in the organization and activities of the Ramsay residency", compiled in 1964 by M.I. Sirotkin stated the following:

"As for the testimony of Ito Ritsu itself, this is the weakest part of this entire version, a poorly thought out detail that reveals a simple trick of the Japanese counterintelligence. Ito Ritsu had nothing to do with the Ramsay intelligence network (this is the true truth, but no one has ever claimed that Ito was a member of the Sorge group. He simply handed over one of Miyagi's agents to the police, and what happened next was a matter of police investigation technique. - B.S.) ... It would be unforgivable naivety to take this Japanese-American version on faith without taking into account the purpose, which was pursued by its authors, without analyzing the circumstances and reasons that could really create real ground for failure.

- firstly: that not a single counterintelligence service is inclined to reveal to the end its true methods and ways of fighting enemy agents, but, on the contrary, prefers to create a false picture that hides

true techniques and methods of activity;

- secondly: that the Japanese police are a skilled master of provocation, especially skillful in the fight against

communist movement;

- thirdly: that the Sorge case was extremely fertile material for the police, which could serve as the basis for launching a broad anti-Comintern campaign and compromising the Japanese Communist Party (however, the Japanese did not even try to launch any such campaign, including because they did not want to spoil relations with the Soviet Union, On the contrary, the Sorge case was covered in the Japanese press extremely sparingly. - B.S.) ... The plan of the Japanese police in subsequent years was eagerly picked up by American counterintelligence, which widely implemented the tasks that were meant by the authors of the version of "betrayal "Ito Ritsu... Even if we conditionally accept the primitive Japanese-American version of Ito Ritsu as true, then in this case there should have been some additional conditions that allowed counterintelligence to uncover the entire organization at once and eliminate the entire network."

It is felt that the author of the report and its editors sought to whitewash one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Japan so that the high-ranking readers of the report would not retain the image of a traitor communist. However, the specific reasons for the failure and the name of any other traitor who could take this dubious honor from Ito were not named in the report.

Those Japanese communist historians who deny Ito's guilt claim that there was a betrayal, but the name of the traitor is still unknown. Soviet intelligence officers preferred to talk about carelessness as the reason for the failure, although they recognized that there were several reasons. One of the main reasons, they considered the order of the Center in 1939, contrary to all the rules of conspiracy, to Sorge and Clausen to contact employees of the Soviet embassy representing the special services - V.S. Zaitsev (second secretary) and S.L. Budkevich (consular officer). From January 1939 until his arrest in October 1941, Sorge met Zaitsev fourteen times. Of course, the meetings were held under secrecy measures, but, on the other hand, the Japanese police knew who Zaitsev and Budkevich really were. However, the Center had no other means of communication, after trips to China to meet with couriers became almost impossible for members of the Sorge residency. Of course, a significant part of the information was transmitted by radio. But Moscow also needed photocopies of documents, and they could only be transmitted through couriers. It was impossible to pick up couriers other than Soviet diplomats in Tokyo.

In 1999, on the official website of the FSB, A. Vitkovsky published the contents of the award lists of the Japanese political police officers involved in the "Sorge case" stored in the FSB Archive. Here they are:

"From the award list of an employee of the 1st department of the political police, assistant bailiff Tomofuji Taketora:

On June 27, 1941, he obtained an important confession from Tomofuji Ken that Kitabayashi Tomo, who had returned from America, was a spy. The investigation in this case developed on the basis of this confession. Thus, we managed to uncover a large spy organization,

and if it were not for the merits of the assistant bailiff Tomofuji Taketora, it would be impossible to even think about arrests in this case.



From the award list of the chief of the security sector, bailiff Tanaka Naboru:

Based on data obtained by Assistant Bailiff Tomofuji Taketora, Tanaka Nabor was tasked with developing suspected espionage Kitabayashi Tomo. Having received an arrest warrant, he made an important confession that the artist Miyagi was engaged in espionage activities, and Kitabayashi was not involved in intelligence work. However, bailiff Tanaka came to the conclusion that Kitabayashi Tomo was still a spy, and Miyagi was one of the leaders of the intelligence group.

From the award list of an employee of the 1st Department of the Political Police Sakai Yasu:

On October 10, 1941, he took part in the arrest of the central figure in this case, Miyagi. On October 11, together with the bailiff, Takahashi interrogated Miyagi on the second floor of the police station. Seizing the moment, Miyagi jumped out of the window into the street to commit suicide. Despite the danger of severe injury or death, Sakai jumped after the criminal and grabbed him, after which he was taken to the hospital, but after lying there for 15 days instead of 20, he was discharged and immediately returned to service. The selfless act of the policeman made a strong impression on the criminal, and he refused the intention not to testify.

From the award sheet of an employee of the 1st political police department bailiff Takahashi Iosuke:

In the disclosure of this case, he has the following merits: he conducted a persistent and thorough interrogation of Miyagi, who tried in every possible way to hide the organization. Forced to testify, the perpetrator tried to commit suicide.

Bailiff Takahashi arrested and subjected to thorough interrogation the well-known person Ozaki. During the interrogation, the offender was close to fainting. He was brought to his senses, and the interrogation continued without the use of punishments. Ozaki confessed to espionage activities, which he had been engaged in for 10 years (as you can understand, Ozaki broke down as a result of beatings. - B.S.).

From the award list of an employee of the 1st Department of the Political Police bailiff Kanasaki Seiji:

Thanks to the skillful actions of the bailiff Kanasaki, a member of the spy organization accused Taguchi was caught in the crime. During the interrogation, the criminal bit off his tongue and tried to commit suicide, but thanks to the measures taken, he was unable to carry out his intention.

Here, a certain Tomofuji Ken is named as a traitor, from whom the thread stretched to Kitabayashi, and then to Miyagi. It would seem that the defenders of Ritsu Ito could triumph. But the trouble is that under this pseudonym Ritsu Ito was known to the police, who was being interrogated, as follows from other documents, on June 27, 1941. Obviously, the police hoped to use his services again and did not mention his real name in the award documents. And here is what the more complete text of the award sheet says about why

attracted the attention of the police Tomofuji Ken: "June 27, 1941,

thanks to his honest attitude to the case, tireless efforts and excellent investigative technique, he (Tomofuji Taketora. - B.S.) forced him to confess to TOMOFUJI KEN in the case of violation of the accumulated savings on maintaining public peace that had been strained by the investigation and instructed to solve a hitherto unknown important crime (preparatory committee for restoration of the Japanese Communist Party). In addition, he secured the important confession that launched the case: "Returned American CCP member KITABAYASHI is a foreign spy." Thus, thanks to the efforts of this assistant bailiff, we were able to uncover a large spy organization.

Ridu Ito was on the preparatory committee for the restoration of the Communist Party. A pseudonym was invented for him by the name of the policeman interrogating him. And the main testimony, apparently, Ridou gave in the case of an attempt to restore the Communist Party. And about the spy Kitabayashi mentioned, so to speak, for a snack. But it was this testimony that brought the reward to his interrogator.

According to the Russian historian Vladimir Tomarovsky, who for the first time published in full the award lists in the Sorge case at one of the symposiums, Tomiya Watabe (a Japanese historian who previously defended the innocence of Ritsu Ito) checked the reverse translation into Japanese of the award lists with the police publications available to him (a list of the ranks of a police officer management, the index list of those arrested, ten-day arrests). "As a result, I realized," he wrote in a letter, "that Tomofuji Ken was Ritsu Ito, Taketora Tomohiro (Tomofuji) was Taketora Ito of the Special Police, Noboru Tanaka was Noboru Takagi.

Until now, in the history of the CPJ and in the literature on the Sorge case, we have considered these arrests only as repressions against the movement for the re-establishment of the CPJ, and the disclosure of the Sorge case looked like a subsequent event caused by the testimony of R. Ito ... "

Note that the names were replaced by pseudonyms on the basis of the exchange of surnames and first names. Both the investigator and the leader of the Communist Party had the same name - Ito, and instead, for conspiracy, both were given the same surname Tomofuji for conspiracy.

Sorge was doomed. "It's a pity, of course," retired colonel Zaitsev wrote in October 1964 to the first deputy head of the GRU, Colonel-General Kh.D. when he got into trouble... The prejudiced attitude of the GRU leadership towards "Ramsay", apparently, led to the fact that proper measures were not taken to save him and such a person died.

But honestly, did the Center have the opportunity to evacuate Sorge in September - October 1941, a few days before his arrest, when his mission had already been completed? I think that any objective answer to this question would be negative. It is unlikely that they would have risked sending a submarine for Sorge, especially since he had practically no chance of getting to it, even if by some miracle they could have agreed on a rendezvous. And Moscow simply had no other ways to evacuate Sorge and his people. That the boat is unnoticed

would have landed off the Japanese coast, there was almost none. And if it were discovered, there would be a grandiose scandal and a sharp deterioration in

Soviet-Japanese relations, which Stalin needed least of all in the days when German tanks were approaching Moscow.

Here is what Hotsuki Ozaki, the brother of the executed Hozumi, claimed: "On October 10, police agents drove up to Miyagi's house. Seeing them through the window, he barricaded himself in the room in fright, hardly thinking what to do. His gaze fell on the samurai sword hanging on the wall. ... When the police agents broke into the room, they saw Miyagi bleeding: he committed hara-kiri, but he was alive. The senior officer ordered him to be quickly taken to the hospital. But, despite the aggravation of the disease (Miyagi had been ill with tuberculosis since childhood. - B. C.) and a terrible wound, the body clung to life. At the Miyagi hospital, they were placed in a ward on the third floor. When the guard let down his guard and moved away to the far end of the room, he tried to jump out of the window. The guard rushed to him, but it was too late. Both of them "fell out. However, fate did not allow Miyagi to die here either. The policeman fell to his death, and Miyagi, hitting a tree branch, only broke his rib. He was brought to his senses, and interrogations immediately began."

It wasn't really all that romantic. The police documents do not mention any hara-kiri. Well healthy, except for tuberculosis, Miyagi was interrogated on the second floor of the police station. During the interrogation, when two of the three police officers left the office, the artist jumped out of the window. Jumping from the second floor, it is rather difficult to hope to commit suicide by breaking to death. Rather, you might think that Miyagi tried to escape. The policeman who was in the room jumped in after him. Both crashed against the stone fence. Miyagi broke his leg and injured his spine, and the policeman spent 15 days in the hospital. After the arrested person was given first aid, interrogations resumed. And then, broken by an unsuccessful attempt to either commit suicide or escape, Miyagi spoke. And he handed over the entire group to Sorge.

On October 15, Clausen, having come to Sorge, found him extremely excited. Two days earlier, the usually punctual Miyagi had not shown up for the meeting. And on the 15th, Ozaki did not appear either (it was on this day that he was arrested). Richard gave Max the text of a telegram with a request to urgently return the group to the Union or send it to Germany. But he hardly believed in the feasibility of this plan. If the Japanese members of the group handed over Sorge, Clausen and Vukelich, they would not be released from the country, but there was no doubt that they would be handed over. It was hard to doubt that Ozaki had been handed over to Miyagi. But he would hardly have limited himself to just one of his comrades.

On October 17, Clausen and Vukelich met at Sorge. After drinking a bottle of sake, they did not figure out how to get out of the slamming trap. They had no instructions in case of failure. Max, having come home, thought for some time whether it was worth destroying or at least removing the transmitter from the house and burning the documents, but decided not to do anything. It seems that he already felt doomed and was preparing with truthful and extensive testimony, supported by physical evidence, to buy his life. It was pointless to deny it - Miyagi and Ozaki knew enough to convict them.

In principle, both Sorge and his comrades knew that the agents of the Comintern and

In the event of a failure, the Intelligence Agency must in every possible way deny its connection with Moscow. Before them was an example of the Nulens couple, who not only

safely escaped the death penalty, but eventually returned to Moscow. But Sorge and other members of the group were not going to remain silent. On the one hand, they understood that in the conditions of a world war and Moscow's interest in Tokyo's neutrality, no one would organize a campaign in their defense. On the other hand, they, at least Sorge and Ozaki, hardly doubted that they would be executed, but they testified, as it were, for history, so that the affairs of the Ramsay group were preserved at least in police protocols. At the same time, Sorge, unlike Ozaki, called by name only those members of the group who had either already been arrested or were out of reach for the Japanese police.

The failure of the Sorge group was due to the communist past of a number of his group members. It should be noted that the mere existence of a "communist trace" in the activities of Soviet residencies by no means always led to their disclosure by counterintelligence agencies. Suffice it to recall the famous "Cambridge Five". But here, probably, the fundamental difference in the political culture of England and Japan affected. In England, and indeed in most European countries, a communist who renounced his views, or at least ceased active communist activity, could well expect to make a career in the public service, not excluding the intelligence agencies. In the establishment there were many representatives of the left political movements, for whom the communists were not completely strangers. In Japan, exposing a communist ruled out his use in the civil service. And even more so, a communist who renounced his views could not count on the civil service. From the point of view of the Japanese, he lost face in this case.

Sorge and his comrades had no instructions on how to act in case of failure. But even if they were, they would hardly have helped in the situation that has arisen. It is unlikely that Miyagi, Ozaki and Clausen would have been locked up during interrogations for a long time, even if Clausen had managed to destroy the evidence (hardly all of them). They did not have fake passports in case they went illegal. And if they had, they would hardly have helped them in the conditions of dense police surveillance, which had long been established for the European members of the group, as well as for almost all Europeans of any note in Tokyo.

During a search, three cameras, a photocopier, and, worst of all, a typed text of a radiogram to the Center, a copy of which was found in Max Clausen's possession, were found at Sorge's. Max was invited to the police station under the pretext of paying compensation for the damage done to some Japanese cyclist and arrested there. Anna was left at home for the time being, as bait. The next day, the police surrounded the houses of Sorge and Branko Vukelić. Until the end of the day on October 18, all members of the Sorge organization were in prison.

When the guards left for a bite to eat, there was a knock on the door of the Clausen house. An unfamiliar man entered, a European who differed from the others in unusual clothing and the pronunciation of English words. He wanted to rent a room. Anna immediately realized that in front of her was a Russian. She quickly escorted the guest out, saying: "Go, go, a great misfortune has happened here." It was Mikhail Ivanov. An urgent message was sent to the Center: "According to reports, Inson and Zhigolo were arrested five days ago for espionage, for whose benefit is unknown. Data

checking."

The day after Max's arrest, Anna was also arrested and placed in jail.

Here is the disgusting picture of the treatment of Japanese jailers she draws in her memoirs: "From the courtyard, along a dark, wet staircase, they lowered me into the basement. It was dark there, only a small light was on at the very door. there were black cages in the pit on both sides near the walls, and people were sitting close to each other on the floor in them. There was water on the stone floor. The police tore off my clothes, down to underwear, tore off my shoes and stockings. shrieked and ruffled my hair, the others laughed like jackals. They pushed me into solitary confinement and threw only my linen after me. there was a hole in the far corner - a bucket ...

Late in the evening, barefoot, they took me up the wet, dirty stairs to the office. I felt sick.

There were nine policemen in the office, one of them was a doctor who examined me and said: "Nothing will come of it." Then they dragged me into the pit again, only this time they threw some kind of bedding. I lay down and, choking, lost consciousness - they apparently discovered this. The doctor gave me six injections, and again they dragged me to the office, sick and broken.

On October 29, 1941, the American ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, commented in his diary on the arrest of the Sorge group:

"The Germans are not very enthusiastic about the new cabinet (led by General Tojo, who replaced Prince Konoe as prime minister on October 17. - B.S.). Their hopes for a decisively interventionist government, which they counted on after the resignation of Konoe, did not materialize. feelings were especially cooled by the arrest of two Germans immediately after the new cabinet took office.

During a search of the houses of the main members of the group, documents testifying to espionage activities were found on everyone, starting with Sorge himself, which subsequently made it easy to decipher all the radio messages. The first radiogram was intercepted in 1937. Since then, messages have been intercepted regularly. However, the Japanese were unable to decipher any of the intercepted radiograms. Only after radio operator Max Clausen gave out everything he knew about encryption codes at the very first interrogation, the Japanese were able to decipher and read the entire collection of intercepted reports over several years. These reports appeared in the materials of the investigation, and on them the defendants gave their

explanations.

At first, Sorge strongly denied all the accusations, demanded a meeting with the ambassador and obtained a promise to arrange it on October 25. But when physical evidence and the extensive testimony of Max Clausen were presented to him, he broke down. This is evidenced by the Japanese prosecutor Yoshikawa, who was observing the case: "Sorge, who was arrested on October 18, strongly denied the charges against him.

On October 24, Sorge met with the German ambassador and therefore sought to obtain a confession from him ... On October 24, Ohashi (assistant police inspector who interrogated Sorge. - B.S.) reported to his superiors that

there was an opportunity to get a confession, and the next day it was confirmed, and 12-13

Human...

To obtain a confession, violence was not used against Sorge. He was presented with physical evidence and demanded their explanation. So at the end of the first week, he confessed...

At about four o'clock in the afternoon, on Saturday, I, along with my colleague Tamasawa and a police officer, went to see him to find out if his health allowed him to continue the interrogation. At this time, he confessed. Before confessing, he asked for paper and a pencil. Then, taking a piece of paper, he wrote the following in German: "I have been a communist since 1925 and continue to be so to this day." He gave me this note. After that, he took off his jacket and, standing up, said loudly: "Since I became a communist, I have never been defeated, now I have lost for the first time." Having said this, Sorge began to cry. Then ... he agreed to start interrogations on Monday."

Most likely, Sorge was really not beaten during interrogations. Still, he was a subject of the allied Germany, easily accessible to the ambassador, and the evidence against him was already through the roof.

In his testimony, Richard tried to take most of the blame on himself in order to alleviate the plight of others. And he tried to call by name only those who were already named by other members of the group or who were already outside the territories occupied by Japanese troops. And he asked not to touch the "girl from the cafe", his Japanese mistress, who had nothing to do with his work. Upon learning that Ozaki betrayed him, Sorge said: "A Japanese remains a Japanese."

The investigators gave Sorge a typewriter, on which he typed written explanations in German on various issues. "When Sorge finished a chapter or section of his testimony," one of the investigators recalled after the war, "he read them to me, and after making amendments or additions at my request, he handed over what was written to me. These testimony were written by Sorge in one copy. They were added to the case as material evidence. Regarding their authorship, Sorge later stated: "I wrote them according to the request of the prosecutor and on the topic proposed by him.

As for the content, it depended on my will, and I did not meet any restrictions here. "In addition to them, there were interrogation protocols signed by Sorge, made in Japanese and translated into German. This is how the intelligence notes" Guremsky notes appeared, which sometimes also call him "memoirs", but very peculiar.

The most persistent was Branko Vukelic. The investigator noted: "Vukelich has absolutely no desire to repent." Also, the American General Willoughby remarked about Vukelich: "He had great courage, because even in the most detailed accusatory materials that have survived, it is impossible to find any detailed information about his work. His early death in prison also proves that he remained firm ... "

Eigen Ott was outraged to the core. As soon as he learned about the arrest of his friend and assistant, on October 23 he sent the following message to Berlin: "The local long-term representative of the Frankfurter Zeitung, Richard Sorge, and another subject of the German Reich, Max Clausen, were arrested by the Japanese police on suspicion of maintaining allegedly

ties hostile to the state. At the same time, a number of Japanese were arrested, one of whom allegedly was close to the circle of supporters of the former Prime Minister Prince Konoe ... It can be assumed that this is an act of revenge or an intrigue into which Sorge was entangled. As is known here, the hostile group still has great influence in the police and among the bureaucracy of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, in connection with which, in the circumstances of the Sorge case, intentions hostile to Germany cannot be ruled out.

Ott demanded a meeting with Richard, and also that he be acquainted with the materials of the preliminary investigation. The appointment was received - however, only for five minutes. The arrested person was categorically forbidden to touch upon the circumstances of his case in the conversation. The visitors' questions were first translated into Japanese, and only then, with the permission of the investigator, Sorge could answer. "He was badly shaved," Ott later recalled, dressed in a prisoner's jacket and made a terrifying impression. Counsellor-envoy Cordt, who was present at the meeting, remembered something else: "He kept himself straight and gave the impression of a man in control of himself." It is forbidden for me to give you explanations," he answered our question. He did not express any desires, and also refused the services of a lawyer. ..."

Japanese investigators hardly doubted that Sorge transmitted information from Ozaki and other informants not only to Moscow, but also to the German embassy. However, they did not raise a scandal about this, so as not to spoil relations with Japan's main ally even more.

The German embassy was discouraged by the unexpected arrest of Sorge. Ott initially thought there had been a misunderstanding. The reaction at the embassy to what happened is indicated by a memo dated November 14, 1941, full of praises to Sorge, envoy Braun von Stumm, who was investigating at the German Foreign Ministry:

The German correspondent Richard Sorge, who had worked in Tokyo for the Frankfurter Zeitung since 1936, was arrested by the Japanese police on October 22, 1941, along with another Reich citizen named Max Clausen, on trumped-up charges of anti-Japanese ties.

Richard Sorge is a good connoisseur of Japan and a talented journalist; however, by the strict objectivity of his reports, in which he sometimes allowed himself to be criticized, he often incurred the dissatisfaction of the official circles of the host country. Based on the information received from the responsible German authorities in Tokyo, the suspicion that Sorge is accused of involvement in communist activities should be considered a delusion. According to Ambassador Ott, who knows Sorge closely, this action is a political intrigue, since Sorge received some secret information about the state of Japanese-American negotiations, which have the status of state secrets.

Until now, it is not allowed to conduct any conversations with the arrested, except for a short formal visit by Ambassador Ott. Despite constant efforts by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the prosecutor's office still refuses to provide an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the available evidence and the illegal activities of the accused. How

It is said that a large number of Japanese have also been arrested in connection with this incident."

Ott, realizing that friendship with a man who turned out to be an enemy intelligence agent, completely compromises him, tries to convince Berlin that Sorge was a victim of the intrigues of the Japanese police. But the Abwehr resident in the Far East, Ivar Lissner, based on Japanese materials, made an unequivocal conclusion: Sorge is a Soviet spy.

At the end of November, Ott also received a letter from the prosecutor's office with a brief summary of the investigation data, which noted: "The suspected Richard Sorge joined the German Communist Party in November 1919 in Hamburg ..."

Sorge emphasized that he worked mainly not for military intelligence, but for the Comintern. He claimed that the Fourth Directorate ensured his work only technically. Thus, he sought to avoid transferring his case to the conduct of military counterintelligence.

Ott demanded to provide "material evidence" and sent the data provided by the Japanese to Berlin. Already in the midst of the scandal, Ott wrote to Ribbentrop that the Japanese authorities still treated him: "The Prime Minister invited me, when I conveyed my New Year's greetings to him, to a family meeting; his wife still works closely with my wife in the organization assistance to Japanese soldiers. As before, I am invited by members of the cabinet to dinners in a narrow circle ... ". But that was just diplomatic courtesy. After Sorge was exposed, the German ambassador hopelessly lost face in the eyes of the Japanese. And when it became clear how much information Sorge, and therefore the Kremlin, received from the German ambassador and military attaches, Japanese officials and diplomats became more and more cautious in contacts with their German colleagues. According to the head of the German Far East Economic Mission, Helmut Wohlthath, Ott "tried to stay in his post as long as possible," despite the obvious unwillingness of the Japanese to deal with him. But Ott was recalled only a year later.

On November 23, 1942, he received a top secret telegram from Berlin marked "in his own hands, to decipher personally." Ribbentrop wrote: "According to various signs, the Sorge case caused a strong resonance in the Japanese authorities, the consequences of which affected the attitude of these authorities towards your person. After a thorough study of the issue, the Fuhrer decided to agree with my proposal regarding changes in the leadership of the embassy in Tokyo and recall you foreign relations for a new appointment. Ambassador to Nanjing Stamer has been chosen as your successor. I ask you to get him an agr...

Your safety when returning to Germany... at this time... cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, I ask you to remain in Japan as a private person for the time being. Funds needed



for the maintenance of a house befitting you in a quiet place suitable for you and for maintaining a material level corresponding to the position you have held until now, will be provided to you. It goes without saying that you should refrain from any political activity during your continued stay in Japan."

The problem was that Ott, once the US and Germany were at war, was hard to replace. Wasn't real

the opportunity to send a diplomat from Germany to replace him.

Joachim von Ribbentrop

In the end, Ott was replaced from January 1943 by Heinrich Georg Stahmer, who was sent to Tokyo back in 1940 as a special envoy to Tokyo to conclude the Tripartite Pact, and in October became the German ambassador to the puppet, pro-Japanese government of China. Ott also remained in China until the end of the war, since he had no opportunity to travel to Germany. Perhaps if the Sorge group had been exposed earlier, in 1940 or early 1941, and Ott had managed to return to Germany before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, taking into account his anti-Nazi sentiments, the general would have had a big chance to take part in anti-Hitler conspiracy and be hanged along with other conspirators. So the fact that Sorge lasted so long may have saved Ott's life.

When Ribbentrop suggested to Ott that he stay in the Far East until the end of the war, he apparently acted with Hitler's consent. It was almost impossible to deliver Ott to Germany at that moment. All the countries through which he could leave Japan were at war with Germany. The seas were dominated by the American and British fleets. On any passenger ship, Ott would sooner or later be arrested by the Allies. It remained to send a submarine for the ex-ambassador, which, however, also did not guarantee safety: the boat could be sunk.

Most importantly, Hitler probably decided that it would be better for the submariners to take more natural rubber and other raw materials scarce in Germany on the return flight, and not the ambassador general who had gone wrong. Ribbentrop already had an overabundance of high-ranking diplomats as more and more countries broke off diplomatic relations with the Third Reich. At the front, a general who had no modern combat experience would have been of no use. Hardly anyone would take the risk

entrust Ott with command of the division. It remained to attach him to some clerical position in the War Ministry. But it would be too expensive to send a submarine for such a "specialist". Obviously, the fact that Ott remained in the Far East suited both himself and his superiors in Berlin.

Ott moved from Japan to China and remained there until the end of the war. He was a defense witness at the Tokyo trials of major Japanese war criminals, including the case of former ambassadors Oshima and

Shiratori, but chose to meet with the defendants' lawyers in Nanjing and give affidavits rather than go to the trial himself.

Sorge was arrested on October 18, 1941. But only on May 17, 1942, the Minister of Justice of Japan issued the first official statement on the Sorge case - a mean message listing the names of those arrested. In the questionnaire in the personal file of Sorge, the phrase appeared: "According to the NKVD, he was shot by the Japanese in 1942." Obviously, the Chekists and intelligence officers were guided by Soviet practice, when spies were shot shortly after the verdict was passed.

In January 1942, a second wave of arrests took place in the Sorge case, based on the testimony of those under investigation who were arrested in October 1941. In total, 35 people were arrested in the case of the Sorge group, but only 18 were brought to trial, of which one died before reaching the verdict. The inquiry lasted until May 1942. The investigation into the grandfather "Ramsay" was conducted first by officials of the Japanese secret police, and then by the prosecutor's office. On May 16, 1942, formal charges were brought against the first 7 defendants: Sorge, Ozaki, Max Clausen, Vukelic, Miyagi, Saionji and Inukai. The rest were charged later. In June 1942, the cases of 18 accused were sent to the Tokyo District Criminal Court. However, before the court hearings began, Sorge and the rest of the accused were subjected to repeated interrogations for six months - now by the judges. Sorge was interrogated by Judge Kazuo Nakamura. His interrogations ended on December 15, 1942. The interrogations of the other defendants continued.

In Prison Notes, summing up the activities of the residency, Sorge gave examples of his predictions that came true: "(1) I first predicted that the Japanese-Chinese conflict would drag on terribly and weaken Japan to such an extent that she would no longer be able to recover; (2) during the events at Khalkhin Gol, I was firmly convinced that Japan had no intention of starting a war with the USSR) (3) and in the summer of 1941 put forward the version that the general mobilization in Japan was not directed primarily against the USSR " .

All these predictions have indeed come true. Sorge sought to prove that by doing so he did not cause any damage to Japan with his activities. But this did not save "Ramsay" from the death sentence.

The court hearings began on May 31, 1943. The case of each defendant was considered separately by three judges. Each defendant received a separate sentence. The sentences for the main defendants were handed down on September 29, 1943. Sorge and Ozaki were sentenced to death by hanging. Vukelich and Clausen - to life imprisonment, Anna Clausen - to seven years in prison. Saionji Kinkazu, son of Prince Saionji Kimmochi, got off the lightest of all the other convicts, receiving a 1.5 year suspended sentence.

sentence for 2 years. Tokutaro Yasuda received 2 years with a 5-year deferment. Inukai Ken escaped trial by being released from detention in May 1942. Iotoku Miyagi died in prison of tuberculosis on August 2, 1943, before his sentencing, and Yoshio Kawamura died on December 15, 1942. In December 1943, three more sentences were handed down: Shigeo Mizuno (13 years old), Fusako Kuzumi (8 years old) and Tomo Kitabayashi (5 years old).

In January-February 1944, the remaining members of the group were convicted: Yoshinobu Koshiro (15 years old), Uganda Taguchi (13 years old), Masazane Yamana (12 years old), Sumio Funakoshi (10 years old), Teikichi Kawai (10 years old), Koji Akiyama (7 years old) and Hachiro Kikuchi (2 years old).

Sorge said in court: "Japanese laws are subject to interpretation, and they can be interpreted either broadly or literally. And although the leakage of information may, strictly speaking, be punishable by law, in the practice of the Japanese judicial system, the issues of keeping secrets are not jurisdictional ... I believe that the indictment did not pay enough attention to our activities and the nature of the information we collect. The data that ... (one of my agents. - B. S.) received was neither secret nor important. He brought me only news that was well known to any international correspondent ... What could be called information of a political nature was obtained by Ozaki and I. I received information at the German embassy, but here, too, I believe that only a small part of it could be classified as state secrets. It was given to me voluntarily, and in obtaining it, I did not resort to any strategy for which I should be punished. I did not use lies or force ... I very much trusted the information which was intended ... for use in the German General Staff, and I am convinced that the Japanese government, communicating some information to the German embassy, took into account the possibility of leakage ... Even the information that Ozaki considered important and secret was no longer such, because he received it indirectly, only after it had left the secret source."

At first, Sorge did not want to appeal, but then he did it, just like Ozaki. In the Clausen case, an appeal was filed by the prosecutor, who demanded the death penalty for the radio operator. According to Clausen, the verdict was approved in its original form.

They were kept in the Sugamo Prison. Doctor Tokutaro Yasuda, who was arrested in the Sorge case, left a description of prison procedures. "At six o'clock in the morning, we get up. An hour later, a check. The door of the cells opens. Three jailers ask: is he alive? The prisoner must meet them, bowing down on the floor. Next - breakfast: a handful of rice or barley, a cup of soup. Lunch and dinner from rotten products I had to buy with my own money. If the relatives of the prisoner were poor, he did not receive anything. In the afternoon - a walk ... "

True, according to Clausen, there were some concessions to the Europeans. So, the Japanese were taken for interrogation in shackles, and only handcuffs were put on Clausen.

Translated during interrogations of European members of the residency Yoshitoshi Ikoma, Professor of German Studies. The mode of interrogation was liberal, and during the breaks the defendant could easily communicate with an interpreter. Ikoma recalled: "We talked with Dr. Sorge on

a variety of topics, but mainly about the war between Germany and the Soviet Union; Apparently, this interested him most of all. If the Soviet troops gained the upper hand, as was the case at the final stage of the Battle of Stalingrad, he came into a good mood, became more talkative. Otherwise, he looked overwhelmed and was very stingy with words. He was a great friend of the Soviet Union. Dr. Sorge was a born journalist with the character of a seeker

adventures ... I know for sure that after the death sentence was announced, he wrote in his diary: "I will die as a loyal soldier of the Red Army."

Sorge was charged with espionage, which he denied, arguing as follows: "The Soviet Union does not want any political conflicts or military clashes with other countries, and first of all with Japan. It also does not intend to attack Japan. Therefore, we - I and members of my group - did not come to Japan as enemies of this country. The meaning that is usually attached to the word "shion" has nothing to do with us. Spies from countries such as England or the United States are trying to identify weaknesses in politics, economics and defense Japan and attack them accordingly. We, on the contrary, in the process of collecting information in Japan had absolutely no such intentions ... "

On January 20, 1944, the Supreme Court rejected Sorge's cassation complaint under the formal pretext that this complaint was delivered to the Supreme Court one day later than the deadline. On April 5, 1944, Ozaki's death sentence was upheld, although his appeal was filed on time.

Asanum's lawyer, who defended Richard at the trial, recalled: "Sorge is a heroic man. He did not say anything without humor, he was very responsive, and when he laughed, he looked like a loving father."

M.I. Ivanov recalled: "On November 6, 1944, our embassy in Tokyo gave a reception on the occasion of the October celebrations, and for the first time in the days of the war, a high official appeared on it - Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, foxes that the world had never seen. During a conversation with the Soviet ambassador, I .A. Malik, next to whom I was standing, he spoke at length about the fact that there had never been military conflicts between our countries, except for 1904 "1905, showed friendliness in every possible way, ornately talked about Japanese nobility. He was expecting something from us, I clearly felt it. If we had put in a word for Sorge, the execution would most likely not have taken place the next day. But who empowered us? But there were options. Several Japanese spies were arrested in the Soviet Union... Yes, and the Japanese side, it seems, wanted and expected this: for more than two years it did not carry out the death sentence pronounced on Richard back in 1942.

I.V. Stalin

But the USSR NKID and the embassy in Tokyo kept silent ...

Shigemitsu stamped his feet in puzzlement and bowed to us.

The next day - at 10 am on November 7, 1944 - Sorge was executed ... "

Of course, the Minister of Foreign Affairs could have been at the reception not to probe the possibility of an exchange of Sorge, but to probe much more important issues. In November 1944, the defeat of both Germany and Japan was no longer in doubt. And the Japanese government, with the help of Moscow, tried to negotiate a compromise peace with the United States and Britain and avoid unconditional surrender. The Japanese were ready to give Stalin both South Sakhalin, and the Kuriles, and

Manchuria. But Stalin was counting on all of China and all of Korea, and if he was lucky, even Hokaido.

According to Leopold Treppera, during his stay in the Lubyanka prison, he was told by his cellmate, General Tominaga Kyoji, that the Japanese offered Stalin to exchange Sorge, which Stalin did not agree to. However, this information is not confirmed by other sources and is most likely a fantasy of either Trepper or a Japanese general. In fact, there is no evidence that the Japanese ever raised the issue of an exchange. Such an exchange would be completely out of samurai tradition. And it's not that the Japanese did not have their own especially valuable agents who failed in the USSR. From the point of view of the bushido code, a samurai who surrendered to the enemy alive lost face, and no one would have thought to rescue him. From the Soviet side, too, there were no attempts to exchange Sorge. On the one hand, he violated the code of conduct for advisers in captivity and admitted that he worked for Moscow. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders knew, at least from the conflict at Khalkhin Gol, how the Japanese treated prisoners, their own and others, and could understand that it was useless to ask them for an exchange.

Sorge was accused as an agent of the Comintern and military intelligence in Japan.

Due to fears that his case might be transferred to the Kempeitai military police, Sorge at the very beginning of the investigation, when he had just begun to testify, emphasized the fact that he worked in China and Japan for the Comintern, and not at all for Soviet military intelligence, which he recognized as a purely technical body, facilitating the transfer of his information to the Comintern and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Sorge testified that he worked for the Comintern while in Japan, he "carried out communist work", while maintaining ties with the staff of the Soviet embassy. The police and the prosecutor's office sought to accuse those arrested of violating the law "On the maintenance of public order", which allowed the Japanese authorities to conduct an investigation in a simplified manner. After the end of the investigation, a brief message about this appeared in a special bulletin of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Japan on May 17, 1942, emphasizing that the group worked for the Comintern, and the Soviet Union and its intelligence agencies were not even mentioned. This was done due to the fact that Japan at that moment was waging decisive battles in the South Seas zone and was interested in maintaining neutrality by the Soviet Union. Therefore, Tokyo was not interested in unwinding a spy scandal with Moscow. Although the Japanese understood that the Comintern was nothing more than an appendage of the Soviet Communist Party, it was formally considered an international organization that had no direct relationship to the USSR. Sorge's version that he worked for the Comintern, and cooperated with military intelligence only on purely technical issues, suited the Japanese government, which did not want the deterioration of Soviet-Japanese relations. Another thing is that Sorge could not completely deny the connection with the intelligence of the Red Army, since Clausen spoke about it. The Japanese counterintelligence officers, who received the materials that the Sorge group collected, were well aware that the government of the USSR and the command of the Red Army were the main consumer of information, but they were not going to catch the head of the group in a lie. Sorge, on the other hand, insisted on the version of the Comintern, so as not to fall under the law "On the Maintenance of Public Order", which made it possible to conduct an investigation and trial under a simplified procedure with guaranteed death sentences for him and the rest of the group. But the Japanese were in no hurry with the investigation, trying as fully as possible to establish the volume and nature of the information transmitted by the Sorge group.

Soviet intelligence agencies have established that the Japanese arrested Sorge, who is actively cooperating with the investigation. In January 1942, the state security agencies tried to establish the affiliation of the arrested to the Comintern, in connection with which a request was sent to the head of the INO NKVD P.M. Fitin to the head of the Comintern - Georgy Dimitrov:

"One of the Germans arrested in Tokyo, a certain SORGE (HORGE), testified that he had been a member of the Communist Party since 1919, joined the party in Hamburg. In 1925 he was a delegate at the Congress of the Comintern in Moscow, after which he worked in the Information Bureau of the ECCI. In He was sent to China in 1930. He left China for Germany and joined the National Socialist Party to cover his work as a police officer of the Comintern. carried out communist work, in Tokyo he kept in touch with the Soviet

employees ZAYTSEV and BUTKEVICH. Please let me know how true this information is.

Sorge's testimony about the work in Japan of his extensive intelligence network for the Comintern played a significant role in the defeat of the Communist Party of Japan. In all territories controlled by Japan, Japanese communists were arrested.

After the failure of the Soviet residency, headed by Richard Sorge, the intelligence of the USSR did not have undercover sources of information in Japan until the end of the war.

execution

Ozaki wrote the story of his cooperation with Soviet intelligence, but in a completely different way - as a story of the fall. "Now I am awaiting the final verdict. I am quite well aware of the importance of the laws that I have broken ... Going out into the street, living among friends, even after many years have passed, is no longer possible both from the point of view of my conscience and from the point of view of in terms of my capabilities and strengths ... I am happy at the thought that I was born and will die in this, my country ... "

During his imprisonment, he wrote 250 letters to his wife and daughter. 73 letters were then published and made up a book, which was published under the title: "Love is like a shooting star."

"My love for my family manifested itself as an unexpectedly powerful force ... at first, reading my wife's letters was so painful for me that I could not look at the photo of my child. Sometimes I sobbed, sometimes resentment overwhelmed me, and I thought how much everything it would be easier if I didn't have a family... Professional revolutionaries shouldn't have families..."

He also wrote: "I am not a coward, and I am not afraid of death."

Under Japanese law at the time, prisoners were only allowed to correspond with close relatives,

located in Japan. Sorge, like the Clausen spouses, had no such relatives and was deprived of the right to correspond. However, after the death sentence, Sorge and Ozaki were allowed to write suicide notes, and both took advantage of this permission. According to the former head of the prison, S. Ichijima, he read Ozaki's voluminous suicide notes and sent them to the Ministry of Justice, making a copy for himself. This copy survived, and the original burned down along with other materials in the building of the Ministry of Justice. Obviously, Sorge's suicide notes were burned. The head of the prison, not knowing the German language, could not make a copy of them. Therefore, the last notes of Sorge are known only from the memoirs of Professor Ikoma.

In 2004, documents describing the execution of Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge and his closest assistant Hotsumi Ozaki were discovered in Japan. Photos of four leaflets describing the execution of two death sentences were published on November 7, 1944 by the Asahi newspaper. They were accidentally found in one of the secondhand bookshops in Tokyo by the researcher of the group's activities, Zorge Tomil Watabe, among the old documents of the headquarters of the US occupation forces. According to Watabe, this find puts an end to a series of speculations about the last minutes

the life of an outstanding intelligence officer. An extract from the "Registration Book of the Execution of Death Sentences in Ichigaya Prison and Tokyo Sugamo Prison for 1932-1945", in particular, states: "The head of Ichijima Prison, after checking the name and age of the convict, informed him; of justice, the sentence will be executed on that day and he is expected to meet death calmly. The head of the prison asked if the condemned would like to add anything to his will, drawn up earlier, regarding his body and personal belongings. Sorge replied: "My the will remains as I wrote it." The chief asked: "Do you want to say anything else?" Sorge replied: "No, nothing more." After this conversation, Sorge turned to the prison officials present and repeated: "I thank you for your kindness." Then he was taken to the execution chamber. In accordance with the will of the executed, as well as article 73, paragraph 2 and article 181 of the prison regulation, the body was buried in a common grave."

The execution of Sorge took place on November 7, 1944 at 10.20. At 10:36 he was declared dead. Sorge's heart beat for another 8 minutes. Earlier, at 09:33, Ozaki was poveted, declared dead at 09:51.

Nothing was reported in the press about it. The Japanese authorities, except for the statement of May 17, 1942, did not give any information about the Sorge case.

Richard did not speak Japanese well, but the last phrase was said in Japanese, and not in Russian or German: "Sekigun (Red Army)! Ko bite kyosanto (Comintern)! Sobieto kyosanto (Soviet Communist Party)!"

Sorge was buried in the courtyard of the Sugamo prison, and in 1967 the urn with the ashes was reburied at the Tama cemetery in Tokyo, with military honors being given. Sorge was reburied in this cemetery by his Japanese wife Ishii Hanako. It was she who discovered and identified the remains of Sorge - according to the marks of three wounds on his legs, glasses, a buckle on his belt and gold crowns.

On the gravestone of Sorge is a slab of polished black marble with an inscription in Russian: "Hero of the Soviet Union Richard Sorge", an image of a medal and a laurel branch. Below is an inscription in Japanese, on the left and right - granite slabs describing the life of Sorge and with the names and dates of death of his associates. Hanako visited Sorge's grave until her death in 2000 and was buried next to him.

BEHIND.

No. : Hanako Ishii, the Japanese wife of Richard Sorge, with German journalists at the grave of a Soviet intelligence officer in Tama. 1964

Not all of Sorge's associates survived World War II. Miyagi and Kawamura died before the trial. Branko Vukelic was sent to the Abashiri concentration camp on the island of Hokkaido, the coldest place in the Japanese islands. In the summer of 1944, he saw his wife and son again. Then there were only letters. "Don't worry about my health," Branco wrote on January 8, 1945, a few days before his death. "I can stand the cold much better than I expected. (But my handwriting is getting worse from it than usual.) waited so long, finally installed; with her appearance, I immediately imagined a picture: "We are together. Sukiyaki is fried. The child is sleeping. There is a fire in the stove ... it is warm as it is now ... Please tell our little boy how glad I was about his letter. "On January 13, Vukelich died in the camp from pneumonia. Isiko decided to bury her in the Christian church where she and Branko got married. The priest agreed, but for now he took the urn home. The next day, the priest's house, along with the owner and the urn, were destroyed by American bombs.

Kitabayashi Tomo died on September 2, 1945, 2 days after being released from prison. Sumio Funakoshi died in prison on February 27, 1945. Shigeo Mizuno died on March 22, 1945 in Sendai Prison.

Sugamo Prison in 1945

Clausen continued to be held in Sugamo Prison after the trial. At that time, the Americans were already bombing Tokyo. The Japanese jailers took revenge on the European in their own way: during the bombings, the cells of the Japanese prisoners were unlocked so that they could take refuge in the prison yard, but this rule did not apply to Max. He recalled: "During one of the raids, I almost died. At the same time, it was as dark as night in my cell at three o'clock in the afternoon ... Thousands of incendiary bombs rained down from the sky. Acrid smoke penetrated into my cell. burning and smoldering pieces of wood, must have been fragments of houses that once stood nearby. I barely had time to put out the burning mats on the floor ... "Then Max was transferred to a hard labor prison on the island of Hondo, in a stone solitary underground, where there were not even straw mats. Once a day they gave a cup of rice and twice a week - a piece of bread. Once a month - a bath, all communication with anyone was prohibited. They don't live in such prisons for a long time, especially Europeans, but the war was already drawing to a close, and Max survived. The Americans released him from prison. He was in a terrible state, he suffered from beriberi and furunculosis, not to mention the fact that he was sick in general - but alive. For the fourth time, he managed to cheat death. First,



what Max asked about was the fate of his wife. He was told that the prison where Anna was kept had been bombed. But she also survived.

..The women's prison was gradually emptying - Japanese prisoners were evacuated. Finally, Anna was left alone in the whole block. They began to bring her every little food, and to top it off, the neighboring cell was turned into a morgue, as if there was no other place in the empty prison. But she did not complain, realizing that it was complaints from her that were expected. Once a bomb fell very close, the ceiling partially collapsed, the door was blocked. Anna spent three days in the destroyed cell until it was dug up. When he and Max met, they did not recognize each other. But despite

for all illnesses and hardships, it was they who were lucky - after the war, Max and Anna Clausen, who were once again baptized, this time in Christiansen, lived in Germany until old age, and in 1964, when Sorge's glory began in the USSR and the countries of the Soviet bloc, they were allowed to become Christiansen-Clausen.

#### Posthumous glory

The Americans, having occupied Japan in September 1945, gained access to the documents of the Japanese special services, including those relating to Richard Sorge and his group. These documents are not completely preserved. Some of them burned down during fires during one of the strongest US air raids on Tokyo, carried out on March 10, 1945 (334 B-29 aircraft took part in the raid). On the basis of these documents, Major General Willoughby, the head of the Tokyo Department of Military Intelligence (C-2) of the US occupation forces in Japan, compiled a report and sent it to Washington, with recommendations to use it in military schools to study Soviet intelligence officers. In August 1951, the secret report of the Charles Willoughby Commission was presented to Congress. In 1952, the general wrote a book about the Sorge case, which became a bestseller. With her, the world fame of "Ramsay" began. But in the Soviet Union, he had to wait another 12 years for recognition.

The complete original of the "Prison Notes" in German, as well as other original documents in the Sorge case, have not been preserved. All of them burned down along with the building of the Ministry of Justice during a massive US strategic air raid on Tokyo on March 7, 1945. Then all the originals of Sorge's scientific and journalistic works, including the manuscript of the monograph "History of the Diplomacy of Modern Japan", also perished. Sorge's multi-volume library, confiscated by the Japanese police during his arrest, also burned down.

All this was established immediately after the war by officers of the headquarters of the American occupation forces. Then it turned out that there were copies of the court and investigative materials in Japanese, which were taken out in advance from Tokyo to Kofu, Yamanashi Prefecture. The Americans immediately classified all these materials. In the US, they were declassified in 1983 and published five years later.

The authenticity of Sorge's memoirs to the Americans was confirmed under oath by the prosecutor M. Yoshikawa and Professor E. Ikoma involved in the Sorge case, who translated the document from German in February - April 1942. Moreover, the Americans found 24 pages of a typewritten original of Sorge's notes with the author's edits, by accident

preserved in the personal file of Yoshikawa, who led the investigation into this case. Yoshikawa handed over the text to the headquarters of the American occupying forces and confirmed in writing that this was part of the notes written and corrected by Sorge in his own presence and handed over to him in the investigation room of the Tokyo prison in October - November 1941.

Sorge's "prison notes" immediately after being translated into Japanese were published in the classified materials of the Ministry of Justice: the first section in February 1942, and the second in April 1942. Data copies of Publication No. 191 (first section) and No. 189

(second section) were discovered by the Americans in vaults outside of Tokyo. They, along with 24 pages of the original notes and Yoshikawa's statement, were returned by the Americans to the Japanese side in 1952. These materials were republished under the heading "top secret" by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1953 and the Public Security Administration in November 1953. In 1957, these documents were published without changes by the General Police Directorate and, after declassification, were included in the open edition.

Sorge was only allowed to correct obvious typos, he did not have the opportunity to review the previously written material and edit it. Therefore, there are repetitions, inconsistencies, and individual inaccuracies in the text. In addition, some errors could occur when translating from German into Japanese.

In the late 50s, the book of the former German diplomat Hans Otto Meissner, *The Man with Three Faces*, dedicated to Sorge, fell into the hands of the French film director Yves Champi. The former 3rd Secretary of the German Embassy in Tokyo released it in 1955. By the title, Meissner hinted that Sorge was addressed to Germany, Russia and Japan. Meisner worked at the embassy in Tokyo at the time Sorge lived there. In 1961, Ciampi released his film "Who are you, Dr. Sorge?", where Meisner played himself, acting as a narrator. The film strengthened the worldwide fame of Sorge.

But in the USSR they did not want to buy the film, at first the Minister of Culture E.A. Furtseva, and then the chairman of the Cinematography Committee A.V. Romanov. But at the last of the views, a KGB officer happened to be, who reported to the authorities, N.S. Zakharov, deputy chairman of the KGB, that the film is good. He recalled:

"Immediately I called A. Romanov:

\_ Well, Alexey Vladimirovich, how is the film?

- You know, Nikolai Stepanovich, in my opinion, Furtseva was right that she refused to buy it. It has many serious shortcomings and there are fragments that are not customary to show.

- And they report to me that the film is good. Let's do this: I'll take the tape and show it to the leadership of the KGB. If you like the film, we will show it to the members of the Politburo on Saturday.

The film was approved by the KGB of the USSR. I asked the head of N. Khrushchev's personal security, Colonel Litovchenko, to acquaint Nikita Sergeevich with the annotation of the film, I picked up several employees, excellent

who spoke French, supplied them with our miniature special devices for simultaneous translation, and by 19 o'clock they were in the Reception House, where films were shown. Soon members of the Politburo and secretaries of the PC gathered... Tea was served to everyone and a list of ten films ready for demonstration was distributed. There was no tape about Sorge in it. The audience began to discuss what to see today, when suddenly Nikita Sergeevich suggested:

- But Zakharov recommends a film about the intelligence officer Sorge. Maybe we'll see?

Everyone, of course, agreed. During the session, the silence in the hall was deathly. When the film ended, everyone went out into the lobby and surrounded Khrushchev.

- Well, how's the movie? asked Nikita Sergeevich. In response - expectant silence.

-I think it's a good movie. For example, I liked ... Zakharov, - Nikita Sergeevich turned to me, - tell Romanov that we have approved the film. It needs to be bought, translated into Russian, individual episodes corrected and put on the big screen ... "

Soon the leadership of the KGB and the GRU offered to reward the members of the Ramsay group, which was fully understood by Khrushchev. A commission was created in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff under the leadership of Major General A.F. Kositsyn to study the materials on the Sorge case. The materials of this commission included, in addition to archival documents, references and memoirs of people who knew and worked with Richard Sorge. In 1964, the GRU commission came to the unequivocal conclusion that Sorge was not a double agent, and therefore there are no obstacles to his "canonization". Many memories of "Ramsay" preserved in the GRU Archive are dated October 1964. The Pravda newspaper on September 4, 1964 published an article about Richard Sorge. In it, he was described as a hero who was the first to receive reliable information about the preparations for the German invasion. After that, he warned Stalin many times about the impending catastrophe hanging over the USSR. "However, Stalin paid no attention to this and other similar reports," the article said.

#### Monument to R. Sorge in Moscow

At the top, it was decided to award Sorge the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and to award the rest of the group with military orders, some, like Sorge, posthumously. True, when on November 5, 1964, the decree on conferring the title of Hero on the scout was signed by the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Anastas Mikoyan, it was no longer Nikita Khrushchev, but Leonid Brezhnev who was in power, but his assessment of Sorge did not differ from Khrushchev's.

Ya.G. Bronin wrote: "I think it's time to speak publicly about the intelligence figures who died during the personality cult. All of them have been rehabilitated, but since they worked in such a field as intelligence, we don't say anything about them in the newspapers ... Sorge now it has become, as it were, a symbol of the courage of the Soviet intelligence officer. A mass of people, especially

youth, craves materials about him. I think that there is a direct need to write our Soviet book about Sorge."

Undoubtedly, at the end of the "thaw", when the decision was made to "canonize" Sorge, the fact that he represented the Comintern and military intelligence, and not the sinister NKVD, played a big role.

In 1964, the GRU commission opposed the publication of "Ramsay's" testimony during the investigation, although it recognized that their giving was not a violation of professional duty, much less treason. Indeed, at the moment when Sorge testified, they were only of historical interest and could no longer harm anyone, even their author.

On September 6, 1998, the Japanese newspaper "Asahi" named Richard Sorge, a Soviet intelligence officer, historian and international journalist, among "a hundred people of the 20th century".

Richard Sorge remained the romanticist of the revolution. And this romanticism, mixed with a dose of healthy adventurism and a talent for analysis, helped him achieve outstanding success as a resident intelligence officer. In terms of the time and intensity of intelligence work, as well as the value of the military-political material he collected, Sorge is rightfully considered one of the most successful intelligence officers in the world. Sometimes he is even called "scout No. 1".

Richard, although he was engaged in purely secret activities, and even working for one of the totalitarian dictatorships, remained internally a very free person, and led a lifestyle that was considered reprehensible for ordinary Soviet intelligence officers. But he was unusual. We can say that Sorge was the most non-Soviet of the Soviet intelligence officers.